

# **SOUTH-SOUTH IDEAS**

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION COHERENCE IN A COMPLEX  
ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT:  
THE CASE OF NIGERIA



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FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF NIGERIA**

**March 2019**

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>List of Tables, Figures and Graphs</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Abbreviations and Acronyms</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1 What Constitutes a South-South Cooperation Initiative	11
<b>2. Background: Development Assistance Landscape in Nigeria</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1 A Brief Overview of Nigeria's Development Context	12
2.2 Development Assistance by Countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	13
2.3 South-South Cooperation: The Entry of Southern Actors	18
2.4 Nigeria-led South-South Cooperation	20
2.5 Policy and Institutional Frameworks for South-South Cooperation in Nigeria	22
<b>3. Conceptual Framework</b>	<b>25</b>
3.1 Observable Components of a South-South Cooperation Initiative	26
3.2. Final Consideration	36
<b>4. Application of the Theoretical Framework: Case Study of South-South Cooperation Projects</b>	<b>39</b>
4.1 Case Studies of South-South (South-South Cooperation Programme) and North-South (Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project) Development Assistance Programmes	39
4.2 SSC (South-South Cooperation Programme) vs. NSC (Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project)	46
4.3 Case Study of Nigeria's Engagement with Southern Countries: Nigerian-led Capacitybuilding	47
4.4 SSC (Nigeria's TAC Scheme) versus NSC (Overseas Development Institute Fellowship Scheme) Technical Cooperation	51
<b>5. Summary and Policy Recommendations</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>56</b>

## LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND GRAPHS

### Figures

Figure 1. Development challenges in Nigeria, 2017	13
Figure 2. Factors related to the process and context of an SSC initiative	26

### Graphs

Graph 1. ODA from OECD/DAC countries to Nigeria except for debt-related activities, 1980–2016	14
Graph 2. G-7 DAC donors' total contributions, 2002–2016	15
Graph 3. Sectoral ODA to Nigeria, 2002–2016	17
Graph 4. Social infrastructure sectoral ODA to Nigeria, 2002–2016	17
Graph 5. Sectoral composition of development aid, North vs. South	19

### Tables

Table 1. Nigeria Trust Fund outstanding loans at 31 December 2015	21
Table 2. Components of the conceptual framework	37
Table 3. Summary of the examination of NSC and SSC development assistance interventions using the theoretical framework	44
Table 4. Success and challenges of the development assistance interventions in Nigeria	47
Table 5. Comparison of the capacity-building cases under South-South and North-South cooperation	52

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research study was authored by Adedeji Adeniran, Chukwuka Onyekwena, Mma Amara Ekeruche and Joseph Ishaku (Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa) and Estefania Charvet (Southern Voice). The authors wish to thank the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for their sponsorship of this research project under the “South-South Global Thinkers- the Global Coalition of Think Tank Networks for SSC” initiative.

The authors would like to acknowledge the efforts of various parties that contributed to the study. The case studies would not have been possible without the inputs of the relevant government institutions, non-governmental organizations and development partners that shared their experiences and reports that fed into this study. The authors appreciate the efforts of staff of the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa, in particular the contributions of Mr. Okpanachi Enemaku and Mr. Peace John, who assisted in data collection and scheduling and transcribing interviews. Thanks also go to Mr. Javier Brolo, who is leading the Guatemala component of this project, for his extensive review of the manuscript. The authors also extend a special thanks Ms. Shams Banihani (UNOSSC) for providing substantive comments and suggestions to the study and to Ms. Nawra Mehrin (UNOSSC) and the anonymous peer reviewers who provided feedback on this report.

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADPs	Agricultural development projects
AfDB	African Development Bank
AiIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
BAPA	Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
CSEA	Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa
CSO	Civil society organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAG	Development Assistance Group
DFID	Department for International Development
DMO	Debt Management Office
DTAC	Directorate of Technical Aid Corps
DTCA	Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross domestic product
GRIPS	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICD	International Cooperation Department
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MSU	Michigan State University
NDB	New Development Bank
NPFS	National Programme for Food Security
NSC	North-South Cooperation
NTF	Nigeria Trust Fund
ODA	Official development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SAIS	School of Advanced International Studies
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEGIB	Ibero-American General Secretariat
SSC	South-South cooperation
TAC	Technical Aid Corps
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United National Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOSSC	United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South-South cooperation (SSC) has evolved over the past two decades from the margins to become an important part of the global development landscape. Economies in the global South have helped to drive global growth after the 2007–2008 financial crisis and are equally prominent in global finance, investment, trade and, more significantly, within the development cooperation space. The roles of major emerging economies, such as those of the BRICS countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa) have been amplified, while others such as Colombia, Nigeria, and Chile are stepping up in theirs. Undoubtedly, SSC has the potential to help to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and address the key technical and skill gaps as well as complement the response to development finance challenges facing the global South.

Despite the enormous potential, at present a systematic framework to account for and compare SSC experiences and interventions is lacking. Solutions to development problems learned in each SSC experience are mostly considered unique cases. This is partly owing to the complex and diverse modalities that SSC encompasses and the problem of quantifying support, especially that which is non-financial, which dominates SSC. The present study attempts to address this key shortcoming by proposing a conceptual framework that will be useful for the comparison and assessment of SSC initiatives. In the spirit of SSC, three research teams from different parts of the global South jointly developed the conceptual framework: the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA) in Nigeria, the Social Research and Study Association (ASIES) in Guatemala and Southern Voice, a coalition of 50 think tanks in Bangladesh.

The framework was constructed based on a document review and focus group discussions with key actors who are part of the development assistance landscape in Nigeria. A number of important characteristics of SSC initiatives were highlighted. These characteristics were then classified under 8 components to assess an SSC initiative: (1) challenges addressed; (2) actors involved; (3) relationship between actors; (4) modality of cooperation; (5) strategy for implementation; (6) time of implementation; (7) reporting; and (8) type of impact.

The framework was then employed to analyse two SSC projects and compare them with two similar North-South cooperation (NSC) initiatives in Nigeria. The initiatives were organized into two sets, each with one SSC and one NSC initiative. One set consisted of the South-South Cooperation Programme, involving technical assistance to Nigerian farmers and implemented by the Government of China, which was juxtaposed with the Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, a technical support programme by the Government of the United States of America. The second set of initiatives comprised Nigerian technical assistance to the Gambia under the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Fellowship Scheme, a capacity-building programme jointly supported by the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Australia.



The analysis of the different case studies of the selected initiatives demonstrated the importance of SSC and its unique pathways in promoting domestic ownership of initiatives through a demand-driven approach. Also, SSC tended to utilize more state actors as an element of the implementation strategy. This could strengthen the existing government-to-government relationship and promote sustainability of projects beyond the end of specific development assistance initiatives. However, funding and scalability remained a challenge in the cases of SSC examined. Funding predictability was more evident for the NSC cases. However, the few cases under study should not be used to generalize about SSC or NSC.

Limited involvement of non-state actors was a major weakness of SSC observed in the cases examined. For example, we found that in cases – mostly of NSC –, where non-state actors such as universities and think tanks were involved, the beneficiaries were more exposed to novel research and analytical processes and gained insight into advanced procedures and technologies. However, involvement of non-state actors can help to clarify many of the misconceptions about SSC. From the donor-country perspective, development cooperation can be viewed as a misplaced priority given the multifaceted development that most developing economies face. From the recipient-country perspective, technical experts drawn from other countries can be regarded as displacing members of the local workforce. Strengthening the role of non-state actors can mitigate this trend in many respects and help SSC to deliver its intended development outcomes.

Overall, this study aims to inform the need for measuring SSC in a systematic and coherent manner for policymakers to understand what works and why it works. In relation to the conceptual framework, we found it useful in identifying and documenting important components of development cooperation initiatives. The various components are important and each has an effect on the overall direction of the project from choice of modality to strategy and timing of implementation. However, the framework does not address all of the problems relating to systematically accounting for SSC. In particular, it is not a substitute for other existing monitoring and evaluation frameworks of SSC initiatives but rather an alternative tool to document experiences and identify key components of an initiative that are important to its success or failure.

Going forward, the following specific policy recommendations will be crucial to strengthen South-South development cooperation pathways:

- **Predictability of funding.** SSC needs to embrace the predictability of aid funding. Depending on the programme, matching funds or triangular cooperation might be considered to improve funding and reduce uncertainty.
- **Addressing the policy and institutional gaps.** There is an opportunity to scale up SSC through exploiting its unique modalities. In Nigeria, there is need for policy coherence to mobilize and target these important development pathways. However, it is also important to ensure that development cooperation fits into the national development plan. At present, coordination



between donors and government is mostly limited to large-scale philanthropic support and development assistance. Developing a strategic institution and partnership between providers and recipients will be crucial. The Development Assistance Group (DAG) in Ethiopia represents a model that other developing countries could emulate. However, it is important to mitigate against challenges that could emanate from a DAG-like framework, such as aid dependency or handing over development initiatives to donors.

- **Drawing on deeper expertise.** Involvement of non-state actors (universities, think tanks and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is needed to maximize the benefits of SSC. This will broaden the scope and depth of expertise and consequently facilitate taking greater advantage of partnerships with other countries.
- **An enhanced monitoring and evaluation framework.** An enhanced monitoring and evaluation framework is required for a proper understanding of the relationship between project inputs and project outcomes and adequate impact assessment. It will enable implementing partners to assess the comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of projects and serve as a learning opportunity for other SSC projects.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

South-South cooperation (SSC) has evolved over the past two decades from the margins to become an important part of the global development landscape. Economies in the global South have helped to drive global growth after the 2007–2008 financial crisis and are equally prominent in global finance, investment, trade and, more significantly, within the development cooperation space. The role of major emerging economies, such as those of the BRICS countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa) have been amplified, while others such as Colombia, Nigeria and Chile are stepping up in theirs. Undoubtedly, SSC has the potential to help to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), address the key technical and skills gaps, and complement the response to development finance challenges facing the global South.

Given its growing importance, SSC has generated diverse interest and debate within the larger development discourse. The main concern centred on the lack of a systematic framework to account for and compare SSC experiences and interventions. While there is resistance by Southern providers to adopting the traditional, North-centric approach to defining and accounting for development cooperation, there is emerging consensus on the need for a consistent, systematic approach to reporting on SSC (see Besharati and others, 2015). At present, solutions to development problems learned in each SSC experience are mostly considered unique cases. The key objectives of SSC with regard to peer learning, exchange of development solutions and comparison of progress are therefore fragmented under the present SSC architecture. Overall, this situation hinders the scaling up of SSC and derails potential benefits from innovations that could increase impact for sustainable development.

The present study therefore attempts to address this key shortcoming by developing a conceptual framework that will be useful for the comparison and assessment of SSC initiatives. By SSC initiatives, we mean project, programme, policy and budget support under the SSC modality. The conceptual framework was developed jointly by research teams from CSEA in Nigeria, the Social Research and Study Association (ASIES) in Guatemala and Southern Voice, a coalition of 50 think tanks. We first identified the unique features of the pathways to development outcomes under various SSC initiatives. This involved each country team's reviewing the existing documentation and the results of a focus group with key actors to have an overview of SSC as well as background information on possible SSC experiences across countries. Based on this, we developed the conceptual framework that fits the observed experiences. The conceptual framework was thereafter used to evaluate specific SSC projects in Nigeria. The Nigerian case study helps to explore how SSC experience works vis-à-vis NSC.

It is important to emphasize at the outset, however, that the task of creating a systematic framework for SSC is a consensus-building process by diverse groups and across national boundaries. Therefore, the main objective of the present study is to place SSC experiences within a framework that can be applied broadly for documenting SSC interventions and therefore understanding what works and why it works.



This, at best, represents a first step to shifting the discourse on SSC from the present intricate and disparate experiences to a more refined and systematic way to measure progress. More important, we envisage the framework as an iterative model in which feedback from cross-country experiences and applications can be used to refine and further develop it.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of Nigerian development trends and highlights the country's important position in the West African and African regions. At present, Nigeria has the largest economy and population in Africa and therefore plays a major role in the drive for African development. Section 3 examines the present development assistance landscape and the complementary roles of Northern and Southern actors, Nigeria-led SSC interventions, and the policy and institutional framework for coordinating SSC. Section 4 presents the main components of the conceptual framework and ways to operationalize it. In section 5, we present the case studies in which the framework was used to evaluate SSC projects in Nigeria. Finally, we conclude with a summary of findings and policy recommendations in section 6.

