How To Resolve The Tariff Disputes Blocking Nigeria’s Solar Project Pipeline?

In 2016, Nigeria signed power purchase agreements (PPAs) worth US$2.5 billion with 14 independent power producers (IPPs) to build a total 1,125 megawatts of installed solar capacity for the national grid. Currently, grid power consists mainly of gas-fired power (85%) and hydropower (15%), with less than 1% solar. The solar IPPs are planned mostly in the northern parts of the country, where higher solar radiation is present (see map). However, put and call options agreements (PCOAs), essential to ensure the bankability of the project, are yet to be signed by twelve of the fourteen IPPs (see Table 1) due to extended negotiations on Partial Risk Guarantees with the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

The deadlock is caused by disagreements between the government and the IPPs on the PPA tariff structure. While IPPs want to sell power at the initially agreed US$0.115 per kWh, the government is insisting on a tariff of US$0.075 per kWh, citing declining solar costs and comparable projects in countries such as Senegal (US$0.05/kWh) and Zambia (US$0.06/kWh).1

Key Factors for Resolution

  1. Fair and Competitive Pricing. While the average cost of procuring solar power has declined globally by 74% since 2009, markets differ greatly across countries.2 The compromise must reflect the true risk-adjusted costs of solar systems in Nigeria.3 A balance should be struck between generating appropriate investor returns while delivering inexpensive energy to impoverished areas short of power.
  2. Commercial Viability and Cost Recovery. Gas suppliers, GenCos, and DisCos are already affected by tariffs set below cost recovery (averaging US$0.066/kWh), which inevitably lead to stalled projects.4
  3. Country Risk Premium. Nigeria is already a high-risk market. Disregarding legally-binding contracts agreed in the PPAs may contribute to weakening investor trust, raising the country’s overall investment risk profile, negatively affecting future investment and, ultimately, energy prices.

Conclusion: Broaden the tools to find a solution. The Government and investors can renegotiate and compromise in these deadlocks through resourceful policy mechanisms that could yield more desirable outcomes for both parties. These include the removal of the import duty on solar components to reduce total costs for the power producers. It could also include a capacity scale down to a captive market, for instance secluding reliable solar systems primarily for communities with high commercial, agricultural and industrial activities – to ensure that the government and populace get the most out of the new power projects. Different tariffs could also be applied to different IPPs on the grounds of certain considerations such as project locations and sunk costs.

Table 1:  The 14 solar IPP companies and project overview
Company Capacity State PCOA Signed
1. Afrinergia Power Limited 50 MW Nasarawa April 2017 (7.5c/kWh)
2. CT Cosmos Limited 70 MW Plateau April 2017 (7.5c/kWh)
3. Pan Africa Solar 75 MW Katsina Not Signed
4. Nigeria Solar Capital Partners 100 MW Bauchi Not Signed
5. Motir Desable Limited 100 MW Nasarawa Not Signed
6. Nova Scotia Power Dev Ltd 80 MW Jigawa Not Signed
7. Anjeed Innova Group 100 MW Kaduna Not Signed
8. Nova Solar 5 Farm Limited 100 MW Katsina Not Signed
9. KvK Power Limited 100 MW Sokoto Not Signed
10. Middle Band Solar One Limited 100 MW Kogi Not Signed
11. LR Aaron Power Limited 100 MW Abuja Not Signed
12. En Africa 50 MW Kaduna Not Signed
13. Quaint Abiba Power Limited 50 MW Kaduna Not Signed
14. Oriental Renewable Solutions 50 MW Jigawa Not Signed
This Memo was drafted in collaboration with Patrick Okigbo of Nextier Advisory This article was first published on energy for growth hub
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Effects of 2019 Elections: Predicting the Economy’s Response in Nigeria

The stability of the country’s political environment is an essential element in determining and predicting the level of economic growth in a democratic economy. The traditional assumption in the political economy model is that opportunistic politicians have the tendency of manipulating economic policy around election times for political gain. The poor and largely uneducated electorate who are more likely to be susceptible to political manipulations dominate the process of electioneering in developing countries such as Nigeria. This piece analyses the changes in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes resulting from the electioneering process (i.e. before, during and after the elections).

Do Election Cycles sway the Stock Market?

