Effective Targeting of COVID-19 Aid in Nigeria

Faced with an invisible and novel enemy to fight, governments across the globe have deliberately shut down their economies and placed cities on lockdown in order to stem the spread of the COVID-19 virus. In Nigeria, two states and the federal capital territory, have so far enforced a total lockdown, while other control measures have been implemented in other states. These mitigation strategies, albeit necessary, have affected the livelihood of most citizens, especially those operating in the informal sector who rely on daily incomes for survival. The Federal Government has introduced various social protection policies to support vulnerable groups during the COVID-19 crises. These policies are primarily targeted towards the 2.6million households on the social registry for the vulnerable, and an additional 1 million households are to be provided conditional cash transfer for 2months. 

The present social registry uses a three-stage targeting process based on geographical targeting, community-based validation, and proxy-means-testing (PMT) in order to identify the poorest of the poor in Nigeria. With over 90 million Nigerians living in extreme poverty, the social registry covers only about 2% of the poor, excluding many households given the enormous financial requirement for universal social protection. While the coronavirus lockdown will negatively affect most Nigerians, the impact will vary markedly across groups, even amongst the poor. There are legitimate questions about the suitability of the existing social registry as a reference for the groups most vulnerable to the economic shocks induced by the coronavirus lockdown. 

For the COVID-19 social protection interventions to be effective in curbing severe drops in basic consumption (largely food and housing), they need to be well targeted to those most vulnerable to Covid-19 shocks. Those most likely to be affected by COVID-19 lockdown measures are not necessarily the most vulnerable groups nationwide, and are likely to be missing from the social registry used for the Federal Government’s social protection measures.

What is known about the current social protection registry is that it largely covers agricultural and rural households, especially those with human capacity constraints. However, these groups are also less likely to be negatively affected by the economic shocks induced by the lockdown for a number of reasons: First, they are largely isolated from the major economic centers, being primarily rural and agricultural, hence basic livelihoods remain minimally unaffected by the lockdown. Second, the transportation of food items is excluded from the lockdown, which means that rural farmers may continue to get their produce to markets. Third, and more important, most households in this group produce a majority of what they consume, and are therefore better able to maintain basic consumption levels during the lockdown.

In order to more effectively target groups of the poor that are most vulnerable to negative consumption shocks during the COVID-19 lockdown, we need to ask, in the most basic terms: which groups of people need to earn an income every day in order to purchase food? Put another way, poor households whose basic income and consumption patterns are more closely tied to the market would be most likely to be negatively affected by the lockdown. In this piece, we profile the characteristics of the groups that are most likely to be affected by the government lockdown and restriction of economic activities vis-à-vis those on the social registry, explain why COVID-19 social protection interventions ought to be better targeted to these groups, and suggest ways to improve poverty targeting for those affected by the coronavirus shock. 

Using data from the Nigeria Demographic and Health surveys (2008 and 2013), we find that the urban poor is more likely to work in non-agricultural occupations, which often involves commuting between suburbs and satellite towns into the urban core. Here, we may think of drivers, cleaners, sales associates, and operators of micro-enterprises, etc. Incomes from these occupations that involve work in the city’s core are the most likely to be affected by the lockdown in economic activities. While most agricultural activities will slow down, the exception to food transportation, storage, and sales, means that income loss here will be minimized. Furthermore, data from the National Living Standards survey (2010) shows that 64% of the food consumed by the poor in rural areas comes from food that they produce themselves (auto-consumption), compared to just 22% for poor urban households. This implies that the urban poor is significantly more likely to experience a greater decrease in food consumption with a decrease in market income. 

Overall, the data reveal that the urban poor are more likely to suffer a decline in incomes as a result of the economic lockdown introduced to control the spread of COVID-19. As a result, the urban poor is also substantially more likely to suffer a decrease in food and other consumption, because unlike rural households, they largely consume what they are able to buy from market incomes. The urban poor have their livelihoods more closely tied to the market, and with a market shutdown, they are better targets for supplementary incomes/consumption intended to alleviate the hardships induced by COVID-19. This category of the poor is largely underrepresented in the current social protection registry.

