The reasons for underperformance of budgets are beyond wrong cycle or under-collection of oil revenue. But rather the biggest issues lie in over-ambitious projections, under-performing non-oil revenue and unspent funds by MDAs

Budget cycle in Nigeria is expected to run from January and December. In practise however, budgets are nearly never passed until late into the second quarter of the year. The irregularities in cycle has affected budget implementation and credibility. It is therefore reassuring that efforts are being make to get the budget cycle right with the 2020 national budget. Already, the appropriation bill presentation is the earliest in the last 10years. The parliament has also rolled out plans to ensure speedy passage of the appropriation bill by November and possible assent in December.

Beyond cycle normalisation, budget implementation remains a key challenge. Particularly, experience over the years reveal that the nation’s budget has consistently underperformed even when the budgets are passed into law early. The budgets have been described as ’incredible’ with the government’s inability to consistently and accurately meet both its revenue and expenditure targets. Looking at the budgets for the past eight years between 2011 and 2018 reveal that those for 2013 and 2015 were signed and passed into law in the first quarter of these years. In addition, the budget cycle for both years lasted for 15 months, which is more than the number of legislated months for a normal cycle. However, the budget implementation performance for these years are not quite different from other years when the budgets were passed much later (see Figure 1).

Figure 1:        Budget performance, cycle and date assented

Note: cycle indicates the number of months between the passage of current and succeeding years’ budget.

Source: National budget implementation reports 2011 – 2018

The biggest underperformance issues are on the capital side of the budget with most of the underspending related to capital expenditure. The average actual spending performance of recurrent expenditures against budgeted values between 2011 and 2018 stood at about 92.3%, while the capital is just around 62%. The degree of implementation of Nigeria’s capital spending clearly depict the inability to deliver on public services and achieve developmental objectives. Hence, meeting the nation’s commitments of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) could be an illusion since SDG action begins with credible budgets.

Figure 2:        Capital and recurrent spending performance

Source: National budget implementation reports 2011 – 2018

Over the years, the reason mainly explained for these underperformances is under-collection of oil revenue as a result of fluctuations in oil price or decline in oil production, and sometimes both. However, revenue performance between 2011 and 2018 reveals that oil revenue collections was about 78% over these years, with average difference of about 22% between the actual and budget projection. Further scrutiny reveals that the under collections of oil revenue were mainly as a result of poor production projections and not price variations. The Oil Price-Based Fiscal Rule (OPFR) which has been in operation since 2004 has ensured that volatilities in international crude oil price are curtailed by setting an oil price benchmark that is below the projected international rate (see Figure 3). Therefore, the problems associated with budget underperformance are explained by other factors.

Figure 3:        Average annual oil price (actual versus budget estimate benchmark)

Source: National budget office and United States  Energy Information Administration

Underperformances of estimated revenue were mainly recorded in the non-oil revenue sources which include collections for Value Added Tax (VAT), Company Income Tax (CIT) and revenue from independent sources (Figure 4). The reasons for the underperformances of non-oil revenues could be that the revenue projections were high and unrealistic or there are leakages and non-remittances by revenue collectors. Others include are weak administrative and monitoring mechanisms, defective and bureaucratic procurement systems that often lead to unnecessary delay in capital spending, and weak legislative oversight among others.

Figure 4: Revenue collection underperformance (2011 – 2018)

Source: National budget implementation reports 2011 – 2018

Improving budget performance to achieve optimum implementation and thus achieve budget credibility requires a combination of different tasks and priorities. Some of these have been well documented in extant articles and literature. However, we attempt to reiterate some of these proposed solutions. First, the projections of revenue and expenditure should be targeted towards realisable estimates to ensure optimum performance. For example, the capital spending estimate for 2015 was reduced by about 50% from 2016 estimates. The capital expenditure performance recorded for that year stood at the record highest of 99%.

