On January 1, 2021, the long-anticipated African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) became a reality. The benefits of creating a single African market under the AfCFTA are wide-ranging and potentially revolutionary. By reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-African trade, the initiative could boost regional exports by 29 percent and income by 7 percent between 2020 and 2035. There is also optimism that greater access to a larger market base could reduce production costs and lead to greater economies of scale for local producers and exporters.

But AfCFTA’s potential might not be fully realized without stronger digital connectivity and effective policies that (1) promote the free flow of data and information across member states to facilitate knowledge sharing and collaboration and (2) reduce trade integration costs and address existing structural barriers to intra-regional trade in Africa.

How digitalization can help to address structural barriers to trade in Africa

At the most basic level, AfCFTA is governed by five operational instruments (an online negotiating forum; a digital payment system; the monitoring and elimination of non-tariff barriers; the African Trade Observatory (ATO); and rules of origin), all of which require effective digital connectivity to be successful. More importantly, developing the continent’s digital sector is crucial for economic integration and could help address some long-standing structural trade barriers while ensuring that the gains arising from the AfCFTA are equitably shared. Examples of how strengthening the digital economy can break down these barriers include:

• Digitalization ensures optimal trade and business processes resulting in cost reduction. The use of digital technologies can reduce transaction costs such as search costs, language barriers, and coordination of logistics that are associated with traditional delivery channels. Greater adoption of digitalization in customs’ management and procedures can also improve regulatory inefficiencies to speed up transit and clearance of exports; this could reduce additional export costs like demurrage charges to suppliers. As the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic indicates, business adaption and resilience to shocks are more enhanced with access to digital platforms.
• Faster and easier information flow for improved participation in the global supply chain: Digital platforms have proven particularly useful in connecting potential buyers and sellers in multiple jurisdictions and eliminating burdensome processes in the value chain. Digitally sharing information about regulations and standards among market actors, and allowing better knowledge of consumer preferences, increases access to trade opportunities. Greater availability of market intelligence through big data analysis can make it easier for African suppliers to increase their participation in global value chains beyond just providing raw materials and inputs.
• Greater access to markets, especially for small enterprises which make up the vast majority of firms in most countries:In Nigeria, for example, 95 percent of firms fall into the category of micro and small enterprises. These businesses generally have less capacity in terms of financing options and digital skills to adapt their business operations to compete in the regional and global markets. Indeed, in Nigeria only 18 percent of micro and small enterprises are even aware of AfCFTA, compared to 67 percent of medium-scale enterprises. Digital technologies can increase the economic access of the disadvantaged groups, including those operating in the informal sector and in rural areas by removing barriers to business expansion while promoting the development of more efficient services for the continent’s rapidly growing consumer class. In addition, digitalization could promote access to fintech credit facilities, crowdfunding, and other less stringent funding and payment options for small-sized export firms to improve their capacity to expand and serve a larger customer base. E-commerce platforms also provide less costly opportunities to build and accumulate verifiable digital presence and track record which can increase such firms’ ability to attract new domestic and foreign business partners and customers.

Despite the vast potential and importance of digitalization for regional integration, digital development remains low across Africa. The problem is notable in two crucial areas: digital penetration and data governance framework. The capacity to address these challenges will determine the AfCFTA’s success. We briefly highlight the critical issues along these areas.

Digital penetration and preparedness are still very low in Africa

Access to the internet remains limited in Africa, with 47 percent of the continent’s population able to access the internet, compared to a global average of 63 percent. The quality of digital infrastructure is also poor, with slower 2G still accounting for 59 percent of the available mobile technology generation mix and 4G penetration at just 6 percent of the mix. It is therefore unsurprising that most African countries are inadequately prepared to leverage the global digital revolution.

To gauge the implication of this on the AfCFTA, which is expected to be facilitated mainly through online transactions, we measure the correlation between an index of digital preparedness among African countries, and an index measuring the commitment and readiness for AfCFTA. Figure 1 suggests a positive relationship, which implies countries with weaker starting positions on the digital preparedness index are more likely to be left behind as benefits from the AfCFTA accrue to better-prepared countries.

Figure 1. Relationship between Digital Preparedness and Readiness for AfCFTA

Disruptions caused by COVID-19 have already highlighted the importance of better digital connectivity across AfCFTA members. The AfCFTA Phase II negotiations, which were forced online due to the pandemic, were slowed by connectivity problems and concerns about the security of online discussions. Given that governments continue to experience difficulties digitally connecting with one another, small and micro firms and households undoubtedly face more severe challenges.