While it is well established that election cycles in Nigeria bring with it some level of political instability amongst and between rival parties, the dimension of this effect on the economy is unclear. In a review of stock market information, the following findings were emphasized:

  • In a research study by Osamwonyi and Omorokunma (2017) on portfolio selection in the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) during elections, the analysis established that while investors strived to minimize losses and maximize gains, market friction and instability during the 2003, 2007 and 2011 election periods instigated low returns performance; and election results negatively affected the relationship between risk and return behaviour of selected companies.
  • In 2015, few months before the general elections, stock indices experienced more downtrends than uptrends and eventually culminated in an annual loss of -16.14 percent. In a similar report, the pre-2015 election year was characterized as a major-loss year for investors, a reoccurrence of a similar event in the pre-2011 election year. Investors lost about N3.23 trillion as at the end of 2014; a similar occurrence is tracked in the forthcoming 2019 elections: 2018 was marked by severe market losses.
  • In Nigeria, evidence shows that trading activities on the stock markets tend to react sensitively to past presidential election results (i.e. 2011 and 2015 elections). Particularly, the outcome of the 2011 elections saw trading activities negatively responding 2 days prior to and till 4 days after the election (Osuala et al., 2017). Overall, in both election years, electioneering activities and outcomes do affect stock market in a certain direction, depending on both the winner as well as the anticipated economic and financial policies of the new administration.
  • With respect to foreign investment in the stock market, a similar negative trend is seen with net foreign portfolio investment and All Share Index (ASI) generally dwindled towards the potential end of a presidential tenure: six months before another election is held.[1] The 2003, 2011 and 2015 elections showed the same trend and also showed a continued decline few months after the elections.

 

How much will the election cost the nation?

The need to win the hearts of electorates and to garner more votes via campaigns often push up government and contesting politicians’ spending in the months leading to the polls. The National Institute of Legislative Studies reports that, in 2015, more than $600 million was spent for an election that involved about 67 million voters – far more than obtainable in developed and bigger economies like Canada and the United Kingdom. The cost was not inclusive of undocumented individual costs incurred by politicians. The 2019 election is to cost about $669 million (N242 billion)[2], equivalent to the current running budget for capital projects in both health and education. In a country with over 70 percent of its populace living in poverty and an economy basked in excessive borrowings, the extensive spending is made at the expense of capital expenditure, provision of essential social infrastructure, and economic progression. The anomaly has become a norm in Nigeria and has also invalidated the cap on election campaign spending (N1 billion for presidential candidates and N200 million for governors) stated in the electoral act, 2010 as amended. Although election spending is absolutely necessary, the huge costs haunt the country post-election.

How have exchange rate, FDI, and external reserve fared during and after elections?

Presidential and general campaign periods are boom eras for the parallel foreign exchange market, and with huge dollar demands for political campaign activities, come the imminent pressure on the value of the naira. During most of the previous election periods, exchange rates were clearly seen to be adjusting to uncertainties surrounding the political environment. For the past four elections—1999, 2003, 2011, and 2015—the probability of having depreciating exchange rate was higher in the months preceding the elections, and sustained depreciation of the Naira was evident few months before, and in some cases, beyond the elections. In 2011, the exchange rate which averaged N153.98/$ six months to election rose to N157.1/$ in election month. Also, the Naira exchanged for N168.64/$ in the run-up to the 2015 election, and increased to N222.93 in election month. For the 2019 election, there are anticipated pressures on the stability of the Naira; however, the CBN is consciously dedicated to ensuring stability in the foreign exchange rate market.

In addition, foreign investors are often deterred during election periods, either in a risk-averse or risk avoidance posture. Their appetite for investments stall prior to elections and this reflects a mindset to gauge the outcome of the elections before further investment decisions are made. For example, Foreign Direction Investment (FDI) flows to Nigeria fell significantly to $73 million one month to the 2007 elections, from $460 million the previous month. Although 2007 marked a transition-government year the falling FDI trend was no different in the month leading up to both the 2011 and 2015 elections. However, there were increases in FDI some months after the stated elections - a possible signal of return of investors’ confidence – at the backdrop of a plausible die-down of political uncertainties. The electioneering period have also injected a dose of precariousness into the value of external reserves. Rather than accrete sustainably, the reserve dwindled during some of the periods and showcased a possible instability in net inflows. Before the 1999,2011 and 2015 elections, the reserves shed some dollars just prior to the election months respectively. For instance, from $8.2 billion five months to the 1999 election to $6.3 billion in the election month, and a significant fall in 2015 from $36.3 billion in the fifth month leading to the general election, to $29.4 billion as at the election month. The trends signify what seem to be capital outflows amid impact of other external factors, and alleged speculations that the reserve was used to fund election campaigns. A similar reserve downtrend is being noticed in run-up months to the 2019 election.