In addition, the introduction of a clear, concise and publicly accessible ex-ante and ex-post budget reports in addition to improved institutional coordination throughout the budgetary cycle, from conception to implementation, could enhance the credibility of the budget. Furthermore, synchronisation of published details of revenue and expenditure reports that capture actual against the budget that is consistent with international standards would further ensure performance monitoring, effective implementation and comparative analysis.

Finally, prevalence of unspent funds by Ministries, Agencies and Departments (MDAs) has further contributed to the implementation gaps in capital spending. Unspent and returned capital vote by MDAs have consequential implications on fiscal governance and performance of the budget, especially capital spending. Hence, the incidences of unspent budgets should be abated. Failure to implement budgets by MDAs, when funds are allocated and available, could be viewed as fraud and abdication of responsibility, and such should be treated accordingly.

Education is acknowledged largely as a significant tool because it equips students with the functional skills for decent living and generates human capital that can spur economic development. Education has many levels, each of which is essential in its distinctiveness and therefore requires adequate public investment.

In Nigeria, government’s policy design and investment focuses mainly on three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary education. In fact, it is not far-fetched to assume that most Nigerians think these are the only levels of education. Government policy, in part, feeds into this narrative with the division of the education system into structures like 6-5-2-3 or more recently 6-3-3-4, in which only primary, secondary and tertiary education are emphasized.

However, there is a fourth level of education—the Early Childhood Education (ECE) which starts from birth through the pre-school, until the child enters the primary level of education. ECE was officially recognized in Nigeria in the 2013 National Policy on Education, with the introduction of 1-6-3-3-4 system. The additional one year covers ECE and was designed to be free and compulsory, thereby extending basic education from 9 to 10 years. According to National Policy of Education (2013), the goal of the ECE is to facilitate transition from home to school and prepare children for primary level of education.

This belated recognition of ECE has not raised its status in any significant way. As shown in Figure 1a, among the pupils enrolled in Primary 1 to Junior Secondary School in 2015, only 45% have attended pre-school. It is also telling that the pattern of pre-school attendance reflects the typical dimension of exclusion in education in Nigeria. Specifically, about 75% of those that have not attended pre-school are from rural areas, while non-attendance is highest among children from the poorest households (Figure 1b). Overall, this data suggests that the majority of children transit directly from home into primary school. While home and family education is an important component of ECE, attending pre-school could ensure seamless transition to primary education.

Source: Nigeria Education Survey (2015)

Government neglect of ECE is evident due to a lack of specialized regulatory institution for it compared to other levels of education. The running and operation of pre-school centers is entirely situated with private sector and social development centers, with some level of oversight from the state ministries of education.

Despite the National Policy on Education (2013) incorporating the ECE into the basic education framework, the scheme has not been implemented in any state in the country. In fact, while funding for all levels of education is poor in Nigeria, ECE has no funding commitment from any arms of government, except modest allocation that could use for ECE as part of primary education budget. The implication  government’s neglect is that ECE becomes accessible mostly to middle- and high-income earners (Figure 1b), thereby excluding children from poor households.

Figure 2 compares the performance of Primary 1 to JSS students based on attendance of preschool. Performance is defined by the ability to meet minimum competency in numeracy and literacy such ability to read and comprehend and do simple arithmetic. By this estimate, 76% of students that attend pre-school meet the minimum benchmark in numeracy, compared to 37% for those that did not attend. Similarly, 69% of those that attend pre-school are estimated competent in literacy, compared to 33% for that did not.

The difference in performance could come from other factors like parents’ education and income; 11% points and 8% points difference in numeracy and literacy performance based on attendance of pre-school. Hence, it can be deduced that part of the learning crisis observed in Nigeria is due to the neglect of ECE.

Source: Nigeria Education Survey (2015)

A more fundamental concern is the lifelong impact of neglecting ECE. Broad consensus emerging from neuroscience and behavioral research is that the most critical cognitive and non-cognitive skills are developed in the first few years.  For example, Figure 3 shows that children develop vison, hearing and language skills in their first year. Higher cognitive function also peaks in first year, but the overall development process continues until age 14. Similarly, a child’s emotional and physical health and social skills are developed in early years of life and these skills contribute significantly to both success in school and community in the later years. Parents’ role is elemental in this process, however there might be a point that professional care giver skills will be more essential. The literature on ECE mostly recommends gradual transition from home to school or start of formal ECE between age 2 and 3. This means vibrant and quality ECE is a core and prerequisite component of the education system for any country.