The absence of national and regional data governance frameworks is a problem

Supporting greater cross-border economic activities on the continent will lead to increased cross-border data sharing. It also requires greater harmonization on how AfCFTA members govern the use of data and digital systems like payments and digital identity, and greater coordination on issues such as taxation of digital platforms and industrial policies aimed at supporting digital entrepreneurs.

Since trust is a prerequisite for ensuring uninterrupted cross-border digital interactions, a clear data governance structure at the national and regional levels is needed. Such laws are required to allay fears related to protection of citizen’s constitutional rights, including the rights to privacy, data protection, and freedom of speech.

There have been some initial steps: At a regional level, the African Union (AU) initiated a Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection in 2014. However, it is still pending ratification, as only eight countries have assented. More recently, the AU, alongside other development partners, developed a digital transformation strategy for the region. The strategy’s objective is to serve as a roadmap in harnessing digital technologies to promote a fully integrated and inclusive digital society by 2030, with the hope that it improves the welfare of Africa’s population. Since the strategy is relatively new, it is premature to assess its effectiveness. Despite these regional action plans and convention, a robust and coordinated regional data governance framework to ensure seamless data interoperability is lacking.

The United Nations Congress on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that a significant number of African economies have yet to enact legislation to safeguard digital transactions and data use (figure 2). And due to countries’ varying digital maturity levels, most African countries that have or are drafting data protection laws are adopting different rather than harmonized strategies, risking market fragmentation. Enforcement capacity, financial and human resources, and reliable institutions to support a well-functioning data governance environment are also lacking in most countries.

Figure 2. Number of African countries that have adopted digital protection-related legislation

Source: UNCTAD E-Commerce Legislation Index - April 2020

The way forward

To increase the competitiveness of the African digital economy and maximize the potential of the AfCFTA, governments, non-state actors, and development institutions should collaborate to ensure the speedy implementation and enforcement of data governance policies and laws that guarantee trust, transparency and increase digital inclusiveness.

Beyond ensuring security of data flows, it has become extremely critical to build the soft and hard infrastructure for a well-positioned African digital economy, through expanded access to digital technologies, wider internet adoption, improved public expenditure on information communications technology infrastructure, and a more conducive regulatory environment for private sector investments in the sector. The African Development Bank’s Programme on Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA) is one vehicle to achieve this. However, it will require a stronger linkage to AfCFTA for better trade facilitation and a more supportive legal framework. This could be in form of providing guidelines on minimum standards, a shared pool of resources, and a timeframe for effecting harmonized interventions especially for countries that are lagging in growing their digital economy. Further, at the country level, digitalization must become a top development priority for governments, with necessary policy reforms and budgetary allocations to accelerate digitalization and deliver on shared prosperity that the AfCFTA promises.

This article was first published at Centre for Global Development

With the passing into law of the reformed Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 2020) which replaces the CAMA 1990 Act, Nigeria is uniquely positioned to be in the top 20 of doing business rating globally by 2030. At this time when the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), one of the world largest Continental Trade Area (CTA)- with 54 African member nations signed,  the reformed CAMA Act could be a big boost to the Ease-of-Doing-Business (EoDB) for Nigerian Micro-Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) to flourish under a competitive environment. This piece highlights some of the critical changes which the new CAMA Act introduces to the principal framework regulating the business climate in Nigeria and how it could promote MSMEs to be competitive under the AfCFTA.

Background of Companies and Allied Matters Act in Nigeria

Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) is one of the critical pieces of legislation which enhances better business climate and promotes Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (MSMEs). The Act provides a regulatory framework for how businesses should be carried out in the country.The CAMA 1990 Act, which repeal CAMA act of 1968 reshaped the business environment of Nigeria in the 90’s. CAMA 1990 was passed into law to establish the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), providing for the incorporation of companies and incidental matters, registration of business names and the incorporation of Trustees of certain Communities, bodies and Associations. The Act was promulgated to repeal the Companies Act of 1968. However, in the last 30 years of promulgation into law, the Nigerian corporate landscape has transformed with global and regional demand for business integration. Hence, the CAMA 1990 Act was heavily hamstrung by several provisions of the Act which limits modern business practices in the light of national and global reforms. 