Conclusion

The analysis shows that the electioneering period brings with it not only uncertainty but also significant changes in economic activities. From stock markets to investors’ behaviours the election process and outcomes become determining factors to where people put their money and what they spend it on. This raises the question of what should be the economic policy focus of either the incumbent or incoming government in Nigeria. Given that Nigeria is still recovering from recession and recently ranked with high incidence of poverty, it is expected that the state of the economy should be of upmost priority to policy makers and government officials.

In our forthcoming policy brief we present the economic priorities that the new government needs to focus on. Look forward to it!

[1] http://www.adsrng.com/monthly-bulletin/

[2] https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/10/17/finally-nassembly-approves-inecs-n242bn-election-budget/

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The need to boost political will for tobacco control policies in Nigeria

Tobacco use and the exposure to secondhand smoke is associated with the rising prevalence of non-communicable diseases some of which are the leading cause of preventable death in Nigeria. In 2018, tobacco use in Nigeria has been linked to 16,100 deaths. According to Tobacco Atlas, economic losses accrued to Nigeria in the form of medical treatments and loss of productivity from tobacco-related diseases are estimated at US$ 591 million as of year 2015, twice the amount spent on all malaria treatment interventions in 2015.

While Nigeria has a low smoking prevalence (about 5 percent of adult population), suggesting that tobacco does not pose an imminent health and social challenge, the trend is rapidly changing. The daily cigarette consumption per smoker has doubled from 7 to 14 sticks between 1980 to 2012. The share of male adults who are smokers has also increased from 11 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2015. Some key factors have driven the trend in cigarette demand in Nigeria. One is the shift in the strategy of tobacco companies who are increasingly moving away from high income countries where they face more stringent control measures to low- and middle-income countries in Africa with weak tobacco control systems. Another is the effect of popular culture which makes tobacco use seem fashionable particularly for young people.

Despite these striking changes in smoking trends, the policy space for tobacco control is not evolving as rapidly. In June 2018, the government introduced a N58 specific excise tax which will be implemented between 2018 and 2021. However, the new policy puts the excise tax burden at 16% which is significantly below the WHO recommended benchmark of 70% of retail price. Worse still, the tobacco industry is actively lobbying the government to rescind the tax increment.

Aside implementing only a modest increase in tobacco tax, the government is also deficient in other tobacco control measures. Both states and federal governments do not protect citizens from secondhand smoking. So far, only four out of 36 states have implemented laws prohibiting smoking in public places and even in these states, citizens continue to flout the law with no consequence. Also, there are no help services provided to tobacco users willing to quit. Few programmes exist to provide tobacco cessation advice, and low-cost medicines to people who want to stop smoking. At the same time, there are no accessible telephone lines that offer treatment for tobacco addiction.

These gaps in tobacco control efforts is an indication of the dearth of political will for tobacco control policy reforms in Nigeria? Government officials are hardly committed to designing policies in line with global standards as well as mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of these policies. Civil Society Organizations which continue to advocate for better laws and dialogue with stakeholders to achieve results cannot directly bring about the much-needed reforms. Building the political will among state and non-state actors is crucial to achieving remarkable strides in tobacco control.

How can political will be built?  

The key actors in the tobacco policy space, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance (for taxation policies) will need to initiate and lead reforms more effectively. The presence of a team of reformers who can convene relevant stakeholders, sidestep bureaucratic bottlenecks and neutralize tobacco industry lobbying can potentially lead to major reforms in the policy space. Nevertheless, collaboration between these ministries and other state and non-state actors is important. This is because implementing tobacco control policies requires the action of other government agencies such as the Customs and tax collection agency. Also, government officials will need to leverage on the expertise and influence of CSOs and advocacy organizations, the research capacity of think tanks, and the financial and political clout of international organizations in order to achieve results.

