The Centre for
the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA) and The African School of Economics
(ASE), recently lent their voices to two separate appeals to developed
countries of the world, to offer the urgently-needed assistance to Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) in their struggle with the Coronavirus pandemic.
Dr. Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala and Prof. Leonard Wantchekon, founders of CSEA and ASE
respectively, are part of a group of 20 global experts in Economics and Health,
who collectively signed a letter
to members of G20 ahead of an extraordinary meeting on the pandemic, urging them
to quickly come to the aid of the developing world in this crisis. They are both
also part of a group of over 200 world leaders and experts (including former
British prime ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown) who signed a letter to
the G20 after the release of the communique from their extraordinary meeting,
outlining the specific, critical, resource-requirements for the various
necessary lines of aid-effort in healthcare and economic terms for poor
countries.
For months, the healthcare capacities of even the most high-income countries have been overwhelmed by COVID-19, and the forced mitigation-response of population lockdowns (to prevent spread through human-contact) have left their economies tethering on the brink of recession. Even though the numbers of infected in Third World countries remain relatively low for the most part so far, their situations are expected to greatly worsen shortly. This bodes rather ill for these poorer economies – in the sense that the extent of their healthcare-response preparedness will prove immensely deficient in the event of ballooning infection-rates, and their already-fragile economies will not survive the demobilization of their labour forces in necessary lockdowns for very long. As a matter of fact, what is greatly feared is that the imminent circumstances of profound lack in support (resource and medical) to impoverished populations in the face of stringent social restrictions and growing infections will cause these societies to explode with unrest. Hence, these countries are in dire need of emergency resource-aid on the economic and healthcare fronts, or they will face deep and multidimensional crises very soon. While the G20 has since responded, in their delay of debt-repayment for poor nations till between 2022 and 2024, this will sadly not suffice, and nothing short of full debt-forgiveness, as well as the required resource-aid, will allow these countries the fiscal heft to stand a fighting chance.
CSEA and ASE are two of the continents leading institutions in economic policy research, and as such are at the forefront of the advocacy to rescue African economies and societies, as well as those of other developing countries, from the certain chaos that this pandemic portends. With a history of successful collaborations in policy-development for the African continent – such as the Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE) initiative, both institutions have fittingly united in this all-important and timely push for resource-aid to poorer nations, in the hopes of spurring all the necessary action from global leaders, and expediently.
Faced with an invisible and novel enemy to fight, governments across the
globe have deliberately shut down their economies and placed cities on lockdown
in order to stem the spread of the COVID-19 virus. In Nigeria, two states and
the federal capital territory, have so far enforced a total lockdown, while
other control measures have been implemented in other states. These mitigation
strategies, albeit necessary, have affected the livelihood of most citizens, especially
those operating in the informal sector who rely on daily incomes for survival.
The Federal Government has introduced various social protection policies to
support vulnerable groups during the COVID-19 crises. These policies are
primarily targeted towards the 2.6million households on the social registry
for the vulnerable, and an additional 1 million households are to be provided
conditional cash transfer for 2months.
The present social
registry uses a three-stage targeting process based on geographical targeting,
community-based validation, and proxy-means-testing (PMT) in order to identify
the poorest of the poor in Nigeria. With over 90 million Nigerians living in
extreme poverty, the social registry covers only about 2% of the poor, excluding
many households given the enormous financial requirement for universal social
protection. While the coronavirus lockdown will negatively affect most
Nigerians, the impact will vary markedly across groups, even amongst the poor.
There are legitimate questions about the suitability of the existing social
registry as a reference for the groups most vulnerable to the economic shocks
induced by the coronavirus lockdown.
For the COVID-19
social protection interventions to be effective in curbing severe drops in basic
consumption (largely food and housing), they need to be well targeted to those
most vulnerable to Covid-19 shocks. Those most likely to be affected by
COVID-19 lockdown measures are not necessarily the most vulnerable groups
nationwide, and are likely to be missing from the social
registry used for the Federal Government’s social protection measures.
What is known about
the current social protection registry is that it largely covers agricultural
and rural households, especially those with human capacity constraints.