Alternative Targeting Mechanism for the Urban Poor

The preceding discussion highlighted the inadequacy of the present social register as the urban poor are not sufficiently captured. However, it is difficult or impossible to rebuild or update the social registry in the midst of the pandemic. The government will need to explore alternative targeting mechanisms in the immediate term. One key characteristic of the urban poor is that they mostly live in slums, which enables them to minimize rental costs in cities. Social security targeted at the slums and other geographical locations where the urban poor people reside will be crucial.  The Government can also leverage on the social infrastructure and local knowledge of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have worked with urban poor in the past. With proper accountability in place, non-state actors can assist in the identification of the vulnerable households and suggest other effective ways of reaching them. This suggests a combination of geographic targeting complemented by community identification.

The efficacy of targeting through direct deposit into individuals’ accounts using their unique Bank Verification Number (BVN) will be weak in the present circumstances. With 36.8% of the adult population in Nigeria still financially excluded, targeting only those with a low balance in their account will exclude the most vulnerable people, who are less likely to have a bank account, and might find it more difficult to get into a bank location where they are able to withdraw cash. Further, using the banking approach also means individuals rather than households will be targeted. Without a quality system for auditing to check duplication, using BVN alone is susceptible to abuse. In some households, multiple members might be able to take advantage of the palliatives at the expense of financially excluded households. 

Irrespective of the mechanism adopted by the government, it is important to emphasize that apart from food security, adequate measures are required to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among urban poor. The optimal poverty targeting for the urban poor must, therefore, incorporate social distancing at its core.

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Understanding the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the Nigerian economy

With 1.39 million coronavirus cases  and 79,382 deaths globally, the world continues to battle the COVID-19 pandemic. Even before the outbreak, the outlook for the world economy—and especially developing countries like Nigeria—was fragile, as global GDP growth was estimated to be only 2.5 percent in 2020. While many developing countries have recorded relatively fewer cases—Nigeria currently has 238 confirmed cases and 5 deaths as of this writing—the weak capacity of health care systems in these countries is likely to exacerbate the pandemic and its impact on their economies.

THE IMPACT ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

Before the pandemic, the Nigerian government had been grappling with weak recovery from the 2014 oil price shock, with GDP growth tapering around 2.3 percent in 2019. In February, the IMF revised the 2020 GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent to 2 percent, as a result of relatively low oil prices and limited fiscal space. Relatedly, the country’s debt profile has been a source of concern for policymakers and development practitioners as the most recent estimate puts the debt service-to-revenue ratio at 60 percent, which is likely to worsen amid the steep decline in revenue associated with falling oil prices. These constraining factors will aggravate the economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and make it more difficult for the government to weather the crisis.

AGGREGATE DEMAND WILL FALL, BUT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE WILL RISE

In Nigeria, efforts were already being made to bolster aggregate demand through increased government spending and tax cuts for businesses. The public budget increased from 8.83 trillion naira ($24.53 billion) in 2019 to 10.59 trillion naira ($29.42 billion) in 2020, representing 11 percent of the national GDP, while small businesses have been exempted from company income tax, and the tax rate for medium-sized businesses has been revised downwards from 30 to 20 percent. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 crisis is causing all components of aggregate demand, except for government purchases, to fall (Figure 1).

The fall in household consumption in Nigeria will stem from 1) partial (or full) restrictions on movement, thus causing consumers to spend primarily on essential goods and services; 2) low expectations of future income, particularly by workers in the gig economy that are engaged on a short-term/contract basis, as well as the working poor in the informal economy; and 3) the erosion of wealth and expected wealth as a result of the decline in assets such as stocks and home equity. The federal government has imposed a lockdown in Lagos and Ogun states as well as Abuja (which have the highest number of coronavirus cases combined). Subnational governments have quickly followed suit by imposing lockdowns in their states. Nigeria has a burgeoning gig economy as well as a large informal sector, which contributes 65 percent of its economic output. Movement restrictions have not only reduced the consumption of nonessential commodities in general, but have affected the income-generating capacity of these groups, thus reducing their consumption expenditure.