The private sector had clamoured for a reformed CAMA because the economy has changed, there are new parameters in the way of doing business both domestically and internationally. As a result of this, the need for public-private partnership in promoting sustainability in the business climate of the country after several attempts to review the CAMA 1990 was inevitable. Also, technological innovation in the business sector had propelled for collaboration for a new legislation that would align with global business practices. The signing into law of the CAMA 2020 has raised hope for the private sector with the recent regional trade integration (AfCFTA). However, without effective monitoring and implementation, this new reform especially in promoting MSMEs which are drivers of growth in developing nations would never fulfil its purpose. 

Figure 1.

Source: World Bank Group- Doing Business Reports

Nigeria had never been ranked in the global top 50 economies by the Doing Business report of the World Bank since inception, but the country had a steady EoDB score as shown in Figure 1. Also, Nigeria is reported as one of the 20 improvers of the ease in doing business among others- Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Togo, Bahrain, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, China, and India.

The impact of CAMA 2020 Act in the Ease of Doing Business

The objective of the reformed CAMA 2020 Act is to promote legislation for regulatory quality and efficiency which would enable efficient EoDB for Nigerian businesses in general, and MSMEs in particular. MSMEs are the engine of growth for most developing nations. As can be expected, without reforms for enabling business environments to sync with global business evolution, most businesses may shut down due to economic and environmental shocks. It follows logically that without reforms in a rapidly changing global market, most firms-MSMEs especially may not survive beyond the unanticipated COVID-19 pandemic.

Specifically, the reformed CAMA 2020 Act among other things, made the starting and running of business more seamless and less expensive by operationalizing electronic platforms that integrate the tax authority and the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). Considering that Nigeria is largely dominated by Medium and Small-Scale Enterprises (MSMEs), making business registration or company incorporation easier will bring in more businesses into the formal space. This also will enhance tax revenue for the government.  The Act has 870 sections and divided into 7 parts as against 612 sections in the repealed Act of 1990. 167 sections were completely new, while 91 sections were modified.

 Some of the major alterations made to the Act which directly promote the ease of doing business in Nigeria compared to the repealed Act and its implications on EoDB are highlighted in Table 1 below:

Table 1.

The amendments made in the CAMA 2020 Act may positively impact the EoDB in Nigeria especially at this time when the AfCFTA is implemented. Although, the Act had factored in new methods while embracing technological changes in the business world. It is expected that without practical implementation of the CAMA 2020 by the CAC, the country’s business landscape would not catch up with international business practices. Therefore, it is hoped that the practical administration of the new CAMA will help ease the strain of doing business, and will enhance productivity and promote ease of doing business in Nigeria.

The Nigerian education system is deep into crises on multiple fronts, including in areas of access and quality of education. However, the recent spate of mass kidnappings of schoolchildren arguably represents the gravest existential threat and crisis to the education system. In less than three months between December 2020 and March 2021, more than 600 children have been kidnapped while in school, in three separate incidents

More worrisome is the fact that the heightened insecurity is predominant in northern Nigeria, which is already the most educationally disadvantaged region. Of the estimated 10.5 million out-of-school children in the country, 69 percent come from the North, where cultural practices and economic deprivation limit children’s active participation in school, particularly females. The Boko Haram crisis, with its debilitating effects on economic and education systems, is also heavily concentrated in the region. Now, with the spate of recent school kidnappings, community and parental trust in the education system could shrink significantly, and the problem of access to quality and equitable education could become severely amplified. Furthermore, with the Nigerian education system still recovering from the devastating effects of the prolonged school closure from COVID-19, adding insecurity concerns to the basket of challenges could lead to its irrecoverable collapse.

Nigerian policymakers, school leaders, and communities must effectively and creatively come together to help reverse the current economic and education dynamics to avoid a catastrophic collapse.

STEPS TO MAKE SCHOOLS SAFER AGAIN

Targeted kidnapping of schoolchildren began in 2014 with the mass abduction of 276 female students in Chibok by Boko Haram insurgents. That event was ideologically motivated, and designed to extort concessions from the government. Recently, abductions have become more profit-driven, involving organized and unorganized criminal groups. The profit dimension to the kidnappings can easily complicate Nigeria’s security problems, as they could become more frequent given the high level of poverty and youth unemployment in the region amid the stark absence of legitimate economic opportunities. If education is to survive, it is crucial to urgently change the current dynamics and make schools safe again. This crisis requires swift and comprehensive action, both in prevention and supporting victims to minimize long-term damages. While the scope for improvement is vast and complex, here we outline four focus areas that—if addressed—might garner meaningful traction toward avoiding future school kidnappings and averting the further dismantling of education in Nigeria’s North.