## 1.1 What Constitutes a South-South Cooperation Initiative

It is important to clearly define what is meant by an SSC initiative from the outset. Following Appe (2018), SSC initiatives are broadly understood as the exchange of solutions among actors from countries of the global South in accordance with shared principles. The global South includes countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Arab States region and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Even though the CIS is not located in the Southern hemisphere, the countries are considered developing countries. The actors include national and subnational government institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and actors from the private sector. The solutions include financial resources, in-kind support, technical assistance, technology, policies, good practices and knowledge.

The principles of SSC have evolved over time. The first reference to them dates back to the meeting in Bandung, Indonesia (1955), which promoted the following: respect for human rights, respect for sovereignty, equality, non-interference, mutual interest and collaboration, and international justice. Subsequent meetings in Buenos Aires, Argentina (1978), Accra, Ghana (2008), Nairobi, Kenya (2009), Bogota, Colombia (2010) and Delhi, India (2013) have revised and expanded the list. The principles promoted at the Conference of Southern Providers held in Delhi were: demand-driven, non-conditionality, national ownership and independence, respect for national sovereignty, self-reliance and self-help, mutual benefit, common but differentiated responsibilities, voluntary partnerships, solidarity, complementarity to NSC, diversity and heterogeneity, and capacity development.


## 2. BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE LANDSCAPE IN NIGERIA

### 2.1 A Brief Overview of Nigeria's Development Context

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with an estimated population of 190.9 million; it also has the largest economy, estimated at \$376 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). The economy hinges critically on the service sector, while oil is relied upon as the main source of foreign earnings. Despite its huge potential, Nigeria has failed to translate its resource endowment and strategic economic and demographic positions into sustained economic development. In fact, the country's performance is abysmally low with regard to key development indicators. A portion (46 per cent) of its huge population is poor by World Bank definitions, and socioeconomic outcomes remain among the worst globally (World Bank, 2017). Specifically, Nigeria has the highest number of out-of-school children in the world (13 million in 2018), coupled with high rates of infant and maternal mortality (figure 1). Furthermore, the country suffers from inadequate and dilapidated infrastructure across the energy, housing and transport sectors. This is in relation to about \$30 billion in budgeted spending for the 2018 fiscal year by the federal government, which reflects the enormous development financing challenges (Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2018). Despite these poor development indicators, the country has made modest progress in improving revenue streams, with recent developments in sectors other than oil such as the agriculture and mineral sectors.

These massive shortfalls in government and private-sector development spending in Nigeria require it to seek international development partnerships. Nigeria receives development assistance from both Northern and Southern partners, with engagement with both groups increasing over the years (graph 1). The population size and regional influence of Nigeria make it an important ally for development partnerships, since achieving economic development in the country can lead to significant spillover effects to other countries and local disturbances can easily translate into regional catastrophe, as in the case of the Boko Haram insurgency. Beyond the aforementioned challenges, Nigeria is also an attractive partner and destination for investment, given its vast human and natural resources for economic growth. For instance, an increase in the well-being of its enormous population can generate massive aggregate demand and production that can sustain long-term economic growth.

Figure 1. Development challenges in Nigeria, 2017




Source: Compiled from various bulletins of the National Bureau of Statistics.

## 2.2 Development Assistance by Countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Historically, the foreign assistance landscape in Nigeria has been dominated by Northern donors. For member countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC), official development assistance (ODA) refers to concessionary loans, debt relief, grants and humanitarian aid. Between 1985 and 2000, ODA (excluding debt-related activities) to Nigeria amounted to \$1.5 billion (graph 1). In line with the global agenda, the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 strongly pushed for an increase in the size and quality of aid from developed countries for effective Millennium Development Goal (MDG)

implementation. Consequently, relative to the period 1985–2000, ODA grew by over seven-fold between 2001 and 2016, totalling about \$10.9 billion (graph 1). Aside from providing direct aid towards the MDGs, the 2005 to 2006 debt-relief-related assistance made available additional funds towards the Goals. Second to Iraq, Nigeria was the top ODA recipient globally between 2005 and 2006, with 84 per cent of the total ODA in 2006 (\$11.8 billion) being debt relief (OECD, 2018b). Since the emergence of the SDGs in 2015, \$2.34 billion have been donated by OECD/DAC countries (graph 1). Similarly, the broader international community has stated its commitment to partner with the Government in curbing illicit financial flows, expanding trade, debt management, and improving access to technology and knowledge in order to achieve the global goals by 2030.


*Graph 1. ODA from OECD/DAC countries to Nigeria except for debt-related activities, 1980–2016 (in millions of USD)*



Source: OECD, 2018b.

With regard to key actors, the Group of Seven (G-7) countries have been the major donors to Nigeria. The United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have been the lead donors in total OECD/DAC contributions since 2007 (graph 2). Between 2010 and 2016, as a percentage of the total contributions from all G-7 donors, the United States and the United Kingdom contributed 47 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively. The extent to which development assistance has contributed to development in Nigeria has been widely debated. ODA has been an instrument for supporting agriculture, education, governance, health and public infrastructure development but there are concerns regarding the use of donor funding. In 2005, Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission revealed that military dictators had stolen or squandered \$500 billion, the equivalent of all Western aid to Africa between 1965 and 2005 (Ayodele and others, 2005). However, Nigeria has achieved significant milestones with the support of donor funding, particularly in the social sector: life expectancy improved from 46 to 53 years between 2000 and 2016; gross enrolment in primary education peaked above 100 per cent between 2004 and 2006; and guinea worm was eradicated in 2013.

Graph 2. G-7 DAC donors' total contributions, 2002–2016 (millions of USD)



Source: OECD, 2018b.

In providing support, DAC donor countries, through conditionalities, leverage development assistance to push their agenda. Conditionalities imposed usually centre on the improvement of the local landscape including good governance environment and recognized procurement standards, which stems from the fact that countries with well-built institutional frameworks are better positioned to implement programmes effectively and efficiently. Continuous ex-ante requirements, some of which border on public finance management, specify that a condition is met before financial transfer is received; they are common with multilateral donors in particular. More recently, individual countries have begun to impose human rights conditions. However, at time, despite non-compliance, responses are deterred because they may threaten the success of programmes in critical sectors such as health. The extent and scope of these conditions reinforce the feeling of inequity associated with North-South relations (Hansen, R., 1980).

Although a number of donor countries are beginning to align their development assistance policies with their commercial interests, as in the case of Canada,<sup>1</sup> the general perception of many African Governments is that these countries do not use assistance as a means to achieve commercial gains. Donor countries that further their economic agenda by specifying that aid be spent on commodities produced in the donor country (or, in some cases, a group of selected countries) could limit the level of shared ownership of programmes. In addition, transparent monitoring using clearly defined indicators plays a vital role in the extent to which policy and programmes are successful.

<sup>1</sup> The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which administers foreign aid programmes in developing countries, was merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2013.



## PRIORITIES

While the United States and the United Kingdom spread their support towards all areas in the social sector, other countries divert more funding to specific areas. For instance, Germany finances education considerably more than other sectors; Canada, on the other hand, pays attention to health. The data, however, show a more concerted effort in financing the humanitarian sector where non-G-7 countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands play a role in funding projects together with G-7 countries. Primarily financing the social and humanitarian sectors is in alignment with the objectives of Nigeria's development agendas the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, the Transformation Agenda, and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan which place significant weight on human capital development.<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact, the donor agencies partner with government ministries and parastatals to deliver on projects in health and education sectors in some cases. For instance, the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria was a partnership between the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the Government of Nigeria to improve the quality of schools, teaching and learning.

ODA allocated to the social sector remains the largest allocation and in the past decade has been of considerable size (graph 3). Investments in the social sector include efforts towards developing the human capital of the recipient country and cover education, health, water supply and sanitation, conflict, peace and security, and government and civil society. A significant reason for the rising trend is the foreign support towards achieving the SDGs since the social sector intersects with the Goals in ending poverty as well as improving education and health. Between 2010 and 2016, \$5.8 billion were deployed towards Nigeria's social sector, with health, government and civil society, and education receiving \$1.3 billion, \$878 million and \$594 million respectively (graph 4). Another noteworthy trend is that aid to the humanitarian sector has gained importance, growing from \$9 million to \$193 million between 2014 and 2016 (graph 3). This is closely linked to the humanitarian crisis in the Northern region of the country, which has attracted DAC financing. Donor agencies have provided funds to improve humanitarian data collection as well as food, health-care and education interventions for conflict-affected communities.

Previously, assistance from Northern donors was heavily focused on the economic infrastructure sector, that is, the development of networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity. Those early investments in the economic sector were based on the rationale that building expensive infrastructure projects, which may not otherwise be possible without foreign aid, was an effective means of ensuring economic growth in developing countries (Easterly, 1999). In other words, the objective was to deploy foreign capital in underdeveloped countries in order to build infrastructure that would serve as the foundation for economic growth. It was common in the 1960s for donors to fund large investment projects in transportation, energy and other economic infrastructure-related areas. Several decades later, policy outcomes and new research findings have provided evidence that foreign assistance in economic infrastructure does not


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<sup>2</sup> Nigeria, NPC, 2004; Nigeria, Transformation Agenda 2011–2015; Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017, Economic Recovery and Growth Plan 2017–2020.




necessarily lead to growth, which has caused a shift away from those projects (Easterly, 1999). The average allocation to the sector between 2002 and 2016 was \$72 million, nearly one eighth of the average allocation to the social infrastructure sector (\$561 million) during the same period (graph 3).

**Graph 3. Sectoral ODA to Nigeria, 2002–2016 (millions of USD)**



Source: OECD, 2018b.

**Graph 4. Social infrastructure sectoral ODA to Nigeria, 2002–2016 (millions of USD)**



Source: OECD, 2018b.

## 2.3 South-South Cooperation: The Entry of Southern Actors

Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the landscape of development cooperation has evolved significantly. Specifically, the actors, institutional frameworks and global trends have changed over the period since independence. New actors, specifically from the global South, have emerged that are quite different from the traditional donors, thus altering the mode of Nigeria's development cooperation. Nigeria's engagement with countries such as China, India and South Africa has increased over the years, with India in particular overtaking Northern countries, such as the United States, to become the biggest bilateral trading partner: in 2017, India was Nigeria's top trading partner, with trade between the two Southern countries reaching about \$9.5 billion (World Bank, 2017). The landscape of development cooperation that was previously dominated by one-way donor-recipient relationships is now dotted with numerous instances of reciprocal partnerships, solidarity-based on the principles of SSC.

### PRIORITIES


The non-conditionality policy of SSC financing is very attractive for developing countries. This allows them to pursue priorities that match local development needs. As Prizzon, Greenhill and Mustapha (2017) noted, "countries identify ownership, alignment with national priorities, speed of project delivery, portfolio diversification as key priorities". However, there are criticisms about the existence of conditionalities in certain SSC projects disguised under a different nature. These conditionalities are often underpinned by economic interests, such as local procurement requirements, and not necessarily the security, ideological and political conditionalities that accompany NSC.

Nigeria needs a great deal of resources to finance its development ambitions of stimulating economic growth, creating jobs and improving public well-being. The country has a huge infrastructure gap estimated to cost \$3 trillion over 30 years to close (NIIMP, 2014). However, the Government has limited capacity to generate sufficient revenues. For instance, the 2017 federal budget amounted to less than \$30 billion with an estimated deficit of over \$7 billion. Similarly, there are massive shortfalls in social investments, which are deemed necessary for attaining sustainable development. Furthermore, stringent borrowing conditions from multilateral lenders and Nigeria's reviewed income classification make accessing concessionary financing from traditional donors difficult, particularly the Bretton Woods institutions. Therefore, there is a great deal of attention given to financial flows from SSC by the Government of Nigeria.

While NSC prioritizes development assistance targeted at the social sectors, SSC involves mostly economic partnerships that prioritize infrastructure development in Nigeria (graph 4). Most of the financial assistance that come from SSC in Nigeria goes towards infrastructure financing, while ODA from Northern countries funds mostly health and education. Specifically, China and India are the two Southern partners providing concessionary bilateral loans to Nigeria, with both heavily focused on economic infrastructure. Chinese loans finance transport, power and communication infrastructure while Indian lines of credit (LoCs) are

provided mostly for the power sector (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) China-Africa Research Initiative, 2018; High Commission of India, 2018).

*Graph 5. Sectoral composition of development aid, North vs. South*



Source: OECD/DAC, Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative; High Commission of India, Nigeria.