Investments by firms will be impeded largely due to the uncertainties that come with the pandemic-limited knowledge about the duration of the outbreak, the effectiveness of policy measures, and the reaction of economic agents to these measures—as well as negative investor sentiments, which are causing turbulence in capital markets around the world. Indeed, the crisis has led to a massive decline in stock prices, as the Nigerian Stock Exchange records its worst performance since the 2008 financial crisis, which has eroded the wealth of investors. Taking into consideration the uncertainty that is associated with the pandemic and the negative profit outlook on possible investment projects, firms are likely to hold off on long-term investment decisions.

On the other hand, government purchases will increase as governments, which typically can afford to run budget deficits, utilize fiscal stimulus measures to counteract the fall in consumer spending. However, for governments that are commodity dependent, the fall in the global demand for commodities stemming from the pandemic will significantly increase their fiscal deficits. In Nigeria’s case, the price of Brent crude was just over $26 a barrel on April 2, whereas Nigeria’s budget assumes a price of $57 per barrel and would still have run on a 2.18 trillion naira ($6.05 billion) deficit. Similarly, with oil accounting for 90 percent of Nigeria’s exports, the decline in the demand for oil and oil prices will adversely affect the volume and value of net exports. Indeed, the steep decline in oil prices associated with the pandemic has necessitated that the Nigerian government cut planned expenditure. In fact, on March 18, the minister of finance announced a 1.5 trillion naira ($4.17 billion) cut in nonessential capital spending.

The restrictions on movement of people and border closures foreshadow a decline in exports. Already, countries around the world have closed their borders to nonessential traffic, and global supply chains for exports have been disrupted. Although the exports of countries that devalue their currency due to the fall in the price of commodities (like Nigeria), will become more affordable, the limited markets for nonessential goods and services nullifies the envisaged positive effect on net exports.

WHAT ARE THE POLICY RESPONSES BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT?

Already, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has arranged a fiscal stimulus package, including a 50 billion naira ($138.89 million) credit facility to households and small and medium enterprises most affected by the pandemic, a 100 billion naira ($277.78 million) loan to the health sector, and a 1 trillion naira ($2.78 billion) to the manufacturing sector. In addition, the interest rates on all CBN interventions have been revised downwards from 9 to 5 percent, and a one-year moratorium on CBN intervention facilities has been introduced, effective March 1.

With oil being Nigeria’s major source of foreign exchange, amid the steep decline in oil prices, the official exchange rate has been adjusted from 306 to 360 naira. The exchange rate under the investors and exporters (I&E) window has also been adjusted from 360 to 380 naira in order to unify the exchange rates across the I&E window, Bureau de Change, and retail and wholesale windows. Furthermore, the government has introduced import duty waivers for pharmaceutical companies and increased efforts toward ensuring that they receive forex.

WHAT OTHER POLICY RESPONSES CAN BE IMPLEMENTED?

Given the size and scope of the economic impact of the pandemic, there is the need to implement other recovery strategies to stimulate demand. Thus, we recommend the following fiscal and monetary policy measures:

  • Although there is a cash transfer program in place, the federal government should improve efforts towards enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the distributive mechanisms to reach households that are worst-hit by the pandemic.
  • The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) as well as State Inland Revenue Services (SIRS) should waive payments on personal and corporate income tax for the second quarter of 2020, considering that the shock has affected the income and profits of households and businesses.
  • The CBN’s decision to increase the cash reserve ratio (CRR) from 22.5 percent to 27.5 percent in January 2020 should be revisited to provide liquidity for banks so that banks can, in turn, create credit to the private sector.
  • FIRS and SIRS should delay tax collection for the worse-hit sectors including tourism, the airline industry, and hoteliers in order to enable them recover from the steep decline in demand.
  • To provide additional liquidity in the forex market, the CBN should establish a swap facility with the U.S. Federal Reserve and/or the People’s Bank of China, as was done in 2018, to provide dollar and yen liquidity to financial institutions, investors, and exporters. This move would ease up forex shortage in the financial market and economy.
  • While the naira has been adjusted as a result of the forex shortage, it is important that the CBN maintains exchange rate stability by deploying external reserves in order to avoid investors selling off naira-denominated assets.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a wake-up call to policymakers as the unusual and unprecedented nature of the crisis has made it impossible for citizens to rely on foreign health care services and more difficult to solicit for international support given the competing demand for medical supplies and equipment. A more integrated response spanning several sectors—including the health, finance, and trade sectors—is required to address structural issues that make the country less resilient to shocks and limit its range of policy responses. In the long term, tougher decisions need to be made, including but not limited to diversifying the country’s revenue base away from oil exports and improving investments in the health care sector in ensuring that the economy is able to recover quickly from difficult conditions in the future.