However, these groups are also less likely to be negatively affected by the
economic shocks induced by the lockdown for a number of reasons: First, they
are largely isolated from the major economic centers, being primarily rural and
agricultural, hence basic livelihoods remain minimally unaffected by the
lockdown. Second, the transportation of food items is excluded from the
lockdown, which means that rural farmers may continue to get their produce to
markets. Third, and more important, most households in this group produce a
majority of what they consume, and are therefore better able to maintain basic
consumption levels during the lockdown.
In order to more effectively target groups of the poor that are most vulnerable to negative consumption shocks during the COVID-19 lockdown, we need to ask, in the most basic terms: which groups of people need to earn an income every day in order to purchase food? Put another way, poor households whose basic income and consumption patterns are more closely tied to the market would be most likely to be negatively affected by the lockdown. In this piece, we profile the characteristics of the groups that are most likely to be affected by the government lockdown and restriction of economic activities vis-à-vis those on the social registry, explain why COVID-19 social protection interventions ought to be better targeted to these groups, and suggest ways to improve poverty targeting for those affected by the coronavirus shock.
Using data from the Nigeria Demographic and Health surveys (2008 and 2013), we find that the urban poor is more likely to work in non-agricultural occupations, which often involves commuting between suburbs and satellite towns into the urban core. Here, we may think of drivers, cleaners, sales associates, and operators of micro-enterprises, etc. Incomes from these occupations that involve work in the city’s core are the most likely to be affected by the lockdown in economic activities. While most agricultural activities will slow down, the exception to food transportation, storage, and sales, means that income loss here will be minimized. Furthermore, data from the National Living Standards survey (2010) shows that 64% of the food consumed by the poor in rural areas comes from food that they produce themselves (auto-consumption), compared to just 22% for poor urban households. This implies that the urban poor is significantly more likely to experience a greater decrease in food consumption with a decrease in market income.
Overall, the data reveal that the urban poor are more likely to suffer a decline in incomes as a result of the economic lockdown introduced to control the spread of COVID-19. As a result, the urban poor is also substantially more likely to suffer a decrease in food and other consumption, because unlike rural households, they largely consume what they are able to buy from market incomes. The urban poor have their livelihoods more closely tied to the market, and with a market shutdown, they are better targets for supplementary incomes/consumption intended to alleviate the hardships induced by COVID-19. This category of the poor is largely underrepresented in the current social protection registry.
Alternative Targeting
Mechanism for the Urban Poor
The preceding discussion highlighted the inadequacy of the present
social register as the urban poor are not sufficiently captured. However, it is
difficult or impossible to rebuild or update the social registry in the midst
of the pandemic. The government will need to explore alternative targeting
mechanisms in the immediate term. One key characteristic of the urban poor is
that they mostly live in slums, which enables them to minimize rental costs in
cities. Social security targeted at the slums and other geographical locations
where the urban poor people reside will be crucial. The Government can
also leverage on the social infrastructure and local knowledge of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have worked with urban poor in the
past. With proper accountability in place, non-state actors can assist in the
identification of the vulnerable households and suggest other effective ways of
reaching them. This suggests a combination of geographic targeting complemented
by community identification.
The efficacy of targeting through direct deposit into individuals’ accounts using their unique Bank Verification Number (BVN) will be weak in the present circumstances. With 36.8% of the adult population in Nigeria still financially excluded, targeting only those with a low balance in their account will exclude the most vulnerable people, who are less likely to have a bank account, and might find it more difficult to get into a bank location where they are able to withdraw cash. Further, using the banking approach also means individuals rather than households will be targeted. Without a quality system for auditing to check duplication, using BVN alone is susceptible to abuse. In some households, multiple members might be able to take advantage of the palliatives at the expense of financially excluded households.
Irrespective of the mechanism adopted by the government, it is important to emphasize that apart from food security, adequate measures are required to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among urban poor. The optimal poverty targeting for the urban poor must, therefore, incorporate social distancing at its core.
With 1.39 million coronavirus cases and 79,382
deaths globally, the world continues to battle the COVID-19
pandemic. Even before the outbreak, the outlook for the world economy—and
especially developing countries like Nigeria—was fragile, as global GDP growth
was estimated to be only 2.5 percent in 2020. While many developing countries
have recorded relatively fewer cases—Nigeria currently has 238 confirmed cases and 5 deaths as of
this writing—the weak capacity of health care systems in these countries is
likely to exacerbate the pandemic and its impact on their economies.