1. Comprehensive threat assessment of schools in the entire Northern region, with subsequent closures and relocation

In all areas of the North, even those removed from the Boko Haram-controlled Northeast, numerous armed groups are increasingly seeing the potential to “cash in” on insecure schools through a “kidnap and ransom” approach. Conducting a threat assessment in all areas of the country deemed vulnerable to such armed groups—including evaluating the location of the schools, their relationship to the surrounding communities (through consultations with local traditional leaders), and the state of their infrastructure—should be a first step to assessing which schools are most at risk. Institutions determined to be unsafe should immediately be shut, with contingency plans in place to facilitate temporary alternative learning arrangements (here the lessons learned during the COVID-19 crisis may be useful), together with strategies for relocating students to safer environments. Preventing more kidnappings should be the priority, not only for the welfare of potential future victims, but also with a view to salvaging any remaining public confidence in the safety of schools and avoiding further insecurity-related dropouts, which Nigeria’s education system can ill afford.

2. The development of a strong community support network to ensure affected communities are not left behind

Children and their parents who fall victim to armed kidnapping groups cannot be left unaided. Ensuring that they mentally recover from their trauma should be a central tenet of any intervention strategy that seeks to limit the adverse impacts of kidnappings on education. Children need strong community support networks tailored to the needs of children in conflict zones, including the training of teachers to help students recover from traumatic experiences and a greater availability of guidance counselors experienced in assisting trauma victims. If children are not to become permanently disillusioned with education, the fostering of positive emotions through affirmative training and building happier school-associated memories is crucial.

3. A reevaluation and revamping of the Safe Schools Initiative

The Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) was launched with much fanfare in the aftermath of the globally publicized abduction of the Chibok girls by Boko Haram in 2014. After a promising start—including several tens of millions of dollars pledged by a coalition of the Nigerian government, international donors, and Nigerian business leaders; a plan to relocate students in high-risk areas; and strategies to strengthen education in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs)—it remains unclear how impactful the program has been so far.

While evidence of SSI’s success is lacking, this should not automatically lead to a disregard of its main principles. A reevaluation of its strong points, including its emphasis on the training of school staff to deal with emergencies and a focused extension of the initiative beyond the original scope for only the BAY states (Boko Haram mainly operate in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states), should be examined. The SSI was originally designed with the aid of international organizations such as UNESCO, and the government should not shy away from leaning on the foundations of a program that, if well-managed and sufficiently funded, could be effective in the North.

4. Addressing the long-term insecurity threat

The importance of dealing with the surge of economically motivated school kidnappings directly in schools cannot be understated. However, it is naive to assume that a school- or community-level intervention could suffice in the long run. Nigeria continues to suffer from perennial multipronged insecurities ranging from terrorism—there were at least 1,600 terrorism-caused deaths in the 11 months between January and November 2020—to the violent, ethnically tinged herder-farmer communal conflicts over agricultural land, which kill several thousands of people yearly. Without a comprehensive strategy to deal with the persistent state of violence, including a coherent plan to regain control of Nigeria’s “ungoverned spaces,” imagining a safe space for education is difficult.

Schools are only safe in so far as the larger society is safe. Nigerian policymakers, school leaders, and communities must effectively and creatively come together to help reverse the current economic and education dynamics to avoid a catastrophic collapse.

This Article was first published on Brookings

The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) presents a major opportunity for African leaders to bolster trade in the region, as the region has become the largest trading bloc in history since the creation of the World Trade Organisation.

Specifically, the AfCFTA has the objective of creating a single market to deepen economic integration in Africa, aid the movement of human and capital resources across Africa, improve food security for Africa and agricultural development, encourage economic diversification, and improve the competitiveness of African countries among other objectives.

Africa’s population of about 1.3 billion people, and a combined market of $2.6 trillion means that Nigeria can gain enormously from this economic bloc. Currently, Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria contributes 76 percent of its total trading volume, implying that the country has strong potentials to be a major player in AfCFTA.

The Aba shoe industry has the potential of driving Nigeria’s export and enabling Nigeria to become a net exporter of shoes, but the industry is constrained by infrastructural deficit such as power and good road network, financial access and the use of crude tools for production. Located in Aba, Abia State, South Eastern zone of Nigeria, the industry concentrates majorly on small and medium scale production, with a large number of artisans. Aba is well known for manufacturing products such as shoes, bags, and clothes. Mostly informal in nature, the industry is huge with an estimate of more than 100,000 shoemakers. The shoe industry has continued to compete favourably in the Nigerian local market with a rough estimate of about 500,000 pairs of daily production. While there is a general acknowledgement that Aba shoes are exported to other neighbouring African countries, there is hardly any documentation to back the claim, highlighting the informal nature of the shoe industry.

