Domestic oil production output increased to 1.82 million barrels per day (mbpd) in the month of April 20191. According to the global oil cartel, OPEC, Nigeria’s crude oil production rose by 5.3%, from 1.7mbpd reported in March 2019. Although the increase likely suggests less disruptions to major oil pipelines in Nigeria and is considered necessary to meet fiscal obligations, it positions Nigeria as a non-compliant OPEC member. Essentially, while Nigeria attempts to gradually step up to producing close to the 2019 budget benchmark of 2.3mbpd to allow for adequate budget funding, the country reneges on the quota of 1.69mbpd signed under the OPEC supply cut agreement. With major investments being undertaken in the oil and gas sector such as Pan Ocean Oil Corporation Limited’s infrastructure projects in gas pipeline, gas processing plant, and early production facility, crude oil production is expected to rise in the coming months. With Nigeria’s production being a negligible component of OPEC’s total production, non-compliance to the agreement should not destabilize the oil market.
A total of ₦342.6 billion was generated internally as revenue by 35 states and the FCT in 2018Q41. The figure indicates a growth rate of 22.8% compared to ₦264.3 billion generated in the previous quarter. For the fiscal year, 2018, total IGR rose by 24.8% to ₦1.17 trillion, from ₦936.5 billion recorded in 2017. While only five states recorded a decline in the review quarter, 31 states recorded IGR growth. The overall IGR growth emanated from improvements in tax revenue as total tax revenue accounted for 77% of total IGR. By states, Lagos state led the pack with ₦382.2 billion at full year – representing 33% of all states’ IGR. Rivers followed closely with ₦112.8 billion, Ogun ₦84.6 billion, Delta ₦58.4 billion, and Kano with ₦44.1 billion. The growth in IGR implies more autonomy and less reliance on FAAC allocations, as well as a larger pool of funds for development needs. Efforts towards sub-national specialization and spatial integration that encourage economic specialization in states as well as inter-state trade such as building connective infrastructure and establishing special economic zones will prove useful in enhancing the IGR
The presence/extent of political will is a key determinant of the success or failure of policies. It is captured by the capability of political actors to achieve the implementation of policies which they prescribed or supported. Political will can be verbally expressed, observed through institutional changes, or demonstrated by budgetary commitments by state actors (Shiffman, 2007; Fox, Goldberg, Gore & Barnighausen, 2011).+ Importantly, the application of political will in achieving policy change usually involves other stakeholders, beyond state actors. Thus, the success in policymaking really depends on a complex interplay of varying degrees of interests, motivations, and beliefs; competencies and skills; coordination abilities and strategic decision-making; among many others.
In societies with huge governance and institutional deficits, political will can play an active role in navigating the challenges to achieve the desirable policy goal/change. However, political will has been generally weak in most societies in Africa, where several constraining factors limit the ability to genuinely move for policy change. In the absence of strong political will, the influence of non-state actors in providing policy support for social and political change becomes critical. In particular, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Trade Associations have been the driving force behind some of the policy decisions in Africa. These non-state actors are generally abreast of the issues the general public faces, and therefore they can mobilise action around issues that protect the interest of citizens.
So while the state bears the ultimate responsibility for effecting policy change, non-state actors may trigger political will, or support an existing one. The likelihood of political will effecting policy change(s) can well depend on the role played by these non-state actors. Following some tenets of Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba’s (1999) conceptual framework for political will for anti-corruption reforms, this piece highlights two indicators of political will: the locus of the initiative and the mobilisation of stakeholders. + It throws light on two separate instances where the influence of non-state actors can drive the build-up of political will for policy change – in tobacco taxes, and trade policies in Nigeria.
Tobacco use has been long proven to be hazardous to the health of both primary and secondary consumers. Governments across the world have made several efforts to curb the use of tobacco through measures such as taxation, publicising the dangers of tobacco smoking, banning use in public spaces, among others. While measures such as these are typically government-driven, non-state actors can play notable roles in shaping their design, implementation, and evaluation. Usually, the loci of initiative of tobacco control measures are government ministries, particularly the Health and Finance ones (see Danishevski et al., 2008; Tam and Walbeek, 2014; and Hoe et al., 2016).+ However, in Nigeria, the recent tobacco control legislation was mainly driven by CSOs, particularly the Nigerian Tobacco Control Alliance (NTCA) – the umbrella organisation dedicated to tobacco control in Nigeria.
NTCA consists of domestic civil society groups, research organisations, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), international organisations and professionals, and their activities are mostly donor funded – by Bloomberg Philanthropies and Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (CTFK). The Alliance mobilised diverse stakeholders and was able to effect the tobacco policy change by harnessing the respective competencies of the members – mostly through evidence-based research, advocacy, and awareness creation. This section provides chronological narrative of the key activities/events that led to the tobacco tax policy change.