THE IMPACT ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
Before the pandemic, the Nigerian government had been grappling
with weak recovery from the 2014 oil price shock, with GDP growth tapering
around 2.3 percent in 2019. In February, the IMF revised the 2020 GDP growth rate from 2.5
percent to 2 percent, as a result of relatively low oil prices and limited
fiscal space. Relatedly, the country’s debt profile has been a source of
concern for policymakers and development practitioners as the most recent
estimate puts the debt service-to-revenue ratio at 60 percent, which is likely
to worsen amid the steep decline in revenue associated with falling oil prices.
These constraining factors will aggravate the economic impact of the COVID-19
outbreak and make it more difficult for the government to weather the crisis.
AGGREGATE DEMAND WILL FALL, BUT
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE WILL RISE
In
Nigeria, efforts were already being made to bolster aggregate demand through
increased government spending and tax cuts for businesses. The public budget increased
from 8.83 trillion naira ($24.53 billion) in 2019 to 10.59 trillion naira
($29.42 billion) in 2020, representing 11 percent of the national GDP, while
small businesses have been exempted from company income tax, and the tax rate
for medium-sized businesses has been revised downwards from 30 to 20 percent.
Unfortunately, the COVID-19 crisis is causing all components of aggregate
demand, except for government purchases, to fall (Figure 1).
The fall in household consumption in
Nigeria will stem from 1) partial (or full) restrictions on movement, thus
causing consumers to spend primarily on essential goods and services; 2) low
expectations of future income, particularly by workers in the gig economy that
are engaged on a short-term/contract basis, as well as the working poor in the
informal economy; and 3) the erosion of wealth and expected wealth as a result
of the decline in assets such as stocks and home equity. The federal government
has imposed a lockdown in Lagos and Ogun states as well as Abuja (which have
the highest number of coronavirus cases combined). Subnational governments have
quickly followed suit by imposing lockdowns in their states. Nigeria has a
burgeoning gig economy as well as a large informal sector, which
contributes 65 percent of its economic output. Movement
restrictions have not only reduced the consumption of nonessential commodities
in general, but have affected the income-generating capacity of these groups,
thus reducing their consumption expenditure.
Investments by firms will be impeded largely
due to the uncertainties that come with the pandemic-limited knowledge about
the duration of the outbreak, the effectiveness of policy measures, and the
reaction of economic agents to these measures—as well as negative investor
sentiments, which are causing turbulence in capital markets around the world.
Indeed, the crisis has led to a massive decline in stock prices, as the
Nigerian Stock Exchange records its worst performance since the 2008 financial
crisis, which has eroded the wealth of investors. Taking into consideration the
uncertainty that is associated with the pandemic and the negative profit
outlook on possible investment projects, firms are likely to hold off on
long-term investment decisions.
On the other hand, government purchases will
increase as governments, which typically can afford to run
budget deficits, utilize fiscal stimulus measures to counteract the fall in
consumer spending. However, for governments that are commodity dependent, the fall in the global demand for commodities stemming
from the pandemic will significantly increase their fiscal deficits. In
Nigeria’s case, the price of Brent crude was just over $26 a barrel on April 2,
whereas Nigeria’s budget assumes a price of $57 per barrel and would still have
run on a 2.18 trillion naira ($6.05 billion) deficit. Similarly, with oil
accounting for 90 percent of Nigeria’s exports, the decline in the demand for
oil and oil prices will adversely affect the volume and value of net exports.
Indeed, the steep decline in oil prices associated with the pandemic has
necessitated that the Nigerian government cut planned expenditure. In fact, on
March 18, the minister of finance announced a 1.5 trillion naira ($4.17
billion) cut in nonessential capital spending.
The restrictions on movement of people and border closures
foreshadow a decline in exports. Already,
countries around the world have closed their borders to nonessential traffic,
and global supply chains for exports have been disrupted. Although the exports
of countries that devalue their currency due to the fall in the price of
commodities (like Nigeria), will become more affordable, the limited markets
for nonessential goods and services nullifies the envisaged positive effect on
net exports.