This article was first published at Brookings.edu

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The implication of Covid-19 pandemic on the Nigerian Economy

The Global Health Hazards and Economic Impacts of COVID-19

In December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases from an unknown virus surfaced in Wuhan, China. Based on initial laboratory findings, the disease named Coronavirus disease 2019 (abbreviated as COVID-19), was described as an infectious disease that is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. The COVID-19 outbreak has since spread to about 196 countries and territories in every continent and one international conveyance across the globe. While there are ongoing efforts to curtail the spread of infection which is almost entirely driven by human-to-human transmission, it has accounted for over 400,000 confirmed cases with over 18,000 deaths[1].

Beyond the tragic health hazards and human consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic uncertainties, and disruptions that have resulted come at a significant cost to the global economy. The United Nations Trade and Development Agency (UNCTAD) put the cost of the outbreak at about US$2 trillion in 2020. Most central banks, finance ministries and independent economic experts around the world have taken solace in the prediction that the impacts might be sharp but short-lived, and economic activities would return to normal thereafter. This line of thought mirrors the thinking of the events that shaped the 2007 global financial crisis. However, it is quite instructive to note that the 2007 crisis which emanated from the United States’ subprime mortgage crisis was mainly an economic phenomenon, with its fallout spreading across many regions of the world. When compared to COVID-19, the 2007 crisis could be described as minor and manageable. The tumultuous events that COVID-19 had spread across the globe cut across every facet of human existence and the consequences may linger beyond the second half of 2020.

The slowdown in the global economy and lockdown in some countries, such as Italy, Spain and most Eurozone economies and beyond, as a result, COVID-19 has also taken its toll on the global demand for oil. The decline in oil demand is estimated to surpass the loss of nearly 1 million barrels per day during the 2007-08 recession. This is also coming at a time when two key players in the global oil industry – Russia and the OPEC cartel – are at loggerheads on the decision to cut output. The unequivocal oil price war started between these two global oil market giants may have more dire consequences on the oil price that has started to dive. .  

Sector-specific implications and impacts could vary. For example, the impacts on the global aviation and tourism sectors are a result of the implications of the pandemic on global travel. As discretionary spending by consumers continues to decline, cruise companies, hotels, and hospitality are facing declining demand and patronage. For example, in Hungary alone, about 40 to 50% of hotel reservations have been canceled. Also, the pandemic is placing up to 8 million jobs in the leisure and hospitality sector at risk, with travel crashes and cancellations expected to continue. Moody’s Analytics, a rating agency, stated that more than half of the jobs in the United States which is about 80 million may be in jeopardy.

The virus is also taking its toll on health facilities and infrastructures across the globe. Italy is currently the largest affected country with a number of deaths surpassing China, since the outbreak of coronavirus. Across northern Italy, the virus has pushed the country’s National Health Service to a breaking point, emphasizing the test that other countries, especially developing and low-income countries, might face in their approach to contain the virus spread. Most hospitals and health facilities that could not handle the hazards are resulting to operating below their capacity by taking a few regular health-related cases or shutting down. What could be more devastating is the fact that the economic pains that accompanied the virus might not go away soon as envisaged. 