Also, the research and analysis component of tobacco control will need to be enhanced to allow for proper analysis of tobacco control measures. Presently, available (freely accessible on the internet) research outputs on tobacco control, which can potentially serve as evidence for designing and implementing important health policies, are few and limited in scope. For instance, to the best of our knowledge, no nationwide research has been conducted to identify the cost of tobacco-related diseases and its impact on livelihoods.

Applying credible sanctions is another area where political will needs to be built. Despite the fact that the federal law contains an enforcement component, the support and use of sanctions to provide incentives that promote compliance is weak. Law enforcement agencies should routinely examine the manufacturing, storage and distribution process of tobacco companies in order to curtail their activities that are not in accordance with the law. Failure to punish offenders will turn Nigeria into a target country for exploitative tobacco companies.

To ensure that these efforts are sustainable, more resources should be provided to state agencies to boost their operational capacity. For key government agencies such as the Ministry of Health and Nigeria Customs Service, budget allocations for tobacco control should be put in place to cater to tobacco control activities. In particular, modern equipment and facilities required to curb smuggling should be provided to Customs units in border towns. Also, the technical capacity of officials should be built through trainings and peer-to-peer learning.

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Tobacco Tax Revenue in Nigeria: To Earmark or Not to Earmark?

Champions of tobacco control both home and abroad have applauded the Nigerian government for its recent approval of higher excise duty on tobacco product. While this duty remains below the standard recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), it is a step in the right direction. Based on CSEA’s study, the government stands to gain NGN67.7 billion (US$187 million) over a one year period from this new taxation policy. The questions in the minds of people would be: what do citizens stand to gain and how can this additional revenue translate to better well-being for all?

 Two possible pathways for welfare gains standout: earmarking tobacco revenue for targeted projects or adding to the pool of government revenue. The CSEA study highlighted that support for tobacco taxation increases by 17 percent if earmarking is introduced, especially among smokers. Most of the respondents view tobacco taxation and earmarking as a means to help smokers quit and improve the wellbeing of citizens. In terms of the wellbeing, respondent prioritize earmarking for public health programmes including treatment of tobacco related diseases, and social programmes for poor households (such as cash transfers). However, with the exception of Ministry of Health, other government parastatals support adding tobacco revenue to the pool of government revenue.

Does it make economic sense to earmark? 

Nigeria currently has one of the lowest budget allocations to the health sector. The AU’s Abuja declaration of 2001, stipulates that 15% of the national budget should go to the health sector, but Nigeria only allocates 3.9% of total budget to the health sector in 2018.  This implies that government spends a meager sum of N1,888 on each citizen’s health care need for the whole year.  This reflects negatively on Nigeria’s health indices; the WHO ranks Nigeria 187th out of 191 countries in terms of health care delivery. 

Following the arguments of pro-earmarks, earmarking tobacco revenue ensures a continuous, regular source of funding that are not subject to annual budgetary review. From the CSEA’s stakeholder analysis, 25%-50% of tobacco tax revenue is proposed as the earmarking benchmark. Applying 50% to NGN67.7billion expected revenue would yield an additional NGN33.9billion of earmarked revenue to the health sector over a one-year period. This will result to 9% increase to the sum allocated for citizen’s health care. Similarly, earmarking tobacco taxes can provide a sustainable source of financing for tobacco control. In 2017, about 0.028% of the Federal Ministry of Health budget was allocated for setting up tobacco control unit (TCU) in 2017. However, the TCU received no funds in 2018 due to the ministry’s budget constraints.

 Another key argument for earmarking tobacco taxes is to provide an appropriate option for countries where the public financial management (PFM) is weak and   policy priorities are not aligned with budget allocations. A major challenge of healthcare financing in Nigeria is the misappropriation of health care funds manifested in the: diversion of drugs and medical supplies, procurement and contract inflation, as well as unethical diversion of budgeted fund among others. While the 2015 National Tobacco Control Act (NTCA) specifies the provision of an earmarked “Fund” for the tobacco control, budgetary allocations of the Ministry of Health have not yet matched this policy priority. 