WHAT ARE THE POLICY RESPONSES BY THE
NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT?
Already,
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has arranged a fiscal stimulus package,
including a 50 billion naira ($138.89 million) credit facility to households
and small and medium enterprises most affected by the pandemic, a 100 billion
naira ($277.78 million) loan to the health sector, and a 1 trillion naira
($2.78 billion) to the manufacturing sector. In addition, the interest rates on
all CBN interventions have been revised downwards from 9 to 5 percent, and a
one-year moratorium on CBN intervention facilities has been introduced,
effective March 1.
With
oil being Nigeria’s major source of foreign exchange, amid the steep decline in
oil prices, the official exchange rate has been adjusted from 306 to 360 naira.
The exchange rate under the investors and exporters (I&E) window has also
been adjusted from 360 to 380 naira in order to unify the exchange rates across
the I&E window, Bureau de Change, and retail and wholesale windows.
Furthermore, the government has introduced import duty waivers for
pharmaceutical companies and increased efforts toward ensuring that they
receive forex.
WHAT OTHER POLICY RESPONSES CAN BE
IMPLEMENTED?
Given
the size and scope of the economic impact of the pandemic, there is the need to
implement other recovery strategies to stimulate demand. Thus, we recommend the
following fiscal and monetary policy measures:
Although there is a cash transfer program in place, the federal
government should improve efforts towards enhancing the efficiency and
effectiveness of the distributive mechanisms to reach households that are
worst-hit by the pandemic.
The
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) as well as State Inland Revenue Services
(SIRS) should waive payments on personal and corporate income tax for the
second quarter of 2020, considering that the shock has affected the income and
profits of households and businesses.
The
CBN’s decision to increase the cash reserve ratio (CRR) from 22.5 percent to
27.5 percent in January 2020 should be revisited to provide liquidity for banks
so that banks can, in turn, create credit to the private sector.
FIRS
and SIRS should delay tax collection for the worse-hit sectors including
tourism, the airline industry, and hoteliers in order to enable them recover
from the steep decline in demand.
To
provide additional liquidity in the forex market, the CBN should establish a
swap facility with the U.S. Federal Reserve and/or the People’s Bank of China,
as was done in 2018, to provide dollar and yen liquidity to financial
institutions, investors, and exporters. This move would ease up forex shortage
in the financial market and economy.
While the naira has been adjusted as a result of the forex
shortage, it is important that the CBN maintains exchange rate stability by
deploying external reserves in order to avoid investors selling off
naira-denominated assets.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a wake-up call to policymakers as the unusual and unprecedented nature of the crisis has made it impossible for citizens to rely on foreign health care services and more difficult to solicit for international support given the competing demand for medical supplies and equipment. A more integrated response spanning several sectors—including the health, finance, and trade sectors—is required to address structural issues that make the country less resilient to shocks and limit its range of policy responses. In the long term, tougher decisions need to be made, including but not limited to diversifying the country’s revenue base away from oil exports and improving investments in the health care sector in ensuring that the economy is able to recover quickly from difficult conditions in the future.
The Global Health Hazards and Economic Impacts of COVID-19
In December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases from an unknown virus surfaced in Wuhan, China. Based on initial laboratory findings, the disease named Coronavirus disease 2019 (abbreviated as COVID-19), was described as an infectious disease that is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. The COVID-19 outbreak has since spread to about 196 countries and territories in every continent and one international conveyance across the globe. While there are ongoing efforts to curtail the spread of infection which is almost entirely driven by human-to-human transmission, it has accounted for over 400,000 confirmed cases with over 18,000 deaths[1].
Beyond the tragic health hazards and human consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic uncertainties, and disruptions that have resulted come at a significant cost to the global economy. The United Nations Trade and Development Agency (UNCTAD) put the cost of the outbreak at about US$2 trillion in 2020. Most central banks, finance ministries and independent economic experts around the world have taken solace in the prediction that the impacts might be sharp but short-lived, and economic activities would return to normal thereafter. This line of thought mirrors the thinking of the events that shaped the 2007 global financial crisis. However, it is quite instructive to note that the 2007 crisis which emanated from the United States’ subprime mortgage crisis was mainly an economic phenomenon, with its fallout spreading across many regions of the world. When compared to COVID-19, the 2007 crisis could be described as minor and manageable. The tumultuous events that COVID-19 had spread across the globe cut across every facet of human existence and the consequences may linger beyond the second half of 2020.