Nigeria's external debt management strategy prioritizes relatively cheaper and long-term borrowing from multilateral and bilateral sources before other sources (Nigeria, DMO, 2017). The African Development Bank (AfDB) and China have been quite prominent in recent years as sources of development finance for Nigeria from Southern partners. Specifically, AfDB loans account for 19.2 per cent of Nigeria's current multilateral debt holding (ibid.). Also, China is the biggest bilateral lender to Nigeria, with a current debt stock of \$1.9 billion (ibid.). China is increasingly becoming the dominant development finance partner for Nigeria. Although there is limited official data for financial assistance between the two countries, some evidence points to this fact. Specifically, China has provided loans amounting to about \$4.83 billion to the Government of Nigeria since 2000 (SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative, 2018).

Between 2000 and 2016, Chinese loans to Nigeria, amounting to about \$3.5 billion, were all to finance infrastructure, specifically transport, power and communication, and, to a lesser extent, support the Government's budget deficit. Remarkably, no loans were provided for social sectors such as health and education. This may be attributed to some peculiarities of this type of SSC between Nigeria and China. For example, there is a preference for projects that are perceived to yield immediate and easily measurable returns. Thus, proceeds can be used to service debt. Also, SSC is built on seeking mutual benefit; hence loans are made to sectors/projects that will utilize the engineering/technical capacity that China is looking to export on credit. For instance, most (about 43 per cent) of Chinese loans to Nigeria within that period went to the transport sector, where Chinese companies were contracted to build airport terminals, railways and roads.

A primary concern for scholars of SSC is the difficulty in systematically analysing projects due to the lack of a viable system for tracking and reporting compared to the situation regarding NSC projects. It is plausible

that the level of SSC in Nigeria is significantly beyond what is reported in this section. However, challenges of accounting and public availability of data on these projects limit our ability to capture the entirety of SSC projects. Furthermore, a challenge of many SSC projects in Nigeria is the low priority given to social-sector investment, especially with loans coming from China.

## 2.4 Nigeria-led South-South Cooperation

Nigeria is a prominent driver of SSC, especially in Africa. It engages other developing countries, especially in Africa, by providing financial, political, technical and peacekeeping support. More recently, the rise of philanthropy has added another dimension to Nigeria's contribution under SSC.

Nigeria is one of the most generous partners for SSC in Africa, contributing billions over the years to several developing countries through different SSC tools. For instance, in 1976, Nigeria set up the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF), which is managed by AfDB, with an initial capital of \$80 million to assist in the development efforts of the poorer AfDB regional member countries. The NTF was replenished in 1981 with \$71 million, taking the total commitment to \$151 million. As at the end of 2015, the NTF had total assets of about \$239.6 million (UA 170.52 million) (table 1).<sup>3</sup> The NTF supports projects in lower-income regional countries by providing concessionary financing for projects across social and economic sectors that the AfDB assesses as bankable.

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<sup>3</sup> As at August 2018, the exchange rate was \$1.40487/AU. UA is the official currency for the AfDB projects.



*Table 1. Nigeria Trust Fund outstanding loans at 31 December 2015 (in thousands of UA)*

Country	No of Loans*	Total Loans	Undisbursed Balance	Outstanding Balance	% of Total Outstanding Loans
Benin	3	10,270	6,000	4,270	8.73
Cabo Verde	1	412	-	412	0.84
Cameroon	1	4,999	4861	138	0.28
Djibouti	1	632	-	632	1.29
Gambia	3	10,471	-	10,471	21.41
Ghana	1	1,257	-	1,257	2.57
Guinea	1	2,682	-	2,682	5.49
Guinea-Bissau	1	3,483	3177	306	0.63
Lesotho	1	4	-	4	0.01
Liberia	1	6,506	5697	809	1.65
Madagascar	1	6,514	5339	1,175	2.4
Malawi	2	11,549	9701	1,848	3.78
Mali	1	6,493	6322	171	0.35
Mauritania	2	7,069	-	7,069	14.45
Namibia	1	688	-	688	1.41
Rwanda	2	10,874	6500	4,374	8.94
Senegal	1	308	-	308	0.63
Seychelles	1	585	-	585	1.2
Sierra Leone	2	7,464	6670	794	1.62
Somalia	1	840	-	840	1.72
Swaziland	1	3,966	-	3,966	8.11
Togo	1	6,500	6500	-	-
Uganda	2	10,232	6713	3,519	7.2
United Republic of Tanzania	1	522	-	522	1.07
Zambia	1	6,376	4313	2,063	4.22
<b>Total</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>120,696</b>	<b>71,793</b>	<b>48,903</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: 2015 NTF Financial Statement.

Nigeria is a major contributor to regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. It provides the largest financial contributions towards funding ECOWAS (ECOWAS, n.d.; Osondu, 2015; Sulaiman, 2016). Nigeria is one of the five major financiers of the African Union that contribute 75 per cent of the organization's operational budget, which amounted to \$150 million in 2017 (Umezurike and others, 2017; Africa Union, 2016). Numerous peace missions across Africa and beyond have benefited from Nigeria's support over the past 50 years, including in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria is among the largest contributors of military and civilian personnel for United Nations peacekeeping, with over 200,000 troops participating in various United Nations peacekeeping operations (Sulaiman, 2016).

The Nigerian Technical Aids Corps (TAC) scheme is the coordinating body for Nigeria's Foreign Aid Technical Assistance Policy. Set up in 1987, TAC deploys highly experienced Nigerian professionals in the fields of medicine, engineering, nursing, agriculture, education, accountancy and other related fields to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries for a period of two years. Since then, more than 30,000 volunteers have served in over 27 ACP countries under the scheme (Sulaiman, 2016). The scheme operates based on a TAC country agreement that is signed between Nigeria and the recipient country and aims to address areas of assessed and perceived need.

## 2.5 Policy and Institutional Frameworks for South-South Cooperation in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the policy and institutional frameworks guiding development assistance inflows and outflows are separated, since they are driven by different objectives. The development assistance inflows are regarded as part of the national economic development plan, while development assistance outflows relate more to foreign policy. Therefore, in discussing the policy and institutional frameworks for SSC, it is important to separately examine the inflows and outflows.

### 2.5.1 Development Assistance Inflows: International Cooperation Department (ICD)

In the last ten years, Nigeria has received more than \$10 billion in development assistance<sup>4</sup>. The assistance goes into different sectors and is coordinated by the International Cooperation Department (ICD). ICD is a division under the purview of the Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning that manages the multilateral and bilateral economic cooperation, including development aid and technical assistance programmes to Nigeria. ICD also monitors the implementation of agreements and projects arising from joint/bilateral commissions. In this regard, the Department to some extent oversees development assistance outflows to other African countries resulting from these joint/bilateral commissions.

The main rationale for the institutional setting is to closely link development assistance inflows with

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<sup>4</sup> The estimate is based on OECD/DAC aid plus China's grants and loans over the period.



domestic economic policy. The Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning has the statutory responsibility for the formulation of the national economic policy, domestication of the international agenda, and translation of these policies into medium-term strategic plans and annual budget estimates. Coordination of development assistance by ICD should therefore ensure proper linkage of the national policies to available financing resources. Also, the institutional arrangement is viable from an efficiency and accountability point of view. The institutional setting allows for project coordination and prevents duplication of effort by the Government and donors. In practice, however, ICD coordinates mostly the aid from state actors and prominent external philanthropic foundation such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation. This leaves a significant area in the development assistance space, especially the non-state actors, with no proper oversight.

Given that the policy framework is anchored in the domestic economic plan, the Government targets traditional and Southern actors in mobilizing development assistance. However, there is no explicit policy framework to attract donors. For example, the present Economic Recovery and Growth Plan 2017–2020 makes no mention of an economic cooperation and development assistance role in its implementation. The long-term policy, Nigeria Vision 2020, underscores the role of global partnership and economic cooperation but there are no substantive implementation modalities. In essence, the Government is open to receiving assistance from any country in as much as this galvanizes the national economic development.

There is, however, a steep increase in the role of Southern actors, especially China, India and South Africa. First, the strategic advantage that key Southern actors now have within the global financial and trading systems has led to more economic cooperation through joint/bilateral commissions. These platforms have been used to mobilize development assistance together with enhanced trade and investment opportunities. Second, Nigeria's economic potential in terms of market and population size and resource endowment also attract key global players. Given the mutual-benefit principle of SSC, more development assistance has also followed through the deepening of economic cooperation between Nigeria and key global Southern actors.

Overall, the present development landscape in Nigeria with its lack of a sound policy framework could affect the effectiveness of aid. In the absence of a clear policy framework, aid coordination a key component of aid effectiveness as declared under the Accra Agenda for Action is the prerogative of the donors. Going forward, policymakers in Nigeria should consider a coordination architecture similar to the Development Assistance Group (DAG) established by the Government of Ethiopia. DAG consists of development partners and top government officials working together to harmonize donor support and foster meaningful dialogue for implementing the national development plan. DAG activities and interventions focus on specific sectors that are identified by the Government with inputs from development partners and civil society. The Group has been key in improving aid effectiveness in Ethiopia. A similar initiative, although refined in line with national development priorities and institutional settings, will be a crucial next step to address the policy gap in Nigeria. However, it is important to mitigate against challenges that could emanate from DAG-like frameworks such



aid dependency or handing over development initiatives to donors.

### *2.5.2 Development Assistance Outflows: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Its Directorate*

Nigeria provides development assistance to other developing countries in various forms such as grants (Chad and the Gambia), humanitarian (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and technical assistance (Ethiopia, Gambia and Jamaica). However, it is difficult to accurately catalogue or provide a monetary estimate for the Nigerian development assistance outflows because the institutional framework for development assistance outflows is fragmented. For example, Afghanistan and Togo among other countries have in recent years been provided with technical assistance in implementing a digital fertilizer distribution scheme that has been successfully implemented by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Nigeria. The digital fertilizer initiative is a scheme to sidestep government in the distribution chain for farm inputs through a more market-oriented approach. The success of the initiative in reducing corruption has led to interest from other developing countries and Nigeria has accordingly provided relevant technical assistance in this regard. This assistance, like many others, is being implemented by various ministries and agencies of government in Nigeria but it is not well documented to provide the aggregate value of Nigerian development assistance.

Nevertheless, there are two components of Nigerian development assistance that are well institutionalized along with a sound policy framework. These are assistance through: (a) the Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa (DTCA); and (b) the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps (DTAC). The two institutions operate under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their activities are in line with the Nigerian foreign policy articulated in Section 19 of the Nigerian Constitution, in which Africa is the central piece. Accordingly, these institutions are established to assist mostly African countries to fill gaps in their technical and human resources. Their activities are in line with the SSC principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit.

DTCA was established in 2001 to provide assistance to African countries in manpower development in key sectors including science and technology, health, education, institutional development and climate change. Projects are funded through the National Technical Cooperation Fund, a \$25 million facility drawn from the NTF. The commitment of resources is capped at \$2.5 million per year and funds are deployed in response to a demand by a recipient country. The grants are provided based on requests for assistance and needs of recipient countries. The grant is targeted largely towards low-income countries. It has limited conditionality, allowing for use of resources and experts within the African region, including diasporas. A DTCA key role is developing a database of local professionals from which specific capacity needs of recipient countries are drawn annually. Between 2004 and 2017, about \$9.3 million was disbursed to over 100 projects within Africa.

Similarly, DTAC provides technical and capacity support to African countries but also extended to the



Caribbean and Pacific regions. DTAC was established in 1987 as part of a Nigerian commitment to SSC as affirmed in the Buenos Aires meeting of 1978. Its funding comes directly from the annual budget of the federal government, representing about 0.05 per cent of that budget in 2017. The programme is demand-driven, based on capacity gaps identified by the recipient countries. Since inception, over 306,000 personnel have been deployed to various sectors in the recipient countries.


### 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This section focuses on providing a framework for documenting and analysing an SSC experience by considering key factors linked to the establishment and implementation of an SSC agreement (procedural factors), and simultaneously integrating factors relating to the context in which the project is being implemented (contextual factors). Thus, this framework provides a general yet comprehensive overview of the factors shaping an SSC initiative from a procedural and a contextual point of view in the recipient country (figure 2). An advantage of using this approach is that it allows the reader to explore the extent to which SSC initiatives are comparable with one another. It also offers the possibility of contrasting South-South and North-South cooperation experiences and of unveiling the scope of each initiative.