As the targeted policy change was to increase excise taxes, evidence-based research became critical in the tobacco control campaign of the Alliance. A report by the Nigerian Tobacco Research Group (NTRG) revealed the tobacco industry was targeting children with promotions, advertisements and the sale of tobacco products around schools as part of their marketing strategy. With such evidence, and the increasing momentum towards tobacco control across the globe, the Alliance became more motivated to explore ways to discourage both tobacco consumption and initiation of use. This coincided with a period when the Nigerian government, particularly the Ministry of Finance, was exploring alternative sources of non-oil revenue. Taxation, which has been proven to be the most effective control measure, became the focus. The Alliance then reached out to the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA), which had conducted a study on tobacco tax simulations, to join the group in order to provide the much-needed evidence to inform their advocacy efforts.
The Alliance was notably vibrant in their advocacy for the tax increment, and were able to achieve buy-ins from the relevant stakeholders and the public. Reports, articles, and press releases highlighting the growing dominance of the tobacco industry in Nigeria, as well as their marketing strategies were released to the public. In addition, the Alliance educated the public in general and young people in particular on the dangers associated with tobacco use and second-hand smoking. It was revealed that tobacco use kills more than 7 million people globally each year, and developing countries like Nigeria will contribute 80 percent of these deaths by 2030 (World Bank, 2019).+ Furthermore, the potential impacts of substantial increments in tobacco tax on public health and the government revenue base were made known to the wider public.
As the momentum for reduced tobacco consumption and higher government revenue was building, a workshop of the Technical Working Group on Tobacco Control became the critical platform for the push for an increase in excise taxes on tobacco products. The workshop gathered policymakers and tobacco taxation experts from relevant government ministries and agencies including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Budget and Planning, and the Federal Inland Revenue Service; as well as from ECOWAS, CSOs, research institutes, and the media. The group noted that there were huge shortfalls in the tax rate at the time when compared to the WHO-recommended excise tax burden of 70 percent, and stressed the need for stronger tobacco control laws. They deliberated on the appropriate excise tax that would reduce tobacco consumption on one hand, and increase government revenue on the other (Win-Win), using evidence from tobacco tax simulations presented by research organisations.
Four months after the workshop, the Nigerian government announced a new tax policy for tobacco products and alcohol beverages. While the new policy maintains the current 20 percent ad valorem-based excise duty rate on tobacco products, it introduces an additional N58 (US$ 0.19) specific tax on a pack of cigarettes which will be implemented over three years (N20 in 2018; N20 in 2019; and N18 in 2020). Although the increment puts the excise tax burden at 16.4 percent, which is still way below the WHO-recommended excise tax burden of 70 percent, it signifies a major milestone in the campaign against tobacco use – a notable success.
In April 2014, the Nigerian government opted out of the EU-West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which comprises of the 15 ECOWAS states and Mauritania. The EU-West Africa EPA aims to facilitate free trade, greater regional integration, and economic development while, protecting infant industries in West Africa. The economic anchor of the Agreement is the immediate removal of 100 percent of the custom duties for West African goods entering into European Union member states, and the gradual removal of up to 75 percent of tariff lines for products from EU into West Africa. It is noteworthy to mention that most West African countries including Nigeria participated in the trade negotiations for about ten years, but Nigeria opted out after the negotiations had been finalised.
The Nigerian government opted out of signing the EPA for the principal reason that the CSOs, particularly trade unions, were not in support of the EPA. At the 2016 Plenary of the European Union Parliament in Strasbourg, France, President Buhari stated that “…the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and Associated Trade Unions, raised concerns over the negative impact of the EPAs on Nigeria’s industrialisation programme”. + The concerns centred around the potential negative impact of the EPA on the country’s revenue base and balance of payment position, noting that the influx of goods into the Nigerian market at a significantly reduced tariff would lead to losses in government revenue and increased imports. The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) which represents about 2,000 private and public companies, as well as the National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS), built the momentum against the Agreement by effectively mobilising stakeholders to provide evidence-based analyses, lobby key interest parties, and organise various media campaigns.
The core of the analyses is that on one hand, Nigeria will not benefit from the EPA, as the majority (95 percent) of its exports to the EU is oil and gas which is not subject to import duty; and that local manufacturers have limited capacity to produce and export industrial goods to the EU. On the other hand, EU countries will import cheaper finished products thereby rendering the existing manufacturing industries uncompetitive, and hindering the country’s ongoing industrialisation programme. As a result, Nigeria will continue to be an importer of processed goods, an exporter of unprocessed raw materials, and will suffer revenue losses. The coalition of organised private sector groups led by MAN, estimated that the revenue losses due to the tariff removal will amount to US$1.3 trillion.