The slowdown in the global economy and lockdown in some countries, such as Italy, Spain and most Eurozone economies and beyond, as a result, COVID-19 has also taken its toll on the global demand for oil. The decline in oil demand is estimated to surpass the loss of nearly 1 million barrels per day during the 2007-08 recession. This is also coming at a time when two key players in the global oil industry – Russia and the OPEC cartel – are at loggerheads on the decision to cut output. The unequivocal oil price war started between these two global oil market giants may have more dire consequences on the oil price that has started to dive. .
Sector-specific implications and impacts could vary. For example, the impacts on the global aviation and tourism sectors are a result of the implications of the pandemic on global travel. As discretionary spending by consumers continues to decline, cruise companies, hotels, and hospitality are facing declining demand and patronage. For example, in Hungary alone, about 40 to 50% of hotel reservations have been canceled. Also, the pandemic is placing up to 8 million jobs in the leisure and hospitality sector at risk, with travel crashes and cancellations expected to continue. Moody’s Analytics, a rating agency, stated that more than half of the jobs in the United States which is about 80 million may be in jeopardy.
The virus is also taking its toll on health facilities and infrastructures across the globe. Italy is currently the largest affected country with a number of deaths surpassing China, since the outbreak of coronavirus. Across northern Italy, the virus has pushed the country’s National Health Service to a breaking point, emphasizing the test that other countries, especially developing and low-income countries, might face in their approach to contain the virus spread. Most hospitals and health facilities that could not handle the hazards are resulting to operating below their capacity by taking a few regular health-related cases or shutting down. What could be more devastating is the fact that the economic pains that accompanied the virus might not go away soon as envisaged.
The conventional policy measures currently being taken such as reducing interest rates and costs of borrowing, tax cuts and tax holidays are quite remarkable. However, these conventional policy measures are quite potent when there are demand shocks. There are limitations to the successes that can be recorded when demand shocks are combined with supply shocks. It is already apparent from the emergence of the current crisis that there are implications on the economy from both the demand and supply sides. Some of the demand factors include social distancing with consumers staying at home, limitations in spending and declining consumptions. On the supply side, factories are shutting down or cutting down production and output, while in other instances, staff work from home to limit physical contact.
The decision to close educational institutions and schools around the globe in an attempt to contain the pandemic has also led to a soaring number of children, youth and adults not attending schools. According to UNESCO Monitoring report on COVID-19 educational disruption and response, the impact of school closures in the over 100 countries that have implemented the decisions around the world has impacted over half of the global students’ population. These educational disruptions are being escalated particularly for the most vulnerable members of society.
Bracing up for COVID-19 consequences on the Nigerian economy
For most developing economies, the odds of sliding into a downturn are gradually expected as the global coronavirus outbreak puts severe pressure on the economy. For Nigeria, the country is still sluggishly grappling with recovery from the 2016 economic recession which was a fall out of global oil price crash and insufficient foreign exchange earnings to meet imports. In the spirit of economic recovery and growth sustainability, the Nigerian federal budget for the 2020 fiscal year was prepared with significant revenue expectations but with contestable realizations. The approved budget had projected revenue collections at N8.24 Trillion, an increase of about 20% from 2019 figure. The revenue assumptions are premised on increased global oil demand and stable market with oil price benchmark and oil output respectively at $57 per barrel and 2.18 Million Barrels Per Day.
The emergence of COVID-19 and its increasing incidence in Nigeria has called for drastic review and changes in the earlier revenue expectations and fiscal projections. Compared to events that led to recession in 2016, the current state of the global economy poses more difficulties ahead as the oil price is currently below US$30 with projections that it will dip further going by the price war among key players in the industry. Unfortunately, the nation has grossly underachieved in setting aside sufficient buffers for rainy days such as it faces in the coming days. In addressing these daunting economic challenges, the current considerations to revise the budget downward is inevitable. However, certain considerations that are expected in the review must not be left out. The assumptions and benchmarks must be based on realizable thresholds and estimates to ensure optimum budget performance, especially on the non-oil revenue components.