Figure 3: Human Developmental Phases

Source: C.A. Nelson (2000)

Economist James Heckman has examined the rate of return on investment in all levels of education from pre-school to tertiary level and post-school training (on the job training). Interestingly, return to preschool is the highest, followed by primary, secondary and tertiary education. This evidence is the basis of the Heckman curve (Figure 4) which illustrates the declining return to each addition level of education after preschool.  By one estimate, a dollar investment on ECE yields 7 dollars in return to society in terms of more productive and healthier workforce and better community and family support (Heckman, Moon and Pinto, 2010[1]).

Heckman curve

Source: James Heckman (2006)

From the foregoing, ECE is arguably the most important level of education. It is therefore crucial that its relevance is recognized through sound policy and institutional frameworks and funding to ensure that Nigeria achieves its ambitious educational goals and broader economic development. The starting point towards improving the relevance and performance of ECE in Nigeria will be for the 36 state governments including Federal Capital Authority Management to implement the NPC (2013), especially the component relating to integration of ECE to basic education framework, increase funding, creating a specialized institution for regulation and agenda setting. Standards and performance of ECE cannot rise above the teaching manpower within education sector; hence there is need for a teacher’s training component to ECE intervention. Lastly, parents play the most crucial role in delivery of quality training for children. The locus of accountability must therefore be given to parents. However, to effectively play this role, more public enlightenment and engagement should be provided to ensure parents understand the importance of ECE and their role in its effective delivery.

[1] Heckman, J. J., Moon, S. H., Pinto, R., Savelyev, P. A., & Yavitz, A. (2010). The Rate of Return to the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program. Journal of Public Economics, 94(1-2), 114–128.

While cooperation between countries in the global South has existed since the 1955 Bandung Asian-African conference, South-South cooperation (SSC) has recently experienced rapid growth and rising global prominence. In 2013, the value of SSC across the world was estimated to exceed $20 billion, up from about  $16.1 billion in 2011. In 2016 alone, over 500 projects were ongoing under the SSC framework in over 120 countries. The growth of SSC is in the context of the economic expansion of countries in the global South such as China, alongside their rising influence in the international political system. As such, a new class of development cooperation actors have emerged as major providers of finance, technology, and knowledge. As aid critics point to the use of development assistance to promote the economic interests of developed countries and exert influence on the foreign policy of the recipient countries, assistance from developed countries has become increasingly viewed with skepticism. With solidarity, shared values, and common interest as its distinct elements, SSC is being presented as a suitable complement to the traditional model of development assistance.

While SSC is not new, its form is. Until recently, SSC was mainly focused on knowledge sharing and capacity building, but now there is an increasing focus on providing finance for development projects, particularly in the infrastructure and the productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. The establishment of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to finance development projects in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Asia-Pacific region, are key examples. Aside from these multilateral banks, a number of Southern-owned development cooperation funds have been created including the Mexico-Chile Joint Cooperation Fund; FAO-China Fund; India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Fund; and India-U.N. Development Partnership Fund. This new financing from and for the South serves as an alternative to the prevailing system of development cooperation by fostering a participatory approach to development, encouraging collective self-reliance, and creating more integrated development cooperation.

Another key development is the ongoing institutionalization of SSC: Chile, Turkey, Thailand, Palestine, and China are some of the emerging countries that have established dedicated agencies for international development cooperation. The mainstreaming of SSC in the agenda of governments, civil society, and research organizations puts SSC forward as a means to mobilize science, technology, finance, and other means of implementation required to implement the sustainable development goals.  SSC is no longer seen as an independent framework but as part of the larger global development architecture.  In order to better understand the role these agencies are playing in development, in Nigeria, the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa in partnership with the Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES) in Guatemala, recently developed a conceptual framework to document aspects of SSC initiatives in order to allow for easy comparison.