The conventional policy measures currently being taken such as reducing interest rates and costs of borrowing, tax cuts and tax holidays are quite remarkable. However, these conventional policy measures are quite potent when there are demand shocks. There are limitations to the successes that can be recorded when demand shocks are combined with supply shocks. It is already apparent from the emergence of the current crisis that there are implications on the economy from both the demand and supply sides. Some of the demand factors include social distancing with consumers staying at home, limitations in spending and declining consumptions. On the supply side, factories are shutting down or cutting down production and output, while in other instances, staff work from home to limit physical contact.

The decision to close educational institutions and schools around the globe in an attempt to contain the pandemic has also led to a soaring number of children, youth and adults not attending schools. According to UNESCO Monitoring report on COVID-19 educational disruption and response, the impact of school closures in the over 100 countries that have implemented the decisions around the world has impacted over half of the global students’ population. These educational disruptions are being escalated particularly for the most vulnerable members of society.

Bracing up for COVID-19 consequences on the Nigerian economy

For most developing economies, the odds of sliding into a downturn are gradually expected as the global coronavirus outbreak puts severe pressure on the economy. For Nigeria, the country is still sluggishly grappling with recovery from the 2016 economic recession which was a fall out of global oil price crash and insufficient foreign exchange earnings to meet imports. In the spirit of economic recovery and growth sustainability, the Nigerian federal budget for the 2020 fiscal year was prepared with significant revenue expectations but with contestable realizations. The approved budget had projected revenue collections at N8.24 Trillion, an increase of about 20% from 2019 figure. The revenue assumptions are premised on increased global oil demand and stable market with oil price benchmark and oil output respectively at $57 per barrel and 2.18 Million Barrels Per Day.

The emergence of COVID-19 and its increasing incidence in Nigeria has called for drastic review and changes in the earlier revenue expectations and fiscal projections. Compared to events that led to recession in 2016, the current state of the global economy poses more difficulties ahead as the oil price is currently below US$30 with projections that it will dip further going by the price war among key players in the industry. Unfortunately, the nation has grossly underachieved in setting aside sufficient buffers for rainy days such as it faces in the coming days. In addressing these daunting economic challenges, the current considerations to revise the budget downward is inevitable. However, certain considerations that are expected in the review must not be left out. The assumptions and benchmarks must be based on realizable thresholds and estimates to ensure optimum budget performance, especially on the non-oil revenue components.

Furthermore, cutting expenditures must be done such that the already excluded group and vulnerable are not left to bear the brunt of the economic contraction. The economic and growth recovery program which has the aim of increasing social inclusion by creating jobs and providing support for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society through investments in social programs and providing social amenities will no doubt suffers some setbacks. Besides, the downward review of the budget and contractions in public spending could be devastating on poverty and unemployment. The last unemployment report released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) ranks Nigeria 21st among 181 countries with an unemployment rate of about 23.1%. The country has also been rated as the poverty capital of the world with an estimated 87 million people living on less than $2 a day threshold.

The decision to cut the retail price of gasoline under a price modulation arrangement is a welcome development. The cut is expected to curb rising inflation, especially food price inflation which will mainly benefit the poor. However, rather than the price capping regime introduced, by which it is expected of the Petroleum Products Price Regulation Agency (PPPRA) to constantly issues monthly guide on appropriate pricing regime. It is expected that the government will use this opportunity to completely deregulate the petroleum industry in line with existing suggestions and reports. In the event that the global economy becomes healthier and crude oil prices increases, the government might return to the under-recovery of the oil price shortfall by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). A policy that annually costs the government huge revenue and recurring losses to the NNPC.

Basically, the Nigerian government essentially must lead economic diversification drive. It is one practicable way to saddle through the current economic uncertainties and instabilities. What the consequences of COVID-19 pandemic should further offer the Nigerian economic managers and policymakers, is that the one-tracked, monolithic reliance on oil is failing. Diversification priorities to alternative sectors such as agriculture, solid minerals, manufacturing and services sectors, should be further intensified.
 

[1] These figures were recorded as a 24th March, 2020.