Furthermore, cutting expenditures must be done such that the already excluded group and vulnerable are not left to bear the brunt of the economic contraction. The economic and growth recovery program which has the aim of increasing social inclusion by creating jobs and providing support for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society through investments in social programs and providing social amenities will no doubt suffers some setbacks. Besides, the downward review of the budget and contractions in public spending could be devastating on poverty and unemployment. The last unemployment report released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) ranks Nigeria 21st among 181 countries with an unemployment rate of about 23.1%. The country has also been rated as the poverty capital of the world with an estimated 87 million people living on less than $2 a day threshold.
The decision to cut the retail price of gasoline under a price modulation arrangement is a welcome development. The cut is expected to curb rising inflation, especially food price inflation which will mainly benefit the poor. However, rather than the price capping regime introduced, by which it is expected of the Petroleum Products Price Regulation Agency (PPPRA) to constantly issues monthly guide on appropriate pricing regime. It is expected that the government will use this opportunity to completely deregulate the petroleum industry in line with existing suggestions and reports. In the event that the global economy becomes healthier and crude oil prices increases, the government might return to the under-recovery of the oil price shortfall by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). A policy that annually costs the government huge revenue and recurring losses to the NNPC.
Basically, the Nigerian government essentially must lead economic diversification drive. It is one practicable way to saddle through the current economic uncertainties and instabilities. What the consequences of COVID-19 pandemic should further offer the Nigerian economic managers and policymakers, is that the one-tracked, monolithic reliance on oil is failing. Diversification priorities to alternative sectors such as agriculture, solid minerals, manufacturing and services sectors, should be further intensified.
[1] These figures were recorded as a 24th March, 2020.
Here is what we know – COVID-19 has no
known cure (at the time of writing this article). We also realize that given
the dearth of medical infrastructure in Nigeria, a full-blown pandemic would
pose a rather dangerous threat. On the bright side, the mechanism of the
disease’s transmission is clear – we know that it happens primarily through
close contact with carriers of the causal Coronavirus, either by imbibing
virulent bodily fluids (mucus, sputum) from them aerially, or through tactile
contact with virus-riddled surfaces. In light of all established knowledge, the
primary defence against the spread of the pandemic has therefore been the
enforcement of social distancing and self-isolation within affected and
at-risk populations, to minimize contact between the infected and uninfected. Countries
like China have achieved significant declines in rates of new infections,
largely by this method.
What may not be very clear at this point
however, is precisely how profound the Nigeria (COVID-19) disease-scenario is. In-country data on infected persons may
very well not be completely accurate representations of reality, as tested
persons so far have predominantly emerged from the upper end of the income
divide – most probably for reasons of limited resources and low knowledge-access
among populations at the other end. What is more, the vast majority of
Nigerians exist on that poverty side of things, and live in impoverished physical
conditions. These groups (who will almost certainly not present for testing,
except when compelled to by personal crisis) are potentially a tinderbox for
the exponential spread of the pandemic, given the unsanitary environments and
lifestyles that their impoverishment reinforces, as well as the fact that the methodologies
of social distancing and self-isolation are hardly feasible among their ranks. They
are, in addition, significantly less able to access and utilize vital
information regarding prevention and management of the disease (for reasons of
education and resource-limitation). The point is this – the COVID-19 situation
in Nigeria at this time is precarious (in terms of risk to life and health) –
perhaps more so than is apparent – and this is largely because of that poverty-dimension.
What is more, the current government response of enforced shutdown of economic
and other activities within most-hit states ( shutdown will probably be effected
in other states soon) will also deeply and adversely affect the livelihoods, and
therefore, lives of the poor, whose incomes are often earned and exhausted on
the same day.