First, the conceptual framework provides a working definition of an SSC initiative. Then it identifies relevant features of the SSC initiative and considers their potential effect on the pathway to development outcomes in order to allow systematic comparisons. To conduct this comparative analysis, this conceptual framework proposes eight components related to the process and the context of an SSC initiative: (1) challenge addressed; (2) actors involved; (3) relationship between the actors; (4) modality of cooperation; (5) strategy of implementation; (6) time of implementation; (7) reporting; and (8) type of evaluation. These components were proposed after reviewing the available literature and consulting with experts and public officials. This framework aims to be as general as possible in order to guide data collection and allow a comparison of a variety of cases across regions. Finally, it provides a template to help with the application of the framework.

In this context, we can proceed to identify the relevant features of each of the eight components of SSC projects and outline their potential effect on the pathway to development outcomes.

Figure 2. Factors related to the process and context of an SSC initiative



Source: Author's illustration.

### 3.1 Observable Components of a South-South Cooperation Initiative

#### 3.1.1 Challenge Addressed

The first component of an SSC initiative is the challenge that it wishes to address or the type of problem that SSC is tackling. The response to a challenge depends on the context and priorities of the country where it is implemented. A challenge presents different levels of complexity based on its geographic scope. Moreover, the urgency to address it responds to a particular set of priorities. Thus, the characteristics inherent in every challenge determine the pathway to achieving a development outcome. For example, an SSC project may directly address the challenges set by the Sustainable Development Goals or the need to solve a local problem such as increasing the political participation of indigenous groups.

##### 3.1.1.1 Geographic Scope

Geographic scope refers to the number and the level of administrative units that it spans. Problems that are more localized or that affect only a particular geographic area generally involve fewer considerations. Therefore, it is presumably easier to identify the causes of a problem that is confined to a small geographic area, reach agreements among key stakeholders, gain support to implement a solution, and evaluate the results, allowing the SSC initiative to be more effective. However, it may also be difficult for an SSC initiative to solve unique problems that do not have a previously known solution. This endeavour requires deep understanding of the history and the culture of the people; otherwise the initiative will not align with national priorities.



### 3.1.1.2 *Level of Priority*

In addition, the level of priority given to a problem can be observed through the justification of its relevance and the previous efforts that partners have made to address it. The relevance of a problem can be justified as something that many actors agree is important to solve, such as those included in the SDGs and national development plans and strategies, or as something that is of particular interest to an actor, such as increasing value added to a product or contributing to the well-being of a particular group of people. One could argue that SSC projects may be more effective when there is consensus among a great number of actors about their importance because it is less costly to decide to address the problem (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). However, when the importance of a problem is the result of a narrative that has not yet been adopted by the beneficiaries of the programme, local actors may not be fully committed to investing in solving it and may attempt to interfere with its implementation. Previous commitments include the existence of policies or actions that seek to address the problem before the SSC project is implemented.

### 3.1.2 *Actors Involved in South-South Cooperation*

SSC has a multi-stakeholder approach. It includes not only Member States but also non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, social movements, universities, think tanks, philanthropies and the private sector. Different actors engage in distinctive ways adapted to the context and needs of recipient countries. However, aid providers also respond to their own political and economic interests. In order to understand these nuances, the following section focuses on actors involved in SSC projects.

#### 3.1.2.1 *Provider Country*

There is a broad set of SSC providers. This group is represented by countries from the global South that do not necessarily follow traditional models of development assistance (i.e., a DAC model). These providers bring different types of contributions that are often grounded in their own national experiences and know-how (Park, 2011). For example, a country looking for strengthening transparency and accountability at the national level can benefit from the support of a provider that has a transparency law in place and has developed successful mechanisms of accountability. In this case, a provider country shares these experiences and trains public servants in the recipient country on how to achieve similar results. The type of assistance that providers offer is supposed to resonate with all the principles outlined in the definition of SSC. This includes but it is not limited to: respect for national sovereignty, mutual benefit and common but differentiated responsibilities.

There are three prominent and influential SSC provider countries: China, India and Brazil. The heterogeneity of these three actors is reflected, inter alia, in the way in which each delivers technical and financial assistance. China, for example, uses a traditional approach to deliver SSC and relies on state actors, while India prioritizes non-state actors. In addition to the aforementioned three, a more recent wave of middle-income economies has also emerged (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014). Even though

these countries are less influential than China, India or Brazil, their SSC efforts have shown sustained growth lately (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014). Some examples of countries under this second wave are Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. SSC initiatives often involve the central government, although there is also the possibility of having a decentralized SSC initiative that involves local instead of the central government.

Depending on the economic and political agenda of the provider country, aid priorities differ. Each provider has its own stand and approach. For example, providers have different geographic priorities. While some engage in SSC projects with neighbouring countries, bigger providers can cover entire regions. In particular, Brazil's development cooperation is focused on Latin America and Africa while China covers mainly its own region as well as Latin America and Africa (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014), although China's aid also has been extended to 71 countries, including Arab and European countries, since the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative. Providers within the same region understand the context better and offer more relevant experiences (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014; Park, 2011). The type of aid offered is by and large focused on knowledge-sharing and capacity-building, and it is channelled through projects and technical cooperation (Park, 2011). There is also a tendency to focus on economic sectors (Park, 2011).

Providers use a broad range of cooperation modalities that could shape the results of SSC initiatives. Sometimes providers offer tied aid in which case procurement of goods and services is tied to the provider country (Park 2011; The Reality of Aid Network, 2010). This in itself is not necessarily problematic, although it can prevent technology transfer (The Reality of Aid Network, 2016) and it raises the question of the extent to which this practice fulfils the principle of mutual benefit. Sometimes, however, this practice responds to the unavailability of certain goods and services in the local market, which requires the provider country to supply them.

On the provider side, there are other aspects to consider, such as aid preferences and the distance that SSC providers keep from the traditional donor system. In general, SSC providers prefer offering bilateral aid rather than using multilateral aid (Park, 2011), although some providers prefer engaging in triangular cooperation projects. It does not come as a surprise that these trends are slowly shifting based on the demand from countries. With respect to the critical issue of the distance that providers keep from the traditional donor system, sometimes countries describe their activities as SSC but they are perceived by recipients as actors closer to the DAC. For example, Mexico, as an OECD member, has not signed the Accra Agenda for Action but has endorsed it on a voluntary basis. As a result, recipient countries might perceive Mexico to be a country linked with the DAC model (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014). In this context, one should look closely to see the extent to which the SSC project is following SSC principles.

Due to the heterogeneity of SSC providers, there is no easy way to characterize them. Nevertheless, exploring the characteristics of the providers, such as their prominence, economic and political agenda, distance from the traditional donor system, the modalities and the priority sectors, can help in understanding the nuances shaping the results of an SSC intervention.



### 3.1.2.2 Recipient Country

SSC is a two-way relationship. Hence, the characteristics of the recipient country have the potential to shape the results of a development intervention. The set of desirable characteristics in the recipient countries varies depending on the type of SSC initiative agreed and the country context, although, in general, the implementation of an SSC initiative can benefit from an environment where there is a legitimate authority setting rules and obligations and, most important, being able to enforce them. Recipient countries can foster enabling environments to implement a development project by providing high levels of government engagement and responsibility, a critical mass of human resources, and coherent policies and regulations (Rogner and Leung, 2018).

Among the challenges found in a compilation of SSC projects are complicated procurement procedures, difficulty in finding technical personnel who are available and who possess the skills to implement the initiative, an unstable political setting, and damage to the project caused by hostilities in fragile contexts (IBSA Fund, 2017; Irena, 2016). For example, Ghana, with the support of the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund), implemented an SSC project to improve solid waste management. Even though the project developed the national capacities to manage solid waste and reduced environmental impact, it faced challenges such as a complicated procurement procedure that slowed down the implementation process. Also, 2015 was an election year, and the change of government and audits caused additional delays in the implementation.

Another aspect to consider is the existence of policy coherence in the recipient country. Horizontal coherence among economic sectors and vertical coherence among different government levels facilitate policy implementation by helping to ensure the allocation of adequate budgets and the assessment and consideration of synergies and trade-offs. In some recipient countries, such as El Salvador or Peru, efforts have been made to harmonize public policy through a planning agency. Lack of policy coordination agencies could result in the development of policies that undermine each other. Absence of policy coherence at the national and subnational levels and among sectors and industries can arguably result in less favourable development outcomes. Likewise, an SSC initiative benefits from policies that enhance its expected outcomes.

Finally, any successful development intervention emphasized general awareness of the local micropolitics of development. This includes looking at the gender and social dynamics and ethnicity, among other characteristics of the targeted population.

### 3.1.2.3 Multilateral Organizations Involved

The architecture of aid for development is complex. The institutionalization and expansion of SSC received support from multilateral organizations (Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou, 2017), which support partnerships between two or more developing countries. Partners act as equals while developing solutions for global challenges. This type of support is also known as “triangular cooperation”. Common modalities of triangular cooperation are training and funding.

Following the historical adoption of the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action for promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, over the past decades, most United Nations agencies have to some extent been involved in facilitating South-South knowledge exchange, learning and partnership-brokering (UNDP, 2011). United Nations agencies cover a broad range of themes, although sometimes it is possible to find thematic overlaps between the agencies, for example the work on food security of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme.

#### **Multilateral Financial Institutions**

National development banks, such as the China Development Bank, the Export and Import Bank of China and the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), have been financing large infrastructure projects at the regional level (United Nations, n.d.).

Multilateral financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), have also been vital actors providing funding. Together with the Bank of the South, these three have been tackling the shortages of long-term capital for investment in infrastructure areas and industries for development (UNCTAD, 2016).

#### **New Development Bank**

NDB was established in 2014 by developing countries and emerging economies: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa. The NDB member States represent more than 20 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). The Bank has an initial authorized capital of \$100 billion and an initial subscribed capital of \$50 billion.

#### **Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank**

Established in 2016, AIIB currently has 87 members (comprising developing and developed countries) worldwide. The authorized capital stock of the Bank is \$100 billion and it can be increased by the Board of Governors. AIIB has provided financial support to the Belt and Road Initiative, and in total, it has supported 32 projects.

*Sources: New Development Bank website, accessed 22 November 2018; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank website, accessed 22 November 2018.*



In addition to the United Nations system, there are other multilateral actors. For example, in Latin America, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group are all active in the regional South-South agenda. Each uses different tools and approaches in its development programmes. The Organization of American States is increasingly prioritizing the use of South-South knowledge exchange while the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) gathers policymakers and focuses on building capacities of countries providing and receiving SSC (UNDP, 2011).

Mandates and areas of expertise of multilateral organizations determine the type of support to SSC. Agencies differentiate themselves from one another, each has a region of focus, and they provide a specific type of thematic or sectoral support. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) works to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities and UNEP leads the environmental agenda.

#### *3.1.2.4 Non-state Actors Involved*

SSC projects do not involve only exchanges between Member States. Frequently, SSC initiatives are adopting a multi-stakeholder approach that involves exchanges between subnational institutions as well as CSOs, academia, the private sector and media.

Strengths and weaknesses of the non-state actors can shape an SSC initiative. These strengths and weaknesses can be further broken down into elements such as human capital, financial sustainability, substantive expertise, internal governance, coordination with other actors and links to people. Interactions among actors foster trust and arguably contribute to the efficiency of an SSC intervention. SSC projects are expected to be more effective when they can minimize weaknesses and make the most of their strengths.

Non-state actors are essential to instrumentalize the implementation of the 2030 Agenda through South-South and triangular cooperation. The private sector, civil society and academia have created partnerships to develop investment opportunities for sustainable development. The private sector, in particular, offers financial means, human resources and technological innovation, and it has been involved in the development of physical infrastructure projects funded by Southern countries.

Overall, non-state actors have made noteworthy contributions. For instance, BRAC in Bangladesh works in more than 13 countries implementing development projects, and Brazilian CSOs have been sharing knowledge on HIV treatment around the world (UNDP, 2016).

#### *3.1.3 Relationship between the Countries Involved*

Deepening the relationship among developing countries is at the core of SSC. It is therefore understandable that the success of the SSC project will relate in part to the relationship between the countries involved. Empirical evidence shows that the majority of partners in the global South channel their development assistance within their region. Brazil and China are a few exceptions in this regard, with a significant



presence in every part of the global South (. However, given that SSC extends beyond these big players, this makes building on regional integration and alignment the initial point of entry into the development assistance space for most countries. With subsequent economic development, it would be possible to extend development assistance to other developing countries. Other relationships can be built based on shared historical antecedents. For example, countries that share former colonial authority have shown stronger ties and made more progress in regional integration. Francophone countries in Africa share stronger economic and political ties, which engender cooperation among them.