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COVID-19 in Nigeria – Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as Vulnerable Populations at Risk

Here is what we know – COVID-19 has no known cure (at the time of writing this article). We also realize that given the dearth of medical infrastructure in Nigeria, a full-blown pandemic would pose a rather dangerous threat. On the bright side, the mechanism of the disease’s transmission is clear – we know that it happens primarily through close contact with carriers of the causal Coronavirus, either by imbibing virulent bodily fluids (mucus, sputum) from them aerially, or through tactile contact with virus-riddled surfaces. In light of all established knowledge, the primary defence against the spread of the pandemic has therefore been the enforcement of social distancing and self-isolation within affected and at-risk populations, to minimize contact between the infected and uninfected. Countries like China have achieved significant declines in rates of new infections, largely by this method.

What may not be very clear at this point however, is precisely how profound the Nigeria (COVID-19) disease-scenario is. In-country data on infected persons may very well not be completely accurate representations of reality, as tested persons so far have predominantly emerged from the upper end of the income divide – most probably for reasons of limited resources and low knowledge-access among populations at the other end. What is more, the vast majority of Nigerians exist on that poverty side of things, and live in impoverished physical conditions. These groups (who will almost certainly not present for testing, except when compelled to by personal crisis) are potentially a tinderbox for the exponential spread of the pandemic, given the unsanitary environments and lifestyles that their impoverishment reinforces, as well as the fact that the methodologies of social distancing and self-isolation are hardly feasible among their ranks. They are, in addition, significantly less able to access and utilize vital information regarding prevention and management of the disease (for reasons of education and resource-limitation). The point is this – the COVID-19 situation in Nigeria at this time is precarious (in terms of risk to life and health) – perhaps more so than is apparent – and this is largely because of that poverty-dimension. What is more, the current government response of enforced shutdown of economic and other activities within most-hit states ( shutdown will probably be effected in other states soon) will also deeply and adversely affect the livelihoods, and therefore, lives of the poor, whose incomes are often earned and exhausted on the same day.

For these reasons, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria are in very significant jeopardy. According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), over 2 million Nigerians have been displaced from (Boko Haram) insurgency hotspots in Northeast Nigeria since 2009. These migrants have settled into IDP Camps across the country, which are characterized for the most part by overcrowded populations amidst severe infrastructure deficits. IDP populations in Nigeria are dominated by poorly educated, rural, farm-folk, who are hardly able to achieve meaningful livelihoods in their new, mostly urban settlements. They are for this reason typically impoverished and dependent on humanitarian-aid for even their sustenance; and have very limited access to healthcare or water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) amenities as well. In the past, these terrible living conditions have rendered IDP camps a cesspool for dangerous medical crises – in 2017 for example, there were over 4,800 cases of Cholera and 61 deaths, in an outbreak across IDP Camps in Nigeria.

One can therefore see how this looming COVID-19 pandemic would give cause for grave concern regarding the level of risk their situation exposes Nigeria’s IDPs to – and further to that, how much risk they might  pose to the larger population (could IDP settlements for instance inadvertently become repository-populations for the virus, and vehicles for its proliferation?). In the event that it is not immediately clear, here are some of the reasons for this concern:

WITH CHARACTERISTICALLY LIMITED LIVING-SPACES IN IDP CAMPS, SOCIAL DISTANCING AND SELF-ISOLATION WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE

The reality is that, with regard to how overcrowded they are, most IDP camps in Nigeria are unfit for a healthy living anyway. Typical camps consist of makeshift or poorly-built housing that hold multiple times the number of occupants that they should; while common areas and outdoor spaces, even amidst recent events, constantly have numerous people congregating within them. These IDP Camps are in essence, in the current climate, accidents waiting to happen.

POOR INFORMATION-ACCESS AND LOW EDUCATION-LEVELS COULD HEIGHTEN SPREAD

Information and knowledge have proved formidable, and effective, weapons so far in the fight against the spread of COVID-19. Across the globe, we have seen and learned from other sources, accounts from different countries of how to successfully prevent incidence. Information of this sort might however not be fully appreciated by poorly educated persons such as IDPs, even when they can access it – for lack of proper comprehension of the situation. For instance, some Nigerians still had to be forcibly barred from gathering publicly only recently. This is an attitude that represents a potential to enable spread of the disease amidst measures to curb it. Until the time when observing the reality of the pandemic foists an understanding of the situation’s true gravity upon them, demographics such as the IDP, might function as loopholes for the propagation of COVID-19; in their disregard of safety conventions.