Figure: Aba-made Shoes

Benefits of the AfCFTA for the Aba Shoe Industry

The AfCFTA has every tendency to expand the market base of the shoe industry in Aba and increase productivity. This is because the industry is nowhere near its production possibility frontier as productivity can still expand to meet demand. An increased market base means that Nigeria can generate substantial revenue from shoe production coupled with improved employment opportunities and an enhanced quality of life. Full implementation of the AfCFTA means the creation of new markets for Aba shoemakers, accompanied with the removal of trade restrictions. Shoemakers in Aba can produce goods locally and get them across borders to sell without having to pay excise duty.

With the implementation of the AfCFTA, the likelihood of technological transfer, in the long run, becomes huge, from leading shoe manufacturing countries such as Ethiopia and Ghana, particularly through partnership and joint venture arrangements. This benefit would not only improve local productivity but can as well reduce the average cost of production. Improved benefits from the AfCFTA could also be achieved through collaboration with marketers from other countries in Africa. These marketers are familiar with the market arrangements of the recipient countries and thus information asymmetry is reduced, enabling proper linkages between the Aba shoe producers and potential customers in other African countries.

Measures required to Optimise the Benefits of the AfCFTA

However, in order to optimise the benefits of the AfCFTA, various measures need to be put in place. One of such measures is improving available infrastructure around the market clusters for ease of goods transportation. Hence, deliberate actions and measures are required to significantly reduce infrastructural deficits.

Improving the access to finance is also mandatory for the Aba shoe industry in the emergence of a larger market. In 2018, the Bank of Industry (BoI) introduced the Aba Finished Leather Goods Cluster Financing programme targeting over 150,000 artisans. The programme aimed to boost import substitution, with beneficiaries accessing about N300,000 to acquire raw materials needed to increase productivity. While this is commendable, the emergence of the AfCFTA has expanded the market frontiers for an increase in demand and further financial access policies which could boost productivity for export promotion becomes important.

Automation of the Aba shoe industry cannot also be over emphasized. While commendable efforts have been made by the Abia state government to improve automation by setting up the Enyimba Automated Shoe Factory, more still needs to be done to improve the tools utilised by small scale shoe manufacturers and artisans. In this line, the Abia state government and other key stakeholders can help with providing superior tools for artisans at a subsidized cost such as sewing machines, folding machines, eyelet pressers, smoothing and nailing machines among other tools that improve the efficiency of shoe production, which is beyond the conventional scissors and leather gums used for shoemaking by these artisans.

It is important to note that commendable efforts have been made to also improve the power supply to the industrial clusters in Aba. One of such is the Energising Economies Initiative which connected 4,000 shops in Ariaria international market to clean, stable, and affordable electricity, generating 9.5 megawatt (MW) of electricity.  Additionally, the Geometric Power Company is poised to provide constant electricity to Aba with its 141 MW power plant. The importance of these developments cannot be overemphasized in improving productivity. This makes it mandatory that various stakeholders ensure the smooth running of the electricity sector in Aba.

Furthermore, the utilisation of the internet for advertisement is important. Producers can create pages in popular social media platforms to advertise their goods beyond the borders of the country in which they operate. Aba manufacturers need to start developing social media networking and advertising skills and platforms for better patronage to reap the benefits of a larger market.

Conclusion

Tackling the challenges of production and marketing can improve the potentials of the industry in reaping the benefits of the AfCFTA, which is a big win for the Nigerian economy as the country struggles to diversify her economy. On this note, the government and the relevant stakeholders must address the challenges of Aba shoe producers for optimality in production to take place. 

The commitment of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to stimulate the economy following the      distortions caused by the coronavirus pandemic prompted the decision to reduce the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) from 12.5% to 11.5% . However, the cash reserve ratio was retained at 27.5% and the liquidity ratio at 30%. 

The major goal of the CBN’s monetary policy has been to ensure price stability in order to avoid distortions and disequilibrium in the Nigerian economy and achieve improved economic activities and employment.