Notably, African countries themselves are playing key roles in the development of the region. South Africa and Nigeria, with the largest economies and most substantial resources in Africa, are providing assistance to poorer countries in the continent. Already, South Africa leads in the SADC region in providing technical and humanitarian assistance needs, as well as facilitating peacekeeping operations which positions it as a major player in the region. Similarly, Nigeria provides a range of development assistance programs, including concessional finance to less-developed countries, technical assistance, and peacekeeping missions.

In these and other ways, developing countries are playing a more proactive role in meeting the development needs of their compatriots. However, the motivation of the emerging development partners is open to question. With non-African donor countries placing value on resource transfers, these development partnerships are hardly free from promoting the interest of the donor. Even for Nigeria and South Africa, their political ambition to achieve hegemonic powers and the subtle contest between both countries for soft power at the continent-level seems to be linked to their willingness to provide development assistance. If countries are more driven by their self-interests, SSC could create a center-periphery relationship where the emerging countries are at the center and the rest of the South are at the periphery.

Moreover, while proponents of SSC argue that it is a development partnership between peer countries, thus quite distinct from traditional North-South cooperation, critics question this assertion as developing countries are at different stages of economic development. A different strand of argument is that SSC is an ideological construct based on the consensus that there is considerable scope for improvement in the traditional development assistance framework. Despite these emerging issues, SSC reflects a more accountable form of development assistance where developing countries take up responsibility and utilize their resources for the pursuit of domestic needs.

To achieve a more effective and efficient cooperation between SSC member countries, we make the following recommendations:

Increased coherence within SSC and between SSC and North-South Cooperation is required to improve knowledge sharing, meet recipient needs, and avoid reinventing the wheel. Mainstreaming SSC into national development policies and creating a forum for the heads of the specialized development agencies and ministries/departments of foreign aid are critical steps towards enhancing policy and institutional coherence. With SSC still a small component of development cooperation, and developing countries still reliant on the North for support, a more coordinated SSC will improve opportunities for collaborating with the North for development.

Developing a general system for data collection and dissemination, like the OECD-DAC countries, is crucial in improving the design, implementation, and evaluation of SSC initiatives, as well as providing knowledge on its scale and scope. While the plurality of approaches may make the exercise cumbersome, member countries working with regional bodies can develop a common methodology that accounts for both financial and non-financial modalities.

A common evaluation framework that accounts for the diversity of SSC initiatives is required for enhanced learning and accountability. While a number of frameworks have been developed by research organizations and academia in the South, there is no common assessment system for countries to track a program’s progress and explain differences in outcome. Given the horizontal nature of SSC, member countries should agree on a system for evaluating initiatives in order to improve resource use for development.

This article was first published on Brookings Institute 

In view of the long-standing debate between green growth and de-growth, this analysis throws light on the dimensions of future energy use growth and its implication for development and climate concerns, in the context of the developing world.

Latest energy demand projections show that a global energy transition is underway. Based on baseline projections by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), BP, Exxon Mobil and IEA, developing countries would have a larger share of energy use. This would be driven by changes in economic growth and structure, demography, and technological advancement. While these projection studies have varying model assumptions, they reach similar conclusions regarding energy use growth between developed and developing countries.

Specifically, projections indicate that global energy use is expected to rise by around one-third by 2040, most of which come from developing countries or non-member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (non-OECD). While energy demand slightly declines in OECD group (total: -0.3%) between 2017 and 2040, it is expected to rise significantly in non-OECD group (total: +56%) within the same period, with non-OECD Asia taking the lead. Thus, by 2040, developing countries will have around 67% of global energy use, up from 57% in 2017. China of course maintains the largest share of energy use. However, the fastest growth by far is expected to occur in India -- and to a lesser extent in Africa & other non-OECD Asia. But the slowest growth will occur in developing Europe & Eurasia, particularly, Russia.