LIMITED ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE MIGHT CAUSE MULTIPLE TYPES OF ADVERSE OUTCOMES

If one envisages a scenario of panic where a great number of IDPs require urgent, life-saving medical care that is in short supply, it is easy to understand how things might escalate at that point. Caregivers to, and family of the dangerously ill (even the moderately ill themselves) might easily in that time succumb to a desperation in their actions, which would put everyone else at risk – in both health and civil terms.

TRUNCATION OF INCOME (FROM LOCKDOWNS) WILL AFFECT IDPs MORE THAN MOST

IDP populations typically have no means of cushioning a cessation of earnings, even for short periods. A situation such as the one that has been imposed in some places, and which portends in others – where all monetary inflow is stopped (during state-wide lockdowns) – simply holds the implication of potential starvation for IDP families. They will not survive without external help.

The state of things is deeply concerning all round, but there are measures that can be taken to  forestall doom:

  • Government, as well as humanitarian players, should scale up current response-plans, to cover vulnerable and at-risk populations such as IDPs in every foreseeable dimension during this pandemic – this means adequate healthcare for treatment and prevention, as well as food and other resources needed.
  • Communication strategies should be formulated and enacted, which will effectively demonstrate the full dimensions of the current problem to IDPs, alongside proper methods of preventing spread and managing infections. The consequences of aberrant behaviour on everyone involved should be fully explained to them as well – it is paramount at this time to communicate acceptance to IDPs into their host communities, so that within crises they would think and act constructively as community-members, and not destructively as disgruntled outliers.
  • Basic, healthcare and WASH facilities should be provided at this time to IDP Camps across the country as preventive measures, to enable them stem spread within their communities.

With all (sanitized and/or washed) hands on (a properly disinfected) deck, we should, IDPs and non-IDPs alike, prevail in the end.

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The Growing Livelihood-Problem for Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

“I was almost killed”

Amos is perched on the edge of the bench, next to me, underneath the broad shade of an old mango tree. It is mid-afternoon, and the heat is sweltering in this Internally Displaced Persons Camp in Sabo Kuchinguro, Abuja Federal Capitol Territory Nigeria. He is absently kicking the pebbles at his feet with the tip of his worn sandals, and is staring blankly into a crowd of noisy, playing schoolchildren in the distance.

“I was almost killed”, he says to me, his face lost in the contemplation of that troubling memory.

“They murdered my next-door neighbour, right in front of my eyes. When they came into our village, they simply set upon slaughtering everyone in sight. All we could do was run fast and far, away from the gunshots and the screams. We left everything behind and ran. We ran up to the mountains and hid for days with no food. We snuck back down in the middle of the night and kept running; we ran all the way to Cameroun. It was from there that some of us eventually made our way back here”.

These armed assailants in Amos’ tale are part of the Boko Haram terrorist group – who repeatedly attacked his village in Gwoza, Borno State and displaced him along with many others. Since 2009, Boko Haram has enacted sustained insurgency attacks in North-East Nigeria, killing thousands and displacing over 2 million people to date – to other parts of the country and to neighbouring Cameroun, Chad and Niger. Camps have necessarily been assembled to absorb and resettle the displaced persons, with a lot left to be desired howbeit – sparse local resources and thin donor-funding imply difficult living-conditions for the migrants. Although the outflow of persons from the troubled regions has waned over the years, the insurgency has not abated sufficiently for residents to return to their homes, and so Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) Camps across Nigeria have, if anything, only ballooned in their population-sizes.

We have nothing to do here”

A collateral problem has emerged: beyond the immediate needs of resettlement, food, healthcare and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) facilities for IDPs, the question of livelihoods has been largely ignored in the intervening humanitarian efforts so far. To put it in context – the vast majority of work-force-age IDPs are (previously-) rural-dwelling farmers with little education, or none at all. Resettling predominantly to urban areas, they are too poorly-skilled to integrate within the local economies of these new metropolitan environments. What is more, opportunities in Agriculture, where their capabilities lie, are sparse in these places. The resultant is their entire dependence on donor-aid for sustenance and survival.