Recent times, however, have seen an expansion among Southern providers to other regions of the global South, notably China, Brazil and India. While relationships at this level are fraught with challenges,<sup>5</sup> countries could use modalities such as joint/bilateral commissions to navigate this new frontier. China, for instance, adopts joint commissions, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative as well as bilateral arrangements. In a way, this mirrors the North-South relationship, which utilizes the multilateral platforms to deliver development assistance. Countries are also coordinating their activities using traditional multilateral systems such as bilateral investment treaties through the World Trade Organization (WTO). The IBSA Fund is another example, which works through the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) in delivering resources to low-income countries. The overall objective is to foster interregional cooperation for SSC projects. However, there are still notable issues concerning the institutional setting for SSC. For instance, SSC still lacks an appropriate institutional framework to respond to diplomatic standoffs or economic disputes between countries that engage in SSC bilaterally or through triangular cooperation.

The most effective strategy with regard to establishing a bilateral or multilateral platform for SSC projects will be influenced mostly by the capacities/competencies of partners. Regardless of the chosen pathways, the existence of an institutional mechanism that coordinates both intra- and interregional relationships will enhance the effectiveness of SSC projects. Therefore, it is important to identify the type of relationship underpinning specific SSC projects.

Other relevant characteristics are the history of diplomatic and economic relations between the countries involved as well as whether the countries share a similar history, culture, legal system and economic activities.

### **3.1.4** *Modalities of the Cooperation*

Modalities of development cooperation are the instruments or methods used to deliver development activities, including both financial (grants, trade and loans) and non-financial instruments (technical assistance and knowledge exchange). According to Ohno and Niiya (2004), the modality “determines how

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<sup>5</sup> For countries in the global South moving beyond their region, the main dilemma lies in creating a new institutional framework for interaction or using the existing multilateral institutions built along a North-South divide.



funds and knowledge are transmitted to recipient countries, how goods are procured, and how recipients and donors interact in such processes”, which invariably determines development outcomes. This explains the constant rethinking and rejigging of the development modality from project aid (infrastructure) in the 1970s to structural adjustment support in the 1980s and, more recently, budget support, the sector-wide approach (SWAp) and pooled funding.<sup>6</sup> For SSC, technical assistance historically has been the main modality of cooperation. However, this has evolved recently to domains covered under NSC including grants, debt relief, project aid and pooled funding.

Beyond this, SSC has been extended to activities such as credit lines, humanitarian assistance, tariff reduction, investment promotion (especially in infrastructure), trade, cost reduction on remittances and support for the private sector (see Chaturvedi, 2016; Besharati and others, 2015). Some of these activities are excluded in the OECD/DAC definition of “aid”. In essence, SSC development assistance extends to a wider domain than that covered by ODA, thereby making comparisons difficult. In addition, SSC prioritizes non-financial assistance such as technical cooperation, technology and knowledge transfer, and coalitions to promote social, cultural and political development.

What makes SSC unique is not the deployment of new modalities but rather innovating with regard to existing ones. Therefore, there are no outright wrong or right modalities but rather the need to fit development assistance within the appropriate context, in line with development priorities integrated into national development plans and strategies. Mixing different modalities might also be essential for risk mitigation and peer learning to improve performance. For example, in many cases, combining grants with technical assistance could be more effective than deploying an individual modality, since it reduces the risk of project failure or a mismatch between the problem being addressed and modalities. SSC modalities should therefore be context- and path-dependent and demand driven. This means that the donor needs to work with recipients in developing the appropriate modality on a project-by-project basis. It is equally important that the chosen modality engender effective public service delivery and accountability from government. For example, project support using a parallel system is known to lead to limited domestic ownership, while accountability lies solely with the donor (Foster and Leavy, 2001).

### 3.1.5 *Implementation Strategy*

A core issue in development assistance is matching a project with an adequate implementation strategy. There are two sides to this matter. On the one hand, there is the practice of channelling support through state actors and state agencies. Alternatively, non-state actors CSOs, the private sector or civil society can be deployed for implementation. Broadly speaking, the area/sector of development assistance will influence the decision to choose between state and non-state actors. Infrastructure or public goods assistance

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<sup>6</sup> “Sector-wide approaches” are development assistance frameworks in which funding and other modalities are concentrated towards a policy within a sector; while “pooled funding” is joint funding of initiatives by multiple donors.

requires coordination with the Government; therefore, implementation through a state actor might be more appropriate. A similar argument holds for humanitarian aid or budget-support facilities. Also, many aspects of technical assistance address a particular skill gap in the public sector, so it is clear that, in such cases, the state leads the implementation.

Even in sectors where it is possible to involve state and non-state actors, sometimes using state agencies is advantageous, especially in a country with viable institutions. In Ethiopia, for instance, the majority of development assistance is channelled through the state. The benefit of state involvement is mainly to promote domestic partnership and, by extension, ownership and reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks. Moreover, Bandstein (2007) observed that the sustainability of development assistance is much enhanced with state participation in initiatives. This is particularly true for an intervention that requires sustained policy and institutional frameworks for its effectiveness. In addition, for initiatives with multiple actors, where coordination is essential, state involvement will be inevitable.

However, in a country/locality with weak institutions, non-state participation can improve aid effectiveness and service delivery. Indeed, CSOs have shown their usefulness in more traditional North-South aid, such as working with grass-roots, marginalized communities, providing humanitarian aid, and being major players in the democratization process, thus also proving effective in SSC (Tomlinson, 2013). Even in areas where state agencies are necessary, non-state actors could play a residual role in the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes and in filling the critical skills gap in the public sector. The role of non-state actors is widely recognized in development cooperation, as observed at the second High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005. Also, the 2009 High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation specifically highlighted their importance with the affirmation of SSC to include “non-governmental organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and other actors that contribute to meeting development challenges and objectives in line with national development strategies and plans”. At present, participation of non-state actors in SSC initiatives is minimal.

The optimal implementation strategy involves an approach that embraces inclusive partnership and multi-stakeholder engagement among all actors. This will draw on key strengths of state and non-state actors and enhance the delivery of initiatives. Furthermore, the implementation strategy should extend to broader citizen involvement and active local participation. SSC initiatives with these characteristics are more likely to deliver their intended goals and sustainability over time.

### *3.1.6 Time of Implementation*

Another important characteristic of the SSC initiative is the time of implementation. Timing can be viewed from its different dimensions, such as duration of the initiative (short term or long term) or periodicity (once or recurring) or whether or not it is a replication/scaling of an existing initiative. These different dimensions of the timing of the implementation are determined by several factors. For instance, duration hinges on type of initiative or sector involved. Interventions concerning infrastructure and institutionbuilding are



more long term compared to grants or humanitarian assistance. Similarly, the periodicity of the initiative is determined mostly by the type of initiative and modality of the cooperation. Capacity development and scholarships are more effective if recurring, at least up until the time when the observed manpower gaps are filled or the transfer of skills and technical know-how has adequately taken place. In addition, cooperation that is codified through joint/bilateral commissions is more long term and recurring owing to the existence of a mechanism for regular monitoring and evaluation of outcomes.

While there is no general rule on the appropriate timing, it is important that initiatives be timed in a way that ensures predictability, with the implementation cycle known to the donors and recipient countries. The Accra Agenda for Action emphasized the need for donors to promote aid effectiveness through providing “developing countries with regular information on how much aid they can expect, and when they can expect to receive it”. Also, the vast literature on aid effectiveness has highlighted the adverse effect that aid volatility, either positive or negative, could generate for macroeconomic stability and socioeconomic outcomes (see Hudson, 2015; Fielding and Mavrotas, 2008). In effect, the characteristics of donor and recipient are crucial in ensuring the appropriate timing of the implementation. In the context of SSC, this will mean that magnitude, depth and timeframe for assistance are known to the recipient from the outset. The predictability of assistance is relevant in all forms of development assistance.

The recipient country also plays a significant role in defining the timing of the initiative and implementing it. First, economic and political stability is crucial, especially in fragile States, where conflicts could delay the implementation of an SSC initiative. For co-funded initiatives, domestic economic instability could push the Government to consider other priorities. There are also instances of local bureaucratic process impeding implementation of the initiative. Both donor and recipient countries have a role to play in ensuring appropriate timing. Overall, matching the initiative to appropriate duration, period and implementation strategy is crucial for the effectiveness of the partnership.

### 3.1.7 Reporting

Inconsistency in reporting on the implementation and results of SSC projects is generally recognized as one of their main weaknesses (Besharati and others, 2015). Although some efforts to systematically gather information about SSC projects exist, such as those by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and SEIGB, they lack common standards regarding how to classify SSC projects and what information to include, and data are often incomplete or cannot be verified.

Since a report is generally delivered after an SSC project is finalized, it cannot be said to directly affect the effectiveness of an SSC project. However, the anticipation of creating a report can encourage thinking more thoroughly about the best ways to implement a project and identify the results that it achieves.

One of the features of a report that suggests a more rigorous and deliberate implementation of an SSC

project is whether it includes a theory of change. When a report identifies assumptions, actions and expected effects, an SSC project is more likely to have achieved success owing to awareness of the mechanisms that connect actions and outcomes. Another feature is how the use of evidence is reported. When a report evaluates qualitative or quantitative evidence in a systematic and scientific manner, it is better able to determine the contribution that the SSC project made. Finally, when the report is transparent regarding its finances and implementation, it is more likely to have been effective by increasing the accountability of actors involved.

On the other hand, reporting is a resource-intensive task. SSC projects with sophisticated reports may have compromised resources to create them; thus, they may be less likely to achieve results than they would have been had they not invested in reporting.

### *3.1.8 Evaluation of Impact*

SSC projects can differ in the type of impact that they aim to achieve. In general, there are three types of impact that can be assessed: (a) the number of people who benefited in a particular way; (b) the improvement of a development indicator; and (c) the acquisition of a capacity. Some types of impact may be more difficult to observe than others. Also, it may be challenging to isolate the impact due to the SSC project from the impact from complementary actions, not to mention the limitation of a lack of information. Additionally, impact evaluation of SSC needs to look at the impact in both the recipient and the provider country. SSC projects that seek to achieve measurable impact in both countries could be better able to conform to the SSC principles. Finally, the study of SSC initiatives needs to identify the method used to assess the impact. Among the most common methods are: qualitative case studies, quasi-experimental methods, econometric approaches, outcome harvesting and randomized control trials.

## **3.2. Final Consideration**

The goal of this conceptual framework is to guide the collection of information about SSC projects needed for systematic comparison. To do this, it determines the limits of an SSC project and identifies the features of eight components that can potentially determine their effectiveness. Classifying the factors as contextual and procedural aims at reducing the complexities of understanding diverse SSC initiative in different and sometimes not comparable contexts.

The application of the framework captures the uniqueness of the context in which the SSC initiative is taking place and sheds some light on the factors linked to the process of establishing the SSC initiative used in that context. The ultimate objective is to guide the systematic collection of information that allows one to compare procedural and contextual factors from different contexts and understand how a certain type of outcome was achieved and under what conditions.

It is hoped that the framework will be useful for developing research that aims at comparing SSC projects



systematically across regions. The framework is not exhaustive and can be further improved by including additional analysis such as the role of strategic interactions between actors on the path to development outcomes.

## Template

The following template (table 2) was developed by the authors to help to guide the collection of information based on the conceptual framework. We propose a set of key questions classified according to two groups of factors: (a) those related to the context in which an initiative is implemented; and (b) those related to the process linked to the establishment and implementation of an SSC agreement.

*Table 2. Components of the conceptual framework*

<b>Factors related to the process</b>	<b>Key questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>
Challenge addressed	What is the geographic scope of the SSC initiative?	
	Level of priority: Is the initiative at the macro, meso or micro level?	
Actors involved: How do the actors involved shape the experience? Not all the actors are the same.	What actors are involved in this SSC initiative? Do they coordinate with each other? Is their opinion taken into consideration for this project? How does the output of the initiative change depending on the type of actors involved? Is the outcome different when the actors come from the same region? Are non-state actors involved? If yes, what are their main strengths and weaknesses?	Number of actors involved Number of meetings that the actors have held since the SSC initiative started Non-state actors: Percentage of staff who have completed tertiary education and are involved in the initiative Percentage of staff who are substantive experts and are involved in the initiative Number of meetings held in the last year with the members of the community/city where the project is taking place
Modality of cooperation	What are the different modalities of cooperation possible?	Finance: Grants, concessionary loans, budget support, project aid
	What modality was used?	Non-finance: technical assistance, technology transfer, knowledge exchange
	What are the implications of using such a modality?	