In an attempt to legitimise their stance, MAN enlisted the support of prominent national and international figures and provided them the platform to engage with other stakeholders. At the 2015 general meeting of MAN, Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s former president, highlighted that signing the EPA had negative implications on the economies of African countries. Similarly, at the 2017 general meeting of MAN, Benjamin Mkapa, Tanzania’s former president stated that the Agreement is counterproductive. Nigeria’s former Minister of State for Finance, Ambassador Bashir Yuguda, in a discussion with MAN advised the government to reconsider its position towards the EPA.
The position of Nigeria’s organised private sector as well as the views of the prominent individuals were repeatedly published in major newspapers including The Guardian, Punch, Leadership and Thisday. Particularly, NANTS ran a periodic publication on EPA-related issues in its Regional Trade Advocacy Series in one of Nigeria’s major newspapers – the Vanguard. Interviews with CSO groups were also aired on leading TV channels and radio stations such as the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), African Independent Television (AIT), and Cool FM.
These aforementioned activities of MAN and NANTS resulted in a general disapproval of the EPA among industrialists and the working class. With the use of evidence-based studies, support from prominent individuals, and widespread dissemination activities, the civil society provided a clear and extensive review of the implications of signing the EPA, and narrowed the government’s options towards rejecting the Agreement.
The two instances presents some notable parallels that can explain how political will for policy change can be built, as well as the critical role of CSOs. In both cases, the composition of the Alliance or coalition was a key determinant of the successful outcome. The size and diversity of the Alliance improved the collective capacity of the group in making their claims, exerting influence, and achieving their overall aim. The inclusion of a wide array of actors such as CSOs, research organisations, and international partners in the NTCA brought together champions that could spearhead the group’s agenda; experts to provide evidence-based analyses, and donors to fund the group’s activities. Similarly, the large size of MAN (over 2,000 members) provided clout for the favourable results.
Despite the fact that both groups possessed a strong drive towards a specific policy stance, their motives seemed to have differed considerably. While the position of NTCA seemed to be driven by genuine disapproval for incessant tobacco use and the negative health implications, the agitation from MAN and NANTS was largely driven by their fear of competition from imported goods if the EPA was signed. Thus the NTCA were mostly anti-tobacco advocates aiming for a tobacco-free society, while MAN and NANTS were essentially trying to protect themselves from potentially harmful competition.
In both cases, the use of credible evidence that was able to demonstrate the magnitude of improvement in public health in the case of tobacco taxation, and the public revenue losses in the case of the EPA, played a critical role as a tool to drive the advocacy efforts. CSEA, a partner of the NTCA, conducted a study on tobacco tax simulations which showed that increments in line with the WHO-recommended tobacco tax rate would result in substantial improvements in public health and government revenue. Likewise, research by the MAN-led coalition concluded that the revenue losses to the government as a result of signing the EPA would be significant. However, the robustness of both evidence differs slightly. While the tobacco tax simulation model was detailed and robust, and has been applied in several countries, the limited information on how MAN arrived at the size of revenue losses makes the quality of the evidence debatable.+
The advocacy and outreach mechanisms in both cases were similar. The choice of media channels was strategic, and dissemination activities were persistent. Leading newspapers, TV stations and radio channels were utilised on a regular basis to share pertinent information. The ability to use diverse media outlets to push their agenda and share the progress was instrumental in capturing the interest and the support of the public as well as highly-placed individuals. In addition, organising round table discussions were instrumental in keeping members of the alliance informed on recent events and future activities.
In sum, although there is no silver bullet in the approaches to building political will for policy change, these two instances have highlighted the importance of CSOs in building a strong and competent coalition, leveraging on evidence-based analyses, and undertaking rigorous dissemination activities in achieving successful outcomes.