Across sectors, industry will remain the largest contributor to overall growth in energy use for developing countries but will contribute twice as much as commercial, residential and transport sectors combined (figure 1). Strikingly, by 2040, the industrial sector of developing countries is also expected to contribute more energy than all the sectors of developed countries combined (figure 1). A key implication of the relative significance of industrial energy use is that, development efforts which narrowly targets household demand for energy may not be as effective in reducing energy poverty, improving human development, and controlling the climate impact of energy demand.

Data Source: EIA International Energy Outlook (2017)

Why developing countries will consume around 67% of the world's energy by 2040.

Rising energy use for the biggest users is expected to be driven by economic growth -measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), urbanization, and population growth. For India specifically, energy use growth will be mostly driven by expanding economic output --well above rates in China and the rest of the world. For Africa, energy use growth is expected to be mostly driven by fast growing population and urbanization –fastest rates globally (table 1).

However, for China, its current fast-growing energy use will begin to slow down around 2030s due to slower population growth and increasing transition away from energy-intensive industrial sectors towards less-energy intensive manufacturing and service sectors-- enabling it generate additional economic activity with lower energy use. This transition will be partly driven by stricter industrial standards in light of serious pollution concerns in China. This gives way for India, other developing Asia and Africa to pick up more heavy industrial production for global consumption by 2030s.

The slowest energy use growth for developing countries, however, is expected to come from developing Europe and Eurasia group, especially Russia, largely due to low population and economic growth as well as significant energy efficiency gains.

Energy intensity will decline, but not enough to stay on track with climate goals

These energy demand projections also show that while overall energy use increases, global energy intensity (amount of energy used per GDP) will continue to decline in the future --from around 1% p.a. (1950-2015) to around 2% p.a (2015-2040). The decline in energy intensity will be mostly driven by the decoupling of economic growth from energy demand –which is ongoing in many developed countries. This decoupling is reflected in slower economic and population growth as well as shifts in economic structures from lower-skilled manufacturing to higher-skilled advanced manufacturing or services. Interestingly, developing countries are expected to decouple by twice the rate of developed country grouping, on average, from around 2030s (figure 2). This would come mostly from China where environmental concerns and air pollution will force the Chinese government to promote better climate-sensitive industrial policies. Although decoupling occurs at a faster rate in the developing world, overall energy intensity remains high.

However, a 2% reduction in energy intensity is not enough to put the world on the path to meeting climate goals. For such reasons, some authors like Jacobson et al. (2017) suggest pathways for reducing energy use that reflect degrowth, while others propose improvements in energy efficiency as the best solution. But recent studies suggest that the latter may not be a viable long-term solution. Particularly, Fouquet & Person (2011) and Luke et al. (2014)  highlight that energy efficiency measures and technologies enable cost declines and expansion of services, which ultimately leads to higher energy use — known as the rebound effect. Therefore, they caution policymakers about depending heavily on efficiency-related emissions reduction as a climate mitigation strategy.

The key implication is that relevant actors in the international community, academia and government still need to think more carefully about other ways to reduce climate impact from energy use, beyond energy efficiency.

Data Sources: Calculated using data from EIA International Energy Outlook (2017); IEA World Energy Outlook (2018); and World Bank Population Estimates and Projections (2018)

Is degrowth, then, a viable alternative solution for limiting energy demand and its impact on our planet? No, due to its impact on development/poverty reduction goals

One of the central messages in these projections is that the level of future energy demand will be largely determined by how fast developing economies grow, and what type of activities make up their economic growth. Given climate change concerns, it seems passively implied that degrowth –limiting the pace of economic growth – could be a viable solution for reducing future energy use. This notion may also be underpinned in the low levels of energy access targets envisioned by many development institutions, like the United Nations (UN) as part of its global development objective – as Moss & Gleave (2013) and Caine, et al. (2014) suggests. However, limiting the use of energy – a resource so essential to human progress – is not an effective alternative, if the world is interested in achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), especially those on poverty and equitable access to energy (SDGs 1 and 7).