Way Forward

 For an earmarking policy to be effective in advancing health and tobacco control priorities in Nigeria, certain considerations need to be made in line with best practices. The prospective policy should:

·         Have a  clear expenditure purpose that is neither too narrow nor broad:

The expenditure purpose should be narrow enough to link funds clearly to activities and results in order to advance health sector priorities. However, it ought not to be too narrow to introduce excessive rigidities or economic distortion. Philippines, South Africa, Vietnam and Estonia provide notable examples of this.

·         Have a strong but flexible revenue-expenditure link to avoid unhealthy dependence:

Neither should the program/unit for earmarking be totally dependent on the earmarked funds without other sources of revenue, nor should the expenditure needs of the program/unit determine the tax rate. On one hand, earmarked revenue is seen to be completely driving expenditure in Ghana: earmarked VAT and social security contributions accounts for 90% of revenues for National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana. On the other hand, the Estonia Health Insurance Fund (EHIF) expenditure has been completely driving the pay roll tax revenue proportions earmarked for EHIF. Hence, when revenue from payroll tax contributions became insufficient to cover expenses in 2013, policymakers set to broaden the revenue base to address the structural deficit.

·         Be a “Soft” earmark with option for reallocating funds to emerging priorities:

To foster tobacco control, an earmarked fund can be dedicated to the TCU within the Federal Ministry of Health, with a reserve fund that allows funds to be reallocated to new priorities within the health sector as they arise.

·         Incorporate a strong PFM and governance systems for monitoring and reporting the revenue flows and impact:

The PFM and governance systems should incorporate reporting systems at different levels to help improve transparency and accountability.

·         Have a clear medium-term time horizon for earmarking review:

A prospective tobacco tax earmarking policy should incorporate a timeframe for review and impact assessment. This should possibly be in line with the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework to give time for the policy effect to crystalize.

 

 

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Achieving Abundant and Affordable Energy in Africa: Is there a place for nuclear power in Nigeria?

Nigeria and Russia has signed agreements to set up four nuclear power plants and a Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology in Nigeria. This piece examines the prospects of nuclear power plants to be built in Nigeria by mid-2020, with the view of objectively assessing its cost implications and feasibility.

Given Africa’s low levels of energy access, supply deficiencies and little contribution to climate change, it can be agreed that energy sources (clean or dirty) is not a question of substitutes but complements. Abundant energy that can be deployed affordably are essential for addressing energy challenges in the region. Two clean energy sources –nuclear and solar– have emerged as a revolutionary source for scaling up energy supply globally. Solar power, on one hand, has become the cheapest and fastest-growing source of electricity since 2011, on account of the surge in Chinese-manufactured silicon solar PV which cut costs by one-third. Nuclear power, on the other hand, supplies at least five times more electricity than solar power.

However, occasional symbolic fallouts around nuclear power raises concern about its suitability, especially for third world countries. The meltdown of the three reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in 2011 after an earthquake and resulting tsunami is one of the two notable symbolic fallouts with nuclear. Opponent’s activism, accidents, and rising production costs have negatively affected the receptiveness and growth of nuclear power. As a result, many developed countries such as Germany, Belgium and the U.S are scaling down or exiting plans for new nuclear reactors.

Despite fallouts, confidence in nuclear power has been gradually improving due to constant development of safety technologies, including newer designs like Generation IV reactors with design features that take into account the “Fukushima Daiichi lesson”. Presently, 56 nuclear power plants are currently being constructed in the world today against 449 in operation. In Africa, the only operating nuclear plant is in South Africa, and it produces 1,860MW of power, contributing to 4% of South Africa’s power capacity. Plans to expand South Africa’s nuclear capacity is however opposed by the country’s Minister of Energy and the Treasury, on the ground of its implications for national debt. However, more African countries like Egypt, Ghana, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zambia are establishing agreements with Russia State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) to build nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.

The Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC) has also signed agreements with Rosatom, in 2017 and 2016, to set up four nuclear power plants and a Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology respectively, after a decade of developing the framework. The nuclear project, which is expected to cost about US$ 20 billion and produce 4,800 megawatts of electricity by 2035, will be initially operated by Rosatom before handover (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Details of the Nigeria-Russia Nuclear Power Agreement

 In light of the nuclear power development, two key questions call for objective analysis:
  1. What are the cost-implications of nuclear power for addressing energy deficit in Nigeria?