Prior to the reduction of the MPR to 11.5%, the CBN had consistently retained the MPR at 14% in 2018, and 13.5% between March 2019 to April 2020. Before 2018, similar patterns were observed. In those periods, as revealed in figure 1, the rate of inflation did not follow the expected pattern to changes in the MPR, even when considering time lags. Also, the correlation coefficient between the MPR and the inflation rate in Nigeria stood at 0.299 between January 2015 and January 2021, revealing a weak correlation between both variables. This suggests that inflation may not be responding to the MPR and that the CBN monetary policy may have been counterproductive.

Figure 1: Monetary Policy Rate and Inflation (M1, 2015 to M1, 2021)

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (2021)

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the MPR and the inflation rate utilising the scatterplot and a regression line. It is revealed that there exists a positive association between the MPR and inflation that does not follow a priori expectations, implying that inflation increases with the MPR.

Figure 2: Scatter Plot and Regression Line of Monetary Policy Rate and Inflation (M1,2015 to M12, 2020)

Why does Inflation Rate not necessarily respond to MPR?

The major reason why the CBN’s monetary policy has not had a negative impact on Nigeria’s inflation rate over time is due to the factors that cause rising prices in the country.  Inflation in Nigeria is influenced by the aggregate supply side of the economy and not the aggregate demand side of the economy which the CBN can influence with its monetary policy tools. This is evident in the continued depreciation of the Nigerian Naira and the subsequent rise in prices. In other words, the Nigerian inflation is a cost-push inflation while monetary policies are most effective in demand pull inflation.

Figure 3: Scatter Plot and Regression Line of the logarithm of Exchange Rate and Inflation (M1,2015 to M12, 2020)

As revealed in figure 2, a scatter plot and a regression line observes this positive relationship between the natural logarithm of exchange rate and the inflation rate in Nigeria.

The Nigerian inflation problem has continued to emanate majorly from exchange rate depreciation due to crude oil price shocks. The fallen crude oil price level has led to the fall in the value of our exports compared to the value of imports. This has led to pressure on the Naira and has caused both currency depreciation and devaluation over recent times. Because Nigeria is heavily dependent on both imported consumer and producer goods, currency depreciation immediately transmits to rising prices, through the prices of imported consumer and producer goods and further multipliers in the economy.

Aggregate supply side inflation makes conventional monetary policy almost obsolete as they are engineered for demand pull inflation. Furthermore, as Nigeria battles with boosting her economy, the mandate of the Nigerian government should be to provide policies that can aid in improving the level of aggregate supply in the Nigerian economy.

Answering the question on what factors lead to the fall in aggregate supply is one way that can propel Nigeria out of a stagflation type economy—a situation where falling output level and rising unemployment is accompanied with rising prices.

Reducing the Monetary Policy Rate to boost Domestic Production

The goal of the double-digit MPR has been to stabilise prices over time. However, as previously acknowledged, the country's inflation problem is not caused by an excess of money supply in the economy. Instead, it has risen from low productivity and high cost of production in the Nigerian economy. If the CBN maintains its double-digit MPR, it will continue to transmit to high lending rates in the financial sector, making borrowing from the financial sector very expensive.

This in turn would keep productivity down and those who can still borrow for productive purposes would increase their price levels in order to make enough profit to repay their debt. This means that the double-digit MPR may be insignificant in terms of curbing inflation, or worse, it may act as a determining factor in raising Nigeria’s inflation level and even limiting the economic growth

While the CBN has taken steps to boost the Nigerian economy by reducing the MPR, further reduction in the MPR is imperative to bring significant increase in domestic production, particularly for Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMSEs). The importance of local production, economic diversification and improving the Nigeria’s  export base should be taken      into consideration by the CBN as they reduce the MPR. It is only when the local economy grows that Nigeria’s export base can grow and bring lasting solutions to Nigeria exchange rate problem.

Conclusion

Finally, given the peculiarity of the Nigerian inflationary problem – such that, inflation is propelled by cost push phenomenon and not demand-pull inflation, thus rendering the conventional monetary policies counterproductive. For the Nigerian economy to experience an increase in economic activities, it is essential that a key lever for facilitating this would be to significantly reduce the monetary policy rate to a single digit.

Moreover, lowering interest rates in the banking system, and making credit available would enable SMSEs maximise financial flow for development – thereby improving productivity, lowering commodity prices, and a reduction in unemployment. Policy makers must work to ensure economic policies are aimed at improving export base, as this would reduce the exchange rate problem which transmits to inflationary pressures.