<b>Factors related to the process</b>	<b>Key questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>
Strategy of implementation	Is the implementation strategy embracing inclusive partnership and engagement among all actors?  Are citizens involved?	Extent of non-state actors' involvement relative to state capacity
Time of implementation: duration of the project, periodicity of the project, or replication/ scaling of the existing project or not	Does the initiative ensure aid predictability?  Is the time of implementation realistic?  Was everything implemented as planned and according to the timeline?	Duration of the project (short term to long term)  Periodicity of the project (one time or recurring)  Ratio of actual project funds released to total project funds
Reporting	Did the SSC provider require reporting?	
Evaluation of impact	Was there an evaluation of impact by a third party? What kind of method(s) were used?	

<b>Factors related to the context</b>	<b>Key questions</b>	<b>Key indicators</b>
Relationship between actors involved	What is the relationship between the actors involved?  How does the relationship between the countries affect the outcome of the SSC experience?	Degree of relationship will be defined by: - whether in the same region and/or part of a regional organization - whether countries share a similar language - whether countries share a common colonial past
National stability	During the time that the project was implemented, was there economic and political stability? Does the country have a conflict or is it a fragile State?	State fragility; indicators for broad macroeconomic performance and political stability  Presence or absence of a divided government

### **Other elements related to the context:**

Policy alignment	To what extent is the SSC initiative studied aligned with the national policies and agendas?  Has the SSC initiative created a trade-off in a different sector?	This will be based on content analysis of national policy document vis-à-vis thematic objective of SSC
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## 4. APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CASE STUDY OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION PROJECTS

To demonstrate the usefulness of the theoretical framework, we employed it to analyse two cases of SSC projects in Nigeria (table 3). The first is the South-South Cooperation Programme for technical assistance to farmers implemented by the Government of China to support the Nigerian agriculture system. It is compared with the Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, which is an NSC programme implemented by the Government of the United States. The second case focuses on Nigeria-led SSC in the form of technical assistance to the Gambia. The objective is to identify the unique pathways in SSC projects vis-à-vis those in NSC projects and demonstrate the policy importance of having a systematic framework to report on interventions.

The South-South Cooperation Programme and the Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project were selected owing to their wide coverage, selected focus areas and sustainability of the programmes. Both programmes began over a decade ago with their reach spread across the country, which offers useful learning experiences and allows for comparisons. In addition, both programmes aim to build the technical capacity of local actors in the agriculture sector. In selecting the case studies, interventions in the agriculture sector were selected considering its importance in ensuring food security given the growing population as well as in achieving economic diversification. Currently, agriculture is a major pillar of the economy: in 2017, the sector employed 37 per cent of the country's labour force, and in 2018, it contributed 23 per cent to the national GDP (World Bank, 2017; Nigeria, NBS, 2018).

The methodological approach for the cases is based on key informant interviews with officials implementing the programmes and a document review. The interviews were conducted between September and November 2018 using structured questionnaires. For the first case study, we engaged stakeholders from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, while for the second case study, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DTAC and the Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa (DTCA) were interviewed.

### 4.1 Case Studies of South-South (South-South Cooperation Programme) and North-South (Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project) Development Assistance Programmes

The South-South Cooperation Programme involves the deployment of Chinese agricultural experts to work with local farmers in Nigeria for the purpose of sharing low-cost efficient technologies in several areas, including fisheries production, crop intensification, agro-processing and livestock production. For instance, in livestock production, technologies relating to the sustainable production of animal feed and to artificial insemination were introduced. SSC is implemented by NPFS, an entity under FMARD, and it is based on a tripartite agreement signed by Nigeria, China and FAO. Under the Programme, the Government



of China searches for, screens and recruits Chinese agricultural workers who have the requisite skill set needed by local Nigerian farmers, which covers a wide range from livestock production to horticulture. The first phase of the programme was implemented between 2003 and 2007 and, owing to its success, it was extended to a second phase (2009–2016). The third phase is expected to start in 2019. Our analysis focuses on the first and second phases of the project.

The Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project centres on building the managerial and technical capacity of local researchers alongside developing the appetite for evidence-based policymaking in Nigeria's agriculture sector.<sup>7</sup> Researchers in Nigerian academic institutions and research firms work together with Michigan State University (MSU) and IFPRI to develop and expand the research and analytical component of Nigeria's agriculture sector.

### 4.1.1 *Challenges addressed*

The SSC Programme seeks to address the skills gap among Nigerian farmers through training and extension services support to achieve a more efficient and robust performance in food production. Training during the second phase of the Programme covered several areas including water use and management, fisheries, livestock, agro-processing, crop production, aquaculture, fabrication of simple farm tools and equipment, bamboo production and utilization, biogas production and sericulture, areas selected based on the needs of local farmers and the priority areas of the agriculture sector. The SSC Programme has been accorded top priority by the Government and is implemented across the country in addition to the establishment of a Regional Multi-Service Extension Centre (REMSEC) in each of Nigeria's six geopolitical zones<sup>8</sup> for easy facilitation of the Programme.

The Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project aims to build the capacity of Nigerian analysts to provide evidence-based solutions in agriculture by developing the research and analysis component of policies. In addition, it promotes and fosters informed policy dialogue among relevant parties and improves the capacity of the Government to plan and implement those solutions. The development of the agriculture sector is closely linked to the implementation of policies that are backed by research and analysis and the prioritization of those policies by government officials.

### 4.1.2 *Actors Involved*

The domestic actors in the SSC Programme include the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development through NPFS, state ministries of agriculture through the agricultural development projects (ADPs), local government councils through the ADPs nationwide, Federal Colleges of Agriculture, local

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<sup>7</sup> The project, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is in its second phase (2016–2020); the first phase covered the period 2007–2011.

<sup>8</sup> The six geopolitical zones are North East, North West, North Central, South South, South East and South West.



agricultural research institutes, the Federal Ministry of Water Resources, the Nigerian Embassy in Beijing, China, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NPFS, as the principal coordinator of the SSC Programme, interacts closely with the ADPs, the Federal Colleges of Agriculture and research institutes in conducting a needs assessment for the Programme and with the Nigerian Embassy in Beijing and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in facilitating the exchange of the expatriates. NPFS also liaises with the foreign state actors, which include the Embassy of China in Nigeria, the Ministry of Agriculture of China, the China Foreign Economic Cooperation Centre, and the China SSC Desk Office at FAO headquarters in Rome.

The development cooperation model for the SSC Programme is developed by FAO, which involves connecting countries with development solutions in emerging economies such as those of China, Brazil and Morocco. As a result, the China-Nigeria SSC Programme is exposed to peer learning through which the learning experiences of Chinese experts in other participating countries as well as the experiences of the Brazilian and Moroccan experts are used to refine the Programme. On the country level, there is active and direct participation of the Government of China, since state agencies from both countries meet during the planning stage to decide on the focus areas and the number of experts required. Interactions with the stakeholders revealed that the open communication provides a feeling of brotherhood and mutual respect and the opportunity for the Programme to be adapted to suit local needs. The Government of Nigeria has the agency to drive its local agenda, which has impacted the success of the Programme.

With regard to the role of the Government of Nigeria in the SSC Programme, its role is extensive. First, the federal government financed the first and second phases of the Programme. Second, adequate political will among high-level state officials has been demonstrated, with the Programme initially championed by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. The former president, who is also a farm owner, prioritized the programme needs and sidestepped bureaucratic bottlenecks to make funds available. Third, placing the SSC Programme under NPFS, an entity under FMARD, has provided adequate human resources with local knowledge of the sector and the country's political terrain. Finally, all three tiers of government participate in the needs assessment process of the Programme. The scope and scale of involvement have led to the State's taking domestic ownership alongside high government engagement and responsibility in all stages of the Programme.

With regard to the Feed the Future Project, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Nigerian research firms and universities are the domestic actors involved in the project. Foreign actors include IFPRI and MSU. The participation of these international NGOs that are frontrunners in agricultural research has enabled beneficiaries to leverage novel research and analytical processes and gain insight into advanced procedures and technologies.

### 4.1.3 *Relationship between Countries*

China's relationship with Nigeria, as with other countries, is guided by the SSC principles of peaceful coexistence and respect for national sovereignty, China's fundamental principle in developing foreign relations (Zhengqing and Xiaoqin, 2015). By extension, foreign assistance provided by China is governed by mutual benefit and respect as well as the practice of equality as exemplified in the SSC Programme. The discussions with high-level government officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development revealed that development cooperation from China is in the form of a peer-to-peer arrangement rather than one between a principal and a subordinate. In the case of the SSC Programme, FAO is playing a role in navigating the development space by facilitating the discussion between both countries.

Nigeria has benefited from the vertical relationship that exists with the United States, which dates back to its independence. Generally, United States interventions in Nigeria are guided by the country's importance in the regional landscape, being the most populous African country. It is believed that a prosperous Nigeria will ultimately lead to a prosperous Africa. More specifically, the selection of Nigeria as one of the 12 priority countries in the Feed the Future project is due to the need for an adequate food supply given the size and growth of the population.<sup>9</sup>

### 4.1.4 *Modality of Cooperation*

Technical cooperation is the aid modality employed in the SSC Programme. The Government of China jointly with the Nigerian counterparts selects and deploys Chinese agriculture experts and technicians to transfer knowledge and skills to Nigerian farmers. These farmers are selected from across the country after indicating an interest in being part of the Programme. The Government of China also assists in developing capacities of the staff from NPFS and ADP as well as farmers through short-term international training programmes and workshops on novel agricultural practices. Although the Programme is co-sponsored by China, the interviews revealed that the Government of Nigeria is responsible for the maintenance of the experts as well as expenses for biannual travel to China. However, the third phase of the Programme will involve more financial commitment from the Chinese. In addition, the exchange of Chinese experts presents a severe communication barrier, which has hindered the programme implementation since the majority of the experts are unable to speak Nigeria's common language: English.

In contrast, Feed the Future is fully funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a development project aid. Aside from other areas, the funding covers the accommodation, travel cost and stipend of the visiting researchers. The reliability of the source of funding has led to proper planning and consistency in the implementation of the programme. Interactions with the implementers

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<sup>9</sup> Nigeria's 2017 population growth rate is 2.6 per cent (World Bank, 2017). Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=NG>.



disclosed that strike actions, which are common occurrences in Nigerian universities, have deterred the programme since beneficiaries are unable to complete their activities in due time.

#### *4.1.5 Implementation Strategy*

The implementation strategy for the SSC project is demand driven since Nigeria's Ministry of Agriculture, through NPFS, identifies the areas requiring the services of Chinese workers based on the activities and priority of the Ministry of Agriculture. NPFS also engages with local farmers to identify missing skills. Afterwards, the Government of Nigeria approaches the Government of China to begin a search for local experts in the focal areas. After a careful selection process by NPFS and officials of the Government of China, the experts begin a two-year exchange programme in which each expert is partnered with a local farmer for the duration of the programme. The State-led implementation of the SSC Programme creates the opportunity to adequately identify the skills gap within the private and public sectors and tailor the Programme to meet local needs. For instance, between the first phase (2003–2007) and the second phase (2009–2016) of the Programme, the focus areas were modified and the number of experts was downsized from 496 to 190 Chinese experts owing to the changing demand of the beneficiaries. Also, there has been adequate local engagement and acceptance of the Programme, particularly among rural dwellers.

For Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, MSU offers positions to Nigerian students at the Master's and PhD levels to be short-term scholars at the university. The students take courses and conduct their research in agriculture, with MSU faculty and IFPRI researchers playing supervisory roles. Also, the student's primary academic supervisor is entitled to a visit to MSU, where the supervisor will engage with the MSU faculty and also make presentations on research findings.

#### *4.1.6 Time of Implementation*

The SSC Programme will begin its third phase in 2019. As noted earlier, its first and second phases covered the periods from 2003 to 2007 and from 2009 to 2016, respectively. In a way, the extension indicates the level of success that the programmes have achieved in meeting their objectives. Recurring programmes present the opportunity to learn from earlier phases and build institutional capacity. However, the timing of the implementation of the SSC Programme is being altered by declining government revenue, which has led to the request for higher counterpart funding from China.

Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project is ongoing (2016–2020); the first phase covered the period from 2007 to 2011. Due to the high level of aid predictability, lags in programme implementation are curtailed.

### 4.1.7 Reporting

Rigorous reporting that connects actions to programme outcomes and is in line with international standards is key to monitoring the success of the programme. A report on the SSC Programme is conducted annually. It covers areas including the key areas of cooperation, achievements and challenges of the Programme. Reporting is also a form of impact assessment since it covers the number of beneficiaries and the number of people who acquired capacity in several focus areas. In addition, it serves as a means of obtaining feedback, which is used to refine subsequent phases of the Programme.

The Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project produces a report on the programme every quarter. As requested by the project funders, the reports are not publicly available, however, which limits the knowledge of the processes and outcome of the programme. More frequent reporting provides further opportunities to learn from challenges confronting the programme.

### 4.1.8 Evaluation of Impact

The SSC Programme evaluates impact using several indicators including the number of technicians and experts that have been deployed, micro projects executed, demonstrations and training sessions conducted, novel technologies introduced and households that have adopted those technologies, and the impact on food production. NPFS also conducts field visits to assess the performance of the experts and annual debriefing sessions where local farmers, experts and government officials examine the extent to which the Programme has been effective.

Information on how Feed the Future evaluates impact is not readily available. However, monitoring the number of students trained and the quality of the research outputs produced can be a means of impact evaluation.

**Table 3. Summary of the examination of NSC and SSC development assistance interventions using the theoretical framework**

Theoretical Framework Component	Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project	South-South Cooperation Programme
<b>Factors related to the process</b>		
Challenges addressed	Dearth of high-quality research in agriculture and lack of political will to utilize research in policymaking.	Skills gap among farmers
Major actors involved		
Foreign actors		
State government	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	Government of China



<b>Theoretical Framework Component</b>	<b>Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project</b>	<b>South-South Cooperation Programme</b>
Multilateral organizations	None	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Non-governmental organizations	International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Michigan State University (MSU)	None
Local actors		
State government	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development through the National Programme for Food Security (NPFs), state ministries of agriculture, and local government councils
Non-governmental organizations	Universities and research firms	Private farms
Modality of cooperation	Financial assistance, project aid	Technical assistance, skills transfer
Implementation strategy	Graduate students apply to be short-term scholars at Michigan State University, where MSU faculty and IFPRI researchers will supervise their research	Government and local farmers identify priority areas and the Government, together with the Government of China, selects the experts
Time of implementation	Third phase: Beginning in 2019 Second phase: 2009–2016 First phase: 2003–2007	Second phase: 2016–2020 First phase: 2007–2011
Reporting	Quarterly reporting	Annual reporting
Evaluation of impact	Use of: (a) Number of graduate students trained	Use of: (a) number of people who benefited (b) acquisition capacity
<b>Factors related to the context</b>		
Stability	Volatile political climate strike action in universities affects the programme implementation	Insufficient support from high-level government officials affects programme funding
Relationship between countries	Nigeria's importance in the regional landscape - It is one of the 12 priority countries of the United States	A more horizontal relationship based on mutual benefit and respect and the practice of equality
Outcome	Production of research output that provides fact-based solutions and recommendations regarding the problems in the sector	Providing novel skills to local farmers and expanding their capacity through the use of low-cost, efficient technology. For instance, Chinese cage fish farming technology, horticulture technologies, and technologies involving bee-hive construction and management being adopted by over 5,000 fishing families, 200 farmers and 5,000 farmers, respectively (NPFs, 2017)

## 4.2 SSC (South-South Cooperation Programme) vs. NSC (Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project)

Table 4 presents the successes and challenges of the South-South Cooperation Programme and Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project interventions based on the findings from the case studies. The high level of ownership and commitment demonstrated by the Government of Nigeria is attributed to the success of the SSC Programme. Unlike the Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, the Government participates in financing the Programme alongside selecting focal areas as well as the Chinese experts, which makes the State accountable for the Programme outcomes. This accountability allows for transparency, better management and monitoring of the Programme. Another factor that spurred the success of the SSC Programme, particularly at the early stage, is the presence of a high-level state actor to advocate for the needs of the Programme among relevant parties. With the Government providing a portion of the resources needed to carry out the Programme, it was crucial for a high-ranking government official to make clear the potential and future usefulness of the Programme for the agriculture sector.

The annual reporting and debriefing sessions, which are publicly available, are another big advantage for the SSC project. While the report provides the opportunity to assess the impact of the project, the debriefing sessions allow for the refinement of the Programme to suit the needs of the sector. For Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, a reliable funding stream has been instrumental to its implementation; this is lacking for the SSC Programme, where there is no funding regulation that provides consistent funding for it. Since the second phase, funding for the SSC Programme has been more affected by the dwindling government revenue amid competing development needs.<sup>10</sup> Another challenge that has hindered the SSC Programme is the language barrier between Chinese experts and local farmers, which poses a difficulty in understanding the training and demonstrations provided. For Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, local socio-political issues such as strike action by university staff and the lack of urgency in passing agriculture bills by the legislature have delayed the implementation process.

Comparisons between both development cooperation programmes that are intended to build the technical capacity of local actors in the agriculture sector reveal the factors responsible for the success as well as the non-performance of programmes. Commitment from the recipient government, whether in the form of financial commitment or a programme champion in government, is crucial to achieving results and programme sustainability since commitment increases the efforts of local actors and makes them accountable. A reliable source of funding also drives the success of programmes since implementers are better able build on the gains from the previous phase and, in general, plan and execute the programme. With regard to challenges, the difference in language poses a serious difficulty in maximizing the benefits of a technical-assistance programme. It may be useful for preference to be skewed towards English-speaking

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<sup>10</sup> Government revenue as a per cent of GDP declined from 14.3 per cent in 2012 to 6 per cent in 2017 (IMF, 2018b.)



experts during the selection process. The analysis also shows that in spite of an appropriate programme design and management in place, socio-political issues can deter programmes from achieving results. The burden lies with the recipient country to address these issues in order to fully maximize the usefulness of the programme.

*Table 4. Success and challenges of the development assistance interventions in Nigeria*

	<b>Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project</b>	<b>South-South Cooperation Programme</b>
<b>Success</b>		
<b>Actors involved</b>		
Domestic ownership		✓
Presence of political champion		✓
<b>Time of implementation</b>		
Reliable funding	✓	
State participation		✓
<b>Challenges</b>		
<b>Modality of cooperation</b>		
Absence of funding regulation		✓
Language barrier		✓
<b>Challenges addressed</b>		
No sense of urgency in political climate	✓	
Strike action	✓	

### 4.3 Case Study of Nigeria's Engagement with Southern Countries: Nigerian-led Capacity building

This section looks at the provision of technical aid by Nigeria to the Gambia under the TAC scheme as a case study for applying the theoretical framework on SSC. Nigeria sent 363 experts to the Gambia between 1987 and 2004, the highest recipient of this type of support since its inception. We examined the historical context that led to the creation of Nigeria's TAC to document the challenges that it sought to address. Furthermore, we identified the actors involved and the relationship between them, the modality and strategy for implementation of the project, and the challenges posed by the scheme. Finally, we juxtaposed this SSC project with a similar North-South technical assistance project of which Nigeria is a recipient.

#### 4.3.1 Challenges Addressed

The Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA) in 1978 marked a significant shift in how Southern countries engaged



in development assistance with their peers. Nigeria also experienced that shift in both thinking about and practising development cooperation. Specifically, stakeholder consultations revealed that most of the Nigeria-led assistance before that period was in the form of direct financial assistance, especially budgetary support. At the time, that form of assistance was raising many concerns about sustainability and accountability for Nigerian policymakers, who received frequent requests from countries that were struggling to meet their budgetary obligations such as payments of salaries. The new thinking on technical cooperation that was refined and inspired by the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (1978) eventually gained footing in Nigeria.

By the mid-1980s, with growing criticism of Nigeria's cash-driven aid diplomacy and shrinking oil export earnings, the new thinking on SSC became crystallized in Nigeria's foreign policy agenda. In 1987, the TAC scheme was established to constitute a practical demonstration of SSC through the provision of manpower assistance. The scheme was designed to expand relations with recipient countries and create the enabling environment for fostering mutual understanding and cooperation in a global South confronted by expanding circles of poverty and underdevelopment (Adebanwi, 2011). Modelled after the American Peace Corps, TAC remains the only international voluntary scheme in Africa.

The earlier model of cash-based development assistance encouraged the recipient countries to employ experts from Europe or Asia. Under the TAC scheme, it was deemed better to use the money to pay Nigerian technical personnel to travel to recipient countries to work.

### *4.3.2 Actors Involved*

The Gambia, located in West Africa, covers 11,300 sq km and has a population of 2,092,731. It is one of the poorest countries in Africa, with scarce natural resources. Agriculture accounts for over three fourths of its labour-force participation and one third of its GDP (The World Factbook - CIA, 2018). The country is heavily reliant on international assistance from multilateral and bilateral partners to make economic progress. Nigeria is an important bilateral partner in this regard. The Gambia turns to Nigeria for skilled and experienced hands, given the country's incredible shortage of manpower and resources. For instance, Nigeria has helped the Gambia to staff its national university, opened only in 1999, with a total of 160 health workers (73 doctors and 87 nurses) in the first 18 years of the TAC scheme. It also provided Nigerian judges to serve as the Gambia's chief justices. The Gambia started a national youth service programme similar to Nigeria's National Youth Service Corps (Adebanwi, 2011).

The Nigerian experts who serve as volunteers under the TAC scheme are also an important group of actors. While the state actors from both Nigeria and the Gambia facilitate the programme, it is the volunteers who carry out the responsibility of delivering capacity where it is needed.



### 4.3.3 *Relationship between actors*

The relationship between Nigeria and the Gambia is based on shared history and geography. Specifically, the two countries are former colonies of the United Kingdom, meaning that they are members of the Commonwealth and share a common language for business and governance: English. Also, both countries are located in West Africa and are therefore fellow members of several regional and supranational organizations such as ECOWAS. All those factors contributed to the initiation and growth of the partnership. Moreover, Ayinde (2011) noted the general belief that technical cooperation granted by a regional state delivers more potent spillover effects in terms of development and intra-regional unity compared to technical cooperation originating from outside the region.

### 4.3.4 *Modality of Cooperation*

Nigeria's TAC scheme is a unilateral international voluntary scheme involving a one-way flow of volunteers to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, as characterized by Sherraden and others (2006). The capacity provision and capacity-building provided under the TAC scheme can be considered as technical assistance. This assistance is covered by a TAC country agreement with each recipient country, which outlines the obligations and responsibilities of each party (Adebanwi, 2011). Nigeria, through DTAC, chooses and prepares the volunteers; provides their onshore, offshore and settlement allowances; and pays for their transit. The recipient country is responsible for providing accommodation, ground transport and utilities for the volunteers during their stay, which is a renewable period of two years.

This modality of SSC responds directly to the challenge identified when the scheme was created. TAC was to employ the modality of technical assistance that used Nigerian volunteers in a partnership that is demand driven and encourages mutual contribution. Whereas previous financial assistance often went towards the engagement of Northern expertise by recipient countries, TAC took responsibility for providing Southern expertise for the needed technical support.

### 4.3.5 *Implementation Strategy*

DTAC was set up primarily as a parastatal under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and charged with overall management and general administration of the scheme, recruitment and orientation exercises for volunteers, deployment of volunteers to recipient countries and debriefing of volunteers on their final return home (Adebanwi, 2011). It liaises with the Government of the Gambia to determine priority sectors that need Nigerian experts to provide technical capacity-building assistance. This engenders local ownership of the project by the recipient country, and the feeling of the recipient country that it is engaging as a partner encourages success of the initiative and stronger ties between the countries. For instance, several government officials have expressed the idea that the TAC scheme has allowed Nigeria's relationship with recipient countries to become stronger.

The nature of the technical assistance provided under the TAC scheme necessarily involves state actors because that is where the capacity needs are (both provision and building of capacity). Nonetheless, non-state actors, specifically professionals, are strategically engaged to provide this needed capacity where it is found to be lacking within the state institutions. The level of success achieved under the TAC scheme is substantially attributed to the employment of this implementation strategy. This approach draws on the strengths of the State to initiate, fund and coordinate the SSC activities and that of the private sector to deliver its capacity where it is lacking in the state institutions but greatly needed.