For these reasons, Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria are in very significant jeopardy. According to the
United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), over 2 million Nigerians
have been displaced from (Boko Haram) insurgency hotspots in Northeast Nigeria
since 2009. These migrants have settled into IDP Camps across the country,
which are characterized for the most part by overcrowded populations amidst
severe infrastructure deficits. IDP populations in Nigeria are dominated by
poorly educated, rural, farm-folk, who are hardly able to achieve meaningful
livelihoods in their new, mostly urban settlements. They are for this reason typically
impoverished and dependent on humanitarian-aid for even their sustenance; and
have very limited access to healthcare or water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
amenities as well. In the past, these terrible living conditions have rendered
IDP camps a cesspool for dangerous medical crises – in 2017 for example, there
were over 4,800 cases of Cholera and 61 deaths, in
an outbreak across IDP Camps in Nigeria.
One can therefore see how this looming COVID-19
pandemic would give cause for grave concern regarding the level of risk their
situation exposes Nigeria’s IDPs to – and further to that, how much risk they might
pose to the larger population (could IDP
settlements for instance inadvertently become repository-populations for the
virus, and vehicles for its proliferation?). In the event that it is not
immediately clear, here are some of the reasons for this concern:
WITH
CHARACTERISTICALLY LIMITED LIVING-SPACES IN IDP CAMPS, SOCIAL DISTANCING AND
SELF-ISOLATION WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE
The reality is that, with regard to how
overcrowded they are, most IDP camps in Nigeria are unfit for a healthy living
anyway. Typical camps consist of makeshift or poorly-built housing that hold
multiple times the number of occupants that they should; while common areas and
outdoor spaces, even amidst recent events, constantly have numerous people
congregating within them. These IDP Camps are in essence, in the current
climate, accidents waiting to happen.
POOR
INFORMATION-ACCESS AND LOW EDUCATION-LEVELS COULD HEIGHTEN SPREAD
Information and knowledge have proved
formidable, and effective, weapons so far in the fight against the spread of
COVID-19. Across the globe, we have seen and learned from other sources,
accounts from different countries of how to successfully prevent incidence. Information
of this sort might however not be fully appreciated by poorly educated persons
such as IDPs, even when they can access it – for lack of proper comprehension
of the situation. For instance, some Nigerians still had to be forcibly barred
from gathering publicly only recently. This is an attitude that represents a
potential to enable spread of the disease amidst measures to curb it. Until the
time when observing the reality of the pandemic foists an understanding of the
situation’s true gravity upon them, demographics such as the IDP, might
function as loopholes for the propagation of COVID-19; in their disregard of
safety conventions.
LIMITED
ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE MIGHT CAUSE MULTIPLE TYPES OF ADVERSE OUTCOMES
If one envisages a scenario of panic where
a great number of IDPs require urgent, life-saving medical care that is in
short supply, it is easy to understand how things might escalate at that point.
Caregivers to, and family of the dangerously ill (even the moderately ill
themselves) might easily in that time succumb to a desperation in their actions,
which would put everyone else at risk – in both health and civil terms.
TRUNCATION
OF INCOME (FROM LOCKDOWNS) WILL AFFECT IDPs MORE THAN MOST
IDP populations typically have no means of
cushioning a cessation of earnings, even for short periods. A situation such as
the one that has been imposed in some places, and which portends in others – where
all monetary inflow is stopped (during state-wide lockdowns) – simply holds the
implication of potential starvation for IDP families. They will not survive
without external help.
The state of things is deeply concerning
all round, but there are measures that can be taken to forestall doom:
Government, as well as
humanitarian players, should scale up current response-plans, to cover
vulnerable and at-risk populations such as IDPs in every foreseeable dimension
during this pandemic – this means adequate healthcare for treatment and
prevention, as well as food and other resources needed.
Communication strategies should
be formulated and enacted, which will effectively demonstrate the full
dimensions of the current problem to IDPs, alongside proper methods of
preventing spread and managing infections. The consequences of aberrant
behaviour on everyone involved should be fully explained to them as well – it
is paramount at this time to communicate acceptance to IDPs into their host
communities, so that within crises they would think and act constructively as
community-members, and not destructively as disgruntled outliers.
Basic, healthcare and WASH
facilities should be provided at this time to IDP Camps across the country as
preventive measures, to enable them stem spread within their communities.
With all (sanitized and/or washed) hands on (a properly disinfected) deck, we should, IDPs and non-IDPs alike, prevail in the end.