“We have nothing to do here”, says Amos to me.

He and I are walking among the dingy homes in the camp now – some of the dwellings are built only with wood and old cement-bags. A glumness hangs in the air all around us – a palpable despondency of this habitat’s occupants that has materialized into the dullness and dirt that characterize it. I see a barely-clad toddler playing on the ground, by a puddle of water, his faced smudged with mud and mucus. I reach down to pick him up.

Please don’t do that!” Amos says sharply.

I am puzzled, but I comply and withdraw my outstretched hands. My little would-have-been-acquaintance looks up at me with an expression of disappointment at this turn of events.

“We have had cases of kidnappings of little children here in the camp”, Amos explains.

“We are vulnerable here….we are migrants….this is not our home. People can take advantage; and they have done. From experience, parents here are very wary of strangers accosting their children. This little boy’s parents might misunderstand your intentions”.

I do not press the matter further.

We stop at what Amos informs me is a brothel. The walls are built with bamboo, as is the ‘fence’. There is a large open space outside for visitors to sit in, and await their turns as it were. Clusters of men are seated in that space, speaking very little and smoking marijuana and cigarettes.

“Men here have nothing to do….no work. They just sit around all day, smoke, drink Codeine and Tramadol, and look for sex – consensual or forced. They have stayed idle this way for so long at this point that I feel some of them don’t even want to have any meaningful jobs anymore”, says Amos.

This makes me realize the very distinct possibility that elements of post-traumatic stress disorder and even depression, borne out the horrific ordeals that most of these people have lived through, might reside in them, undiagnosed and untreated. Surely it is important to get them working again, but maybe that step is contingent on an appraisal of their psychological states, given their past and indeed, present situations. Another thing nags at me.

“If these young men have no jobs and income, where do they get the money from, for the drugs and prostitutes?” I ask Amos.

“I don’t know”, he responds. I find this worrisome.

As we leave the premises, I notice 3 of the ‘hostesses’ seated outside in that open, conversing. I am astounded at how young one of them looks to me to be.

“Allow us farm”

Next to the entrance of the camp, where there are makeshift administrative offices and a tiny nurse’s station, we run into Enoch, who is one of the directors at the camp. He is himself an internally displaced person. Enoch tells me of how different groups bring different types of aid to them routinely – mostly money, food, and such items as clothing and books. He and Amos take me to what was purposed as a skills-training centre, housed in a makeshift building. They tell me the centre had been gifted to them by the Embassy of South Africa in Nigeria, in their recognition that the IDPs need to be reskilled in order for them to function gainfully within the labour markets of their new homes. The centre, which at one time had vocations such as sewing, cosmetics-making and basic computing taught within its walls, was now derelict…..with old and damaged equipment strewn about.

“The South Africans started this with the hopes that after a while, aid-groups from Nigeria would carry on the work. That didn’t happen, and it all died out eventually”, Enoch tells me.

“We are at a severe economic disadvantage. We are mostly just uneducated farmers here. Without training in even the most basic trades and crafts, a lot of us really will not be able to ever make a sufficient living”.

“Allow us to farm”, he continues. “If we cannot receive training that will help us get jobs, then at the very least allow us to farm – that is what we know to do. Given our plight, we should be allowed farmland and any concessions that help us get back on our feet. It’s not that we don’t appreciate all the help so far, it’s only that we would be prefer to be assisted to become self-sufficient, and not just be assisted to eat day to day”.

As I leave the camp that evening, I realize that this paradigm-shift Enoch spoke of is an imperative. I realize that in our collective neglect – oblivion even – of the more sustainable manner of aid to IDPs, we may have just been giving room for the emergence of another dire set of problems. But surely it’s not too late.

In 2019 CSEA conducted livelihood assessments in Waru and Sabo Kuchinguro IDP Camps in Abuja FCT Nigeria, to ascertain best methods for training/re-skilling/equipping IDPs for economic independence.

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