While nuclear power is relatively more expensive to construct, its maintenance cost is said to be low; as it can operate for about 60-80 years with very little maintenance.  As such, it is argued as being more profitable and cost-effective in delivering power in the long run, relative to other sources including gas and solar. However, the prospects of repaying loans used in the construction of the nuclear plants may be daunting for African countries.

Although information on the Nigeria-Rosatom nuclear project is scarce, analogy can be drawn from the Egypt-Rosatom agreement in which Rosatom provided a construction loan of US$ 25 billion for the 4.5 gigawatts nuclear project. The loan is projected to have an annual interest of around 3% beginning from the 10th to 13th year after the loan is made for a period of 22-28 years. At repayment, the 3% annual interest could have increased the debt by as much as 40%.

The implication is that the country receiving the nuclear plant may pay very little at onset, but the country’s fiscal space and electricity consumers could be faced with a massive burden when the repayments kick in. It is argued that most African economies may never be able to meet such debt obligations, given that the possibility of recouping funds from electricity sales is low. Furthermore, the nuclear industry is seen to have a history of cost overruns due to delays in construction, suggesting that the country receiving nuclear plant will likely face a higher-than-expected debt servicing cost. This raises concerns that future debt may position Russia to exert disproportionate influence over the affairs of the debtor country in the long-run.

The cost implications of nuclear project should be an issue of concern for Nigeria, given cost-recovery challenges presently faced by power generation companies (Gencos) mostly due to low electricity tariffs that has proven politically and structurally difficult to raise. In addition, the country’s fiscal balances remains very susceptible to oil price and production shocks so affordability might be a major concern.

  1. How feasible and safe is nuclear power in an economy characterized by inefficiencies?

Nigeria has existing nuclear facilities for other purposes except electricity generation. A case in point is the multi-billion naira Gamma Irradiation Facility within the national Nuclear Technology Centre (NTC). However, existing nuclear facilities are barely functional due to several challenges including: government’s financial constraints, non-prioritization in energy programme, corruption, and cynicism about the risks of nuclear waste and radiation on health and environment.

Despite the challenges, the prospective nuclear power project for electricity generation in Nigeria has been deemed feasible and safe by several stakeholders. Positive evaluation reports by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the feasibility of deploying nuclear energy for electricity generation in the country, lead to the activation of the NAEC in 2006. Furthermore, reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), following Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions to Nigeria, has been quite optimistic. Several missions carried out between 2015 and 2018 concluded that Nigeria’s emergency preparedness and response framework was consistent with IAEA safety standards. The review team often observe notable progress in strengthening the infrastructure for the new research reactors. In addition, a great deal of work has been done to establish appropriate legal framework and educate specialists in the NTC.

While standards seem high at onset, maintenance may be an issue especially after the project handover, given historical and current inefficiencies. For instance, Nigeria’s current thermal plants are operating below capacity due to poor maintenance and frequent disruptions to fuel (gas) flow. In addition, the country’s current installed thermal capacity is 12,500 megawatts, but in practice, it is only 3,200 megawatts.  Such inefficiencies reinforces the potential cost implications of the nuclear project.

Going forward: If nuclear plants are to be effectively operated in Nigeria, the following considerations should be incorporated in the projects’ regulatory and operational framework. These include:

  • An informed evidence-based arrangement for cost-recovery and loan repayment needs to be made.
  • Practical measures for enforcement, with penalties, need to be erected to ensure that a prospective nuclear electricity tariff/pricing schedule is followed through. This is important for safeguarding loan repayment.
  • A well-thought out plan for securing financial and human resources, needed to maintain the nuclear facilities and safeguard uranium to power the nuclear plants over the long-run, should be crafted.
  • Legal clauses that would guarantee commitment to the plan by successive government regimes should be entrenched in to the framework.
  • Continuous public awareness on the implications of nuclear power on health and environment as well as the need to maintain highest echelon of safety measures must accompany any nuclear power project in Nigeria, even decades after construction.
  • Sustainable measures to ensure that safety of the workers and residents in nuclear site locations must be guaranteed and never jeopardized.
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