Despite energy demand growth, average energy use in many developing countries will remain below levels required for human development. The UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) suggests that increases in energy consumption up to around 100 gigajoule (GJ) per head are associated with substantial increases in human development and well-being, after which the relationship flattens out. However, many developing countries will not attain this level by 2040 (figure 3), despite fast growing energy use. Specifically, despite economic growth and prosperity of the Indian people, energy use per head increases only marginally by 2040. For Africa, its fast-growing population is expected to suppress the prosperity of its people, thus energy use per capita only rises by one unit to 20 GJ.

But interestingly, energy use per head in China (at 102 GJ) could meet UN standards for human development by 2040. Perhaps this would classify China as a developed country by 2040. It is important to note that, while China struggles environmental degradation due to the high energy use and pollution of its industries, China’s high energy use has also allowed for faster development, that will potentially transform it to a developed country by 2040. This case of China buttresses the environmental cost, yet value of high energy in driving development.

Data Sources: EIA International Energy Outlook (2017) and World Bank Population Estimates and Projections (2018)

Key Takeaways

Environmental and climatic concerns are vital variables for consideration, given its immediate and long-term impact for our world. However, limiting energy demand through degrowth, especially for developing countries, would be inappropriate -- given the need for energy to drive human development and poverty reduction. Therefore, we need to think of a lower carbon and higher energy planet, bearing in mind both climate and socio-economic development goals, especially for developing countries where high energy level is required to lift people out of poverty.

Drawing on my recent grounding in the Ecomodernist ideology at The Breakthrough Institute, Any progress at advancing the twin goal (climate and poverty reduction) will require both: advanced technological innovations and piecemeal incremental policy changes to guide household and especially industry behavior. It would require unusual and equitable energy policy decisions to decrease the climate impact of energy use without reducing consumption, especially for developing countries where high energy is much needed.

The global community and developed countries will need to work with fast developing countries to minimize the environmental footprint of their industries, without minimizing production. Policies that encourage investments in initiatives that reduce emissions from industries, without constraining output, should be prioritized over household energy demand that are often in the forefront of development efforts. Carbon capture and storage for steelmaking, as well as non-emitting ways to produce cement are some good examples.

Lastly, reducing the social and political barriers to a high and clean energy transition will require relevant stakeholders to continuously spread the message of hope and possibilities that will fuel government action and human ingenuity. As advocates of energy equity emphasize, “the way we use energy will become increasingly clean not by limiting consumption but by using expanded access to energy to unleash human ingenuity”.

Think tanks in China have drawn prominence in the global body of think tankers since the end of the Chinese closed-border policy era. By all accounts, the number of Chinese think tanks have risen to top any global lists of think tanks. As a research associate in a leading think tank in Nigeria, the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa(CSEA), I was recently invited by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) to participate in a three-week seminar to study the characteristics and national conditions of Chinese think tanks. In this note, I document a brief summary of my key observations from engaging with Chinese think tank experts.

The whole idea of this piece is to explore areas of shared features with African think tanks as well as suggested areas of improvements for both communities.

First, I observed that think tanks in China play critical roles in the engagement and education of policymakers, the media and the public on local and international policy issues as it affects China. This is not very different from the role played by think tanks globally and Africa in particular. The main aim of think tanks is to generate evidence-based policy-oriented analysis, research, and advice for policy decision-making institutions and agents. However, contrary to the high dominance of private and non-governmental think tanks in Africa, virtually all think tanks in China are affiliated with the government at different levels and scale by operating as government-owned, quasi-governmental or party affiliated. Only very few operate as private ventures and are financially autonomous and operationally independent.

The institutional structures of these think tanks are designed such that they form a critical part of the government. For example, the president of CASS has an important hierarchical authority as a cabinet member of the People’s Republic of China. One advantage of this model is that being a fundamental unit of the government, it is assured a stable source of internal funding. Although these funds might sometimes be inadequate, the periodicity allows for steady contribution to policy issues through continuous evidence-collection and research.

