The COVID-19 pandemic has posed significant challenges for the African continent in achieving peace, justice and inclusive and effective institutions, including significant negative effects on economic, social and political conditions. This policy brief presents and discusses key trends on SDG 16 on the African continent, including: an increasing concentration and strengthening of executive power; shrinking civic space and enlarged restrictions on civil liberties and media independence; disproportionate effects for women and other vulnerable groups; the worsening of conflict triggers; and declining trust in institutions and rising corruption. To reverse these trends and strengthen progress towards the goal, this policy brief recommends that the digitalization process must be accelerated; social protection of vulnerable groups must be ensured; and institutional accountability structures must be built to strengthen public trust as a means to better support inclusive recovery efforts.
Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows that Nigeria’s economy grew in real terms by 3.11 percent in Q1 2022.1 The growth rate is 2.6 percent points higher than the 0.51 percent growth rate recorded in Q1 2021 but 0.88 percent points lower than the 3.98 percent recorded in Q42021. Although there was a marginal decrease in real output growth, the quarter growth made it the sixth quarter of uninterrupted positive growth since the country exited the COVID-19 induced recession in Q4 2020. The non-oil sector grew by 6.08 percent and contributed about 93.37 percent of total output in the period under review. However, the oil sector contracted by 26.04 percent, and its share dipped to 6.63 percent in Q1 2022 from 9.25 percent in 2021. Persistent vandalism and illegal refineries are partly responsible for the declining contribution of the oil sector. Also, the electricity sector contracted by 11.2 percent, partly due to the frequent collapse of the transmission network in the period under review. For the Nigerian economy to have high and sustainable growth, the non-oil sector growth will need to be sustained to compensate for the contraction in the oil sector. Also, the country’s electricity generation and distribution need to be improved. The unreliable electricity situation partly contributes to the high cost of doing business and indirectly hinders growth.
Out-of-school children (OOSC) has long been a global problem that affects a country in various ramifications. With 10.5 million OOSC, Nigeria is recognised to have the largest number of children not attending school in the world. The economic and social repercussions of not educating these children in Nigeria are examined in this brief. Exploratory data analysis and empirical estimation reveal the following facts:
• Economic costs due to OOSC in Nigeria is estimated to be about US$40 billion in modest terms.
• A higher number of rural dwelling children do not go to school as compared to the children living in the urban areas in Nigeria.
• Income poverty keeps more children out of school.
• The Northeast geo-political zone has the largest percentage of OOSC in Nigeria.
The number of out-of-school children (OOSC) in Nigeria has increased at an alarming rate over the past years, reaching approximately 10.5 million children. According to the global out-of-school statistics compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), this figure is the highest any country has ever recorded. UNICEF (2022) corroborates the high OOS rates in Nigeria, reporting that one in every five out-of-school children in the world is a Nigerian. The statistics are even much worse in the Northern part of Nigeria compared to other parts of the country. Net school attendance rate in Northern Nigeria, for example, is 53 percent, indicating high dropout risk. This is not withstanding continuous efforts by the federal government to enhance access to education (primary to junior secondary level) by making it free and compulsory. Evidence suggests that the high out-of-school risk in Northern Nigeria is largely associated with conflict situations and other disturbances, though socio-cultural norms, economic barriers, among others, still play a significant role.
In August 2019, the Nigerian government closed all land borders to check the smuggling of products, especially rice and petroleum products, and other illicit cross-border activities. In December 2020, sixteen months after the closure, the government began the phased reopening of land borders and started with four borders - Illela, Maigatari, Mfun, and Seme. Sequel to the phased approach, on April 23rd, 2022, four additional borders – Idiroko, Jibiya, Kamba, and Ikon were opened.1 The closure of the borders contradicts the principle guiding the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), to which Nigeria is a signatory. The agreement seeks to ensure people's free movement and transfer of goods, technology, and knowledge within the continent, fostering intra-Africa trade. Therefore, the reopening of the borders indicates Nigeria's readiness and commitment to the regional free trade agreement. Nigeria has a lot to benefit from AfCFTA, but the benefit depends on several factors, including infrastructure, security, cost of doing business, and skills. Deliberate government efforts at improving security and infrastructure, especially electricity, roads linking Nigeria to other African countries, and the port conditions would increase the country's gains from the agreement. Also, there is a need for the government to address the porous state of our borders, thereby ensuring that they are not routes for the smuggling of arms, harmful substances, petroleum products, and agricultural products.
According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) May 2022 oil report, Nigeria’s oil production fell in April 2022.1 The report shows that Nigeria produced an average of 1.22 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil in April 2022. This production level is approximately 18,000 barrels per day (b/d) lower than 1.24 mb/d recorded in March 2022. In addition, total production is about 500,000 b/d lower than 1.74 mb/d OPEC assigned quota for the country. At US$ 100 per barrel, which is lower than the prevailing market price, the shortfall in production results in a loss of crude oil export earnings valued at over US$ 50 million per day, which also indicates a shortfall in Government revenue from crude oil royalty. These findings indicate that Nigeria is not maximising additional oil revenue associated with the surge in crude oil prices in the international market since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nigeria’s declining crude oil production is due to low investment and other factors, including persistent oil theft and pipeline vandalism. For Nigeria to achieve the OPEC crude oil production quota, a result-oriented collaboration between the government and the private sector is required. The collaboration would lead to policies that eliminate bottlenecks hindering investment in the oil and gas sector. The collaboration would also ensure increased uptake of digital technologies in protecting the pipelines and the fast-track implementation of the revised PIA.
sector
According to the data on credit allocation by sector released by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 's allocation to the agricultural sector rose to approximately N1.458 trillion in December 2021 from N1.049 trillion recorded in December 2020.1 This represents a 38.88 percent increase year-on-year. The CBN's development financing initiatives, including the Anchor Borrowers' programme, which involves DMBs in funds disbursement to farmers, partly drove this increment in credit allocation to the agricultural sector. The challenge of lack of access to credit facilities to purchase improved seedlings and modern facilities lowers agricultural productivity and contributes to food insecurity. The high food inflation (above 15 percent in 2021)2 indicates the persistence of food shortages, which might be attributable to non-financial factors constraining production, such as insecurity and poor road networks connecting farmlands. Addressing food shortages and achieving low food inflation requires a combination of financial and non-financial interventions from the government. First, the government needs to sustain initiatives that increase farmers' access to finance and partner with the private sector to unlock innovative agricultural financing tools. Second, the government needs to guarantee farmers' security and construct more roads connecting farmers to the markets.
Public participation is an integral aspect of ensuring effective and advanced data governance practices. African countries are largely in need of strong and efficient data governance systems. To build such systems, there is an urgent need to carry the public along in policy formation, development and output. A prerequisite for active public engagement in data policy making is a citizenry that is aware and knowledgeable about data issues.
This brief was authored by Tomiwa Ilori, Sone Osakwe and Adedeji Adeniran
A major argument for advocating for a participatory approach in developing Africa’s data policies and systems stems from the underlying drivers and principles guiding data governance. These principles cut across several themes such as human and digital rights protection, transparency and accountability, that are geared towards engendering greater confidence in the data ecosystem, for more purposeful development outcomes. In view of this, it is impossible for policy makers to effectively protect citizens’ data rights without extensive collaboration with, and input from the people being protected. But how can the public be active in data policy processes and systems or hold responsible parties accountable if they are not fully aware of their rights and responsibilities?
This report was written by Tomiwa Ilori