This article was first published for On Think TanksAccording to the UNFPA, Nigeria’s population increased from 195.9 million in 2017 to 201 million in 20181 – representing an annual increase of about 2.6%. The age composition of Nigeria’s population indicated that 54% Nigerians fall between ages 15-64, 44% between 0-14, and a paltry 3% between 65 and above. Two demographic dimensions are visible in the rising population: while the youth population continues to expand due to limited progress in reducing fertility rate and family planning (fertility rate reduced by only 1.1% in 50 years), the older population continues to shrink. The latter is congruent with the low life expectancy in Nigeria; which at 55 years, is one of the lowest in the world and accounts for the low percentage of the population within 65 and above. Life expectancy in Nigeria is often shortened by deaths caused by various diseases and other health related cases - a situation that is worsened by the country’s dilapidated health care system. Given the growing youth population, job creation should be a priority in the national agenda to prevent an escalation of security, health and livelihood crisis in the country. In addition, creating awareness and subsidizing family planning solutions is also essential
Nigeria’s new national minimum wage bill recently received the President’s assent and was signed into law, subsisting as an Act of Parliament effective from April 18, 20191. The act provides that ₦30,000 be paid as the new minimum wage to Nigerian workers; representing a 67% increase from the ₦18,000 formerly stipulated and paid as minimum wage since 2011. The wage increase emanated from concerns of inflationary effects on the real value of the previous minimum wage, and series of trade and labour union agitations for the government to increase purchasing power and welfare of its members. While delivering more income to workers’ coffers and increasing their welfare, the new minimum wage would also place strains on federal government finances and particularly on state governments that are largely in debt. Ensuring higher worker productivity and widening the tax net can help to minimize business and fiscal strains from the new policy.
Nigeria became the largest remittance-recipient country in sub-Saharan Africa and the sixth largest among low-middle income countries in 2018. The country’s official remittances amounted to $24.3billion in 2018,1 a 10.5% increase from the 2017 remittances received and accounts for 6.1% of GDP. Along with the strong economic conditions in high-income countries, the year-on-year acceleration in remittance flows is not unconnected to a slight declining trend that has been observed in remittance costs since the beginning of 2018.2 Although currently at an average of 9%, these remittance costs remain above the global average of 7% and far from the SDG target of 3%. Given the relatively strong economic and employment situation in high-income countries, and the growth in emigration in Nigeria, we expect that remittance flows to Nigeria will continue to rise. Addressing the regulatory barriers to entry in order to allow for more money transfer operators, particularly digital operators will drive the cost of remittance down and increase inflows. For instance, the N2 billion capital threshold mandated by CBN for domestic companies (compared with the N50 million for foreign companies) could be reviewed to allow companies lacking the financial clout to meet up.
Nigeria’s officially recorded debt obligation reached a record high of N24.39 trillion in 2018 relative to the N21.73 trillion in 201721, according to the DMO’s latest debt report. This represents a year-on-year 12.2% growth or N2.66 trillion2. Further decomposition of the data shows that both domestic and external components experienced increments: while domestic debt rose from N15.94 trillion to N16.63 trillion, external debt increased from N5.79 trillion to N7.76 trillion. However, the external debt component saw a higher increment implying that progress has been made towards achieving the 60:40 target of domestic-external debt stock mix. The share of domestic debt fell from 73.4% in 2017 to 68.2% in 2018 producing a total debt mix of 68.2% (domestic) and 31.8% (external). The review year saw the DMO make use of relatively cheaper and longer tenured external funds (Eurobonds) to achieve the debt stock mix objectives which also includes creating more space for other borrowers in the domestic market.3 With the growth in the issuance of Eurobonds, DMO should internalize the costs and risks of these changes such as currency and refinancing risk. This could limit the frequency of public borrowing.
Inclusive education implies that education (quantity and quality) is accessible to all children, irrespective of their individual circumstances. However, in Nigeria, some vulnerable groups of children are found to be excluded from quality education. These include children with disabilities, children from nomadic groups, many of the children in the Almajiri education system, and internally displaced children. Worryingly, the socio-cultural and economic backgrounds of children in Nigeria continue to influence their access to education. Furthermore, education data shows gaps in access and learning between the popular dimensions of exclusion: gender, location of residence, region, and wealth. These figures often mask the most critical dimensions and their underlying drivers. Such insights are what CSEA’s ongoing research project, on Educational Performance in Nigeria under the framework of the Southern Voice on the State of the SDGs (SVSS), aims to unveil. In this issue, we highlight some equity concerns relating to access and quality of basic education in Nigeria.
The CBN Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) switched its policy stance to ‘easing’ at the last MPC held on March 25-26, 2019. While holding other policy parameters at previous levels, the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) was cut by 50bps to 13.5%1 following a retaining policy stance of 14% that lasted for more than two years (since July 2016). The justification for the rate cut is linked to the following: the relative moderation in the exchange rate, continued deceleration of inflation rate, and the gradual renaissance of investment flows. Although the economy has welcomed improvements in economic indicators such as the GDP growth rate, the policy decision was primarily anchored on the need to further stimulate the economy. The rate cut could reduce the cost of borrowing while encouraging credit flows to productive sectors of the economy.2 In the coming months, we expect that the 13.5% MPR will be sustained as the transmission lags of the new rate on other economic variables will be expected to fully manifest before further changes are made.