In Africa, most government-based think tanks were also established to address specific policy needs and motives. However, funding irregularity, insufficiency, unavailability and lack of sustainability have mostly hindered their ability to consistently stay true to their missions. Therefore, most think tanks in Africa, even government based, are greatly dependent on international funding.

Second, the embedded nature of most Chinese think tanks ensures synergy between them and government ministries/departments. Most think tanks are compartmentalised into departments and specialisations and sometimes into research institutes in order to address specific research needs related to these ministerial/departmental specialisations. This structure has further facilitated mutual interactions among research experts and policymakers. It has reinforced staff mobility practices between the two separate but intertwined entities – policy space and think tanks. In addition, it has served to cushion the reverse effects of the political institutionalisation of China with strict rules on retirement ages for government officials. By appointing retired senior civil servants as heads of think tanks, it facilitates the sustainable use of policy experts in the areas of research for policy making and evaluation – and contributes to developing an institutional memory about policymaking which the think tanks can maintain. Nonetheless, it is worthy of mention that within the operational context of China, this practice might have lent a great deal to the popular belief that think tanks in China are not independent. Interestingly, the intellectual independence of Chinese think tanks is strictly observed as research outcomes and contributions to policy discussions are strictly data-driven and evidence-based.  However, like every other ‘independent’ think tank, Chinese think tanks are guided by the conditions, ideologies and principles of their funders, in this case the government and the Party.

African think tanks could adopt the revolving door policy of Chinese think tanks as this could be a good strategy for ensuring and sustaining the inputs of policy-experts who are retired top government officials in the development and implementation of key policy research. Adopting this practice could also bring about mutual benefits for both think tanks and the policymaking space by (i) ensuring knowledge transfer and experience sharing between retiring policymakers and think tanks; (ii) offering policymakers a ‘retirement incentive’ which in some contexts may reduce the temptation and tendencies to be corrupt while in public service; (iii) increasing the relevance of think tanks and (iv) also serve as a good narrative when raising funds. Although, contrary to the popular practice in China of putting retiring public officials at the helm of affairs of think tanks, which would mean that think tanks being led by older individuals and mostly men, think tanks in Africa might incorporate them as senior fellows. In addition, intellectual independence and operational autonomy would further be enshrined by defining their work engagements and ensuring that research outcomes are strictly data driven and evidence based in attempting to contribute to policy issues.

Third, I observed that different pressures and influences shape the reactions across different levels of Chinese government to think tanks’ research outputs and policy suggestions. An important characteristic of most of these think tanks is their administrative network and personal ties, referred to in traditional Chinese as “Guanxi (关系)”. In many instances, research reports and policy suggestions are directly communicated to the relevant policy making agencies (popularly referred to as “Neibu” 内部). These close ties have facilitated the huge acceptance of research outputs of Chinese think tanks by the government and policy decision-makers. This is in addition to exposing them to potential research gaps within the policy space and the effective tracking of developments.

In Africa, some members of the public and government do not trust think tanks as they are often brandished as pro-government or working for the opposition. Building a strong network and trust with the policy space without compromising integrity, transparency, independence and research quality is a possibility and it can be achieved by building credibility. In addition, the practice of sharing research outcomes with first hand decision-making agents as it is the case in China might be a difficult task for African think tanks, as African states do not have control over the media, private sector, and the public, as well as how information flows and leaks within the various ministries and departments of government. However, engaging policy stakeholders throughout the research process would expose them to the likely outcomes and taking appropriate policy decisions where relevant and necessary.

In conclusion, while African think tanks are evolving and positioning for a sustainable future, it is imperative that they credibly build strong ties with policymakers to facilitate internal funding and acceptance. Achieving this should not in any way compromise their objectivity and best practice. However, they should accelerate engagement with experts within the policy space in order to facilitate their contributions to Africa’s development and prosperous future.