### 4.3.6 *Time of Implementation*

The TAC scheme is recurring to ensure that, given the need, capacity is periodically provided. Specifically, volunteers are sent for a renewable period of two years, as mentioned earlier. Also, the Gambia has been the most consistent and biggest recipient of Nigerian experts since the inception of the TAC scheme.

The modality of cooperation under the TAC scheme technical assistance makes this timing appropriate for several reasons. For example, in many cases, success is defined by the ability to build domestic capacity to carry out necessary assignments for which assistance is provided. Hence, once capacity is built, the exit strategy provided for TAC volunteers by the time of implementation is important to allow local takeover and sustainability. Moreover, local professionals may develop a disdain for foreigners who play critical roles in their institutions that they themselves may feel capable of playing. For instance, the Gambian Bar Association recently voiced concerns over the continuous use of Nigerian judges in critical positions in the country's judiciary where they deemed that there was Gambian capacity.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, different sectors in the recipient country may require different types of capacity at any given period. A recurring two-year life cycle enables the Gambia, in this case, to liaise with Nigeria to supply the capacity required over the cycles of project implementation based on current need. For instance, when a plan to start the first university in the Gambia was implemented, Nigeria provided academics to assist in the process, with a Nigerian, Professor Donald Ekong, serving as the founding Vice-Chancellor.

### 4.3.7 *Reporting*

DTAC makes information about the scheme public through the media and produces reports of its activities from time to time to highlight key successes. There also are a few efforts in the literature to document issues related to the scheme (Ayinde, 2011; Adebani, 2011; Jinadu, 2016). However, there is no systematic reporting on the SSC project that lends itself to empirical analysis and possible comparison to similar SSC or NSC projects. This is probably an extension of the limited data capacities in Southern countries. The

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11 Gambia: Gambian Bar Pissed Off With Barrow's Attempts To Maintain Nigerian Mercenary Judges At The Judiciary, As Lawyers Embark On A Sit down Protest, Freedom Newspaper, 29 March. Available at <https://www.freedomnewspaper.com/2017/03/29/gambia-gambian-bar-pissed-with-barrows-attempts-to-maintain-nigerian-mercenary-judges-at-the-judiciary-as-lawyers-embark-on-sit-down-protest/>.



inconsistency of reporting on the implementation and results of SSC projects is generally recognized in the case of the TAC scheme.

#### 4.3.8 *Evaluation of Impact*

Interaction with DTAC officials indicated that they measure the impact of the scheme by the level of demand and testimonies that they receive from recipient Governments as well as the successes that volunteers are able to help to achieve. For instance, the appointment of a Nigerian judge, Emmanuel Oluwasegun Fagbenle, as the Chief Justice in the Gambia was deemed to represent the remarkable success of the scheme. Furthermore, DTAC holds debriefing sessions for returning volunteers as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy (Jinadu, 2016). This is complemented with field visits during their periods of service to obtain feedback on the scheme's operations and the performance of volunteers.

### 4.4 **SSC (Nigeria's TAC Scheme) versus NSC (Overseas Development Institute Fellowship Scheme) Technical Cooperation**

Technical cooperation in Africa is driven primarily by Northern donors, who package technical cooperation as part of ODA (Ayinde, 2011). For instance, ODI runs a fellowship scheme that gives highly qualified postgraduate economists and statisticians, hired from around the world, the opportunity to work in developing-country public sectors as local civil servants on two-year contracts. This NSC project aims to provide expert capacity where there are gaps in local capacity in developing country governments. Since 1963, the scheme has sent more than 1,000 economists and statisticians on two-year postings to more than 40 countries across Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The programme is implemented by ODI, while funding is based on grants from DFID in the United Kingdom, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Table 5 uses the components of the theoretical framework to summarize and compare two cases of technical cooperation: the SSC exemplified in Nigeria's TAC scheme partnering with the Gambia, and the NSC provided by the ODI Fellowship Scheme in partnership with developing-country Governments. The diversity of funding sources for the NSC is a big advantage, given the criticism that the Government of Nigeria receives for funding the technical cooperation scheme in spite of domestic development challenges. Also, reporting is seen to be a weakness in the SSC project under study compared to the NSC project. Specifically, the annual reporting employed by the ODI Fellowship Scheme makes it a viable tool for assessing the project. However, when it comes to local ownership, the Nigeria-led SSC seems to respond more to local demand than the NSC project. For instance, although both schemes target capacity gaps in recipient countries, the TAC scheme in the Gambia covers more diverse areas of need and provides a larger number of volunteers.

*Table 5. Comparison of the capacity-building cases under South-South and North-South cooperation*

<b>Components of the theoretical framework</b>	<b>SSC Nigeria's TAC scheme in the Gambia</b>	<b>NSC ODI Fellowship Scheme</b>
<b>Factors related to the process</b>		
• Actors involved		
• State government	Nigeria's Directorate for Technical Cooperation in Africa (DTAC); Government of the Gambia	United Kingdom and Australian aid agencies
Non-state organization	Nigerian experts as volunteers	ODI; recruited experts; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Modality of cooperation	Technical assistance capacitybuilding	Technical assistance capacitybuilding
Strategy of implementation	DTAC selects, prepares and deploys volunteers to the Gambia; heavy reliance on volunteers	ODI recruits and sends Fellows to civil service of developing countries; heavy reliance on Fellows
Time of implementation	Recurring: the scheme is recurring but the posting of a cohort of volunteers is biennial	Recurring: the scheme is recurring but the posting of a cohort of volunteers is biennial
Reporting	No consistent reporting; media reports available	Annual report
Evaluation of impact	Use of: a) number of volunteers deployed b) contribution made in recipient country, e.g., success in setting up a university in the Gambia c) field visits and debriefing sessions	Use of: a) number of Fellows deployed b) employer testimonies c) alumni experiences
<b>Factors related to the context</b>		
Relationship between the countries involved	Horizontal: shared development aspirations, history, geography, membership of supranational organizations; SSC partners	Development partners under North-South ODA
Stability	Although both countries have had their fair share of political and economic instability, the TAC scheme has managed sustained implementation.	The scheme has largely enjoyed stability.
Outcome	The scheme is judged by many, including top leadership in the Gambia, to be instrumental to the functioning of the State.	The programme has injected technical expertise to support key institutions while providing valuable experience for Fellows, many of whom continue to work in development.



Nigeria's TAC scheme in general, and its implementation in the Gambia in particular, has faced some challenges over the years. These challenges relate to finance and negative volunteer experience in recipient countries and upon return. In particular, there is criticism in Nigeria about the money devoted to technical cooperation in the presence of fiscal stress and a huge need for domestic spending (Ayinde, 2011). These views are often challenged with the perceived need for Nigeria to continue playing its role in the global South, given the benefits to the nation-state, recipient countries and the individuals involved (Jinadu, 2016).

Furthermore, some volunteers face negative experiences upon arrival in the host communities. Specifically, there are reports of some recipient countries not being aware and delivering their responsibilities to volunteers, cultural clashes for volunteers, and hostility from the local communities in some cases. In the Gambia, Nigerian volunteers have had some of these negative experiences. For instance, the Gambian Bar Association recently protested the appointment of Nigerians as High Court Judges in the country (Vanguard, 2017).

In sum, from the foregoing analysis using the theoretical framework developed, we have seen how Nigeria has taken an important lead in fostering SSC through TAC, which is the first and perhaps only structured non-material (volunteer) assistance programme instituted by a country in the global South (Adebanwi, 2011). Also, we have identified the differences between this type of SSC project and a similar NSC project, primarily in reporting and funding. Therefore, it will be beneficial to explore more funding mechanisms for the TAC scheme, given its perceived level of success and its criticism as a drain in the face of shrinking fiscal space. This provides ample opportunity for triangular cooperation with developed countries or multilateral institutions to scale up the TAC scheme to other developing countries. Additionally, having a more effective and efficient method of evaluating impact will help funders to review and make more informed decisions about scaling the SSC project.

## 5. SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

As seen in recent years, SSC, as development modality has grown in scale, volume and importance. SSC has the potential to help to meet SDGs, address the key technical and skill gaps, and complement the response to development finance challenges facing the global South. However, without a systematic approach to measure the process, improving and scaling up SSC projects will remain a challenge. This study has therefore proposed an alternative framework that could guide thinking on SSC and therefore provide a systematic way to report and compare activities from different actors. The application of the framework to two SSC and two NSC initiatives in Nigeria has identified a number of processes and challenges that could inspire success or failure with regard to a development intervention.

The analysis of different case studies demonstrates the importance of SSC and its unique pathways in promoting domestic ownership of initiatives through a demand-driven approach. In addition, SSC

tends to use more state actors as an implementation strategy. This could strengthen the existing state relationship and promote sustainability of projects beyond the expiration of the assistance. However, funding and scalability remain a challenge for most SSC initiatives. Funding predictability is more evident for the NSC cases. In addition, limited involvement of non-state actors is a major weakness of SSC. For example, we found that, in cases where non-state actors such as universities and think tanks were involved, the beneficiaries were more exposed to novel research and analytical processes and gained insight into advanced procedures and technologies. In addition, involvement of non-state actors can help to clarify many misconceptions about SSC. From the perspective of donor countries, development assistance can be viewed as a misplaced priority, given the multifaceted development challenges that most developing economies face. From the perspective of recipient countries, technical experts from other countries can be regarded as displacing local manpower. Strengthening the role of non-state actors can mitigate this trend in many respects and help SSC to deliver its intended development outcomes.

The study also has important implication for SSC beyond the specific cases. First, Southern providers have become important players on the development assistance landscape. An SSC programme from China to develop agriculture capacities in Nigeria is an example of one of many Southern-partner interventions. However, lack of institutional and policy space to further drive the cooperation might be constraining its growth. While government actively encourages involvement of all development partners, there is a viable opportunity to explore the unique development pathways under SSC such as technical assistance and other best practices. It is within this space that a clear policy framework will be needed.

Second, measurement matters, and it can reveal what works and why. The findings of this study reveal that many components of a development intervention matter. For instance, understanding the problem being addressed in many instances affects the direction of other components. Invariably, the success of a project hinges on the extent to which the stakeholders designing the solution understand the context and cause of the challenges. This strengthens the case for aligning the general aid architecture with domestic ownership, which is a core principle of SSC. Finally, measuring SSC is a holistic exercise that requires both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It requires in-depth understanding of the specific context. This represents both strengths and weaknesses for the proposed framework. Lack of a single approach for evaluation could affect the replicability of evidence, yet availability of mixed methods means that relevant but unquantifiable dimensions of SSC are included.

Going forward, the following specific policy recommendations will be crucial to strengthen SSC development pathways:

- **Predictability of funding.** SSC needs to embrace aid predictability. Depending on the programme, matching funds or triangular cooperation might be considered to improve funding and reduce uncertainty.



- **Addressing the policy and institutional gaps:** There is an opportunity to scale up SSC through the exploitation of its unique modalities. In Nigeria, there is a need for policy coherence to mobilize and target these important development pathways. However, it is important to ensure that development cooperation fits into the national development plan. At present, coordination between donors and government is limited mostly to large-scale philanthropic support and development assistance. Developing a strategic institution and partnership between providers and recipients will be crucial. The example of the Development Assistance Group (DAG) in Ethiopia represents a model that other developing countries could emulate. However, it is important to mitigate against challenges that could emanate from a DAG-like framework such as aid dependency or the handing over of development initiatives to donors.
- **Drawing on deeper expertise:** Involvement of non-state actors (universities, think tanks and other NGOs) is needed to maximize the benefits of SSC. This will broaden the scope and depth of expertise and consequently contribute to being able to take greater advantage of partnerships with other countries.
- **An enhanced monitoring and evaluation framework:** An enhanced framework is required for a proper understanding of the relationship between inputs and project outcomes and adequate impact assessment. This will enable implementing partners to assess the comparative advantages and cost-effectiveness of projects and serve as a learning opportunity for other SSC projects.

In conclusion, it is also important to emphasize what the conceptual framework is not. First, it is not a substitute for existing monitoring and evaluation frameworks of SSC initiatives but rather a tool to document experiences and identify key components of an initiative that are important to its success or failure. Second, from a policy standpoint, the framework resonates more with the needs of the recipient countries. As the review of the case of Nigeria as a provider reveals, much of the effort to improve the effectiveness of development assistance initiatives lies with the recipient countries, especially in as much as the project is demand driven and partner support is delivered in a predictable manner. Thus, the framework serves as a tool for understanding development assistance architecture that is more useful for recipient countries.



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