Here is what we know – COVID-19 has no known cure (at the time of writing this article). We also realize that given the dearth of medical infrastructure in Nigeria, a full-blown pandemic would pose a rather dangerous threat. On the bright side, the mechanism of the disease’s transmission is clear – we know that it happens primarily through close contact with carriers of the causal Coronavirus, either by imbibing virulent bodily fluids (mucus, sputum) from them aerially, or through tactile contact with virus-riddled surfaces. In light of all established knowledge, the primary defence against the spread of the pandemic has therefore been the enforcement of social distancing and self-isolation within affected and at-risk populations, to minimize contact between the infected and uninfected. Countries like China have achieved significant declines in rates of new infections, largely by this method.

What may not be very clear at this point however, is precisely how profound the Nigeria (COVID-19) disease-scenario is. In-country data on infected persons may very well not be completely accurate representations of reality, as tested persons so far have predominantly emerged from the upper end of the income divide – most probably for reasons of limited resources and low knowledge-access among populations at the other end. What is more, the vast majority of Nigerians exist on that poverty side of things, and live in impoverished physical conditions. These groups (who will almost certainly not present for testing, except when compelled to by personal crisis) are potentially a tinderbox for the exponential spread of the pandemic, given the unsanitary environments and lifestyles that their impoverishment reinforces, as well as the fact that the methodologies of social distancing and self-isolation are hardly feasible among their ranks. They are, in addition, significantly less able to access and utilize vital information regarding prevention and management of the disease (for reasons of education and resource-limitation). The point is this – the COVID-19 situation in Nigeria at this time is precarious (in terms of risk to life and health) – perhaps more so than is apparent – and this is largely because of that poverty-dimension. What is more, the current government response of enforced shutdown of economic and other activities within most-hit states ( shutdown will probably be effected in other states soon) will also deeply and adversely affect the livelihoods, and therefore, lives of the poor, whose incomes are often earned and exhausted on the same day.

For these reasons, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria are in very significant jeopardy. According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), over 2 million Nigerians have been displaced from (Boko Haram) insurgency hotspots in Northeast Nigeria since 2009. These migrants have settled into IDP Camps across the country, which are characterized for the most part by overcrowded populations amidst severe infrastructure deficits. IDP populations in Nigeria are dominated by poorly educated, rural, farm-folk, who are hardly able to achieve meaningful livelihoods in their new, mostly urban settlements. They are for this reason typically impoverished and dependent on humanitarian-aid for even their sustenance; and have very limited access to healthcare or water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) amenities as well. In the past, these terrible living conditions have rendered IDP camps a cesspool for dangerous medical crises – in 2017 for example, there were over 4,800 cases of Cholera and 61 deaths, in an outbreak across IDP Camps in Nigeria.

One can therefore see how this looming COVID-19 pandemic would give cause for grave concern regarding the level of risk their situation exposes Nigeria’s IDPs to – and further to that, how much risk they might  pose to the larger population (could IDP settlements for instance inadvertently become repository-populations for the virus, and vehicles for its proliferation?). In the event that it is not immediately clear, here are some of the reasons for this concern:

WITH CHARACTERISTICALLY LIMITED LIVING-SPACES IN IDP CAMPS, SOCIAL DISTANCING AND SELF-ISOLATION WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE

The reality is that, with regard to how overcrowded they are, most IDP camps in Nigeria are unfit for a healthy living anyway. Typical camps consist of makeshift or poorly-built housing that hold multiple times the number of occupants that they should; while common areas and outdoor spaces, even amidst recent events, constantly have numerous people congregating within them. These IDP Camps are in essence, in the current climate, accidents waiting to happen.

POOR INFORMATION-ACCESS AND LOW EDUCATION-LEVELS COULD HEIGHTEN SPREAD

Information and knowledge have proved formidable, and effective, weapons so far in the fight against the spread of COVID-19. Across the globe, we have seen and learned from other sources, accounts from different countries of how to successfully prevent incidence. Information of this sort might however not be fully appreciated by poorly educated persons such as IDPs, even when they can access it – for lack of proper comprehension of the situation. For instance, some Nigerians still had to be forcibly barred from gathering publicly only recently. This is an attitude that represents a potential to enable spread of the disease amidst measures to curb it. Until the time when observing the reality of the pandemic foists an understanding of the situation’s true gravity upon them, demographics such as the IDP, might function as loopholes for the propagation of COVID-19; in their disregard of safety conventions.

LIMITED ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE MIGHT CAUSE MULTIPLE TYPES OF ADVERSE OUTCOMES

If one envisages a scenario of panic where a great number of IDPs require urgent, life-saving medical care that is in short supply, it is easy to understand how things might escalate at that point. Caregivers to, and family of the dangerously ill (even the moderately ill themselves) might easily in that time succumb to a desperation in their actions, which would put everyone else at risk – in both health and civil terms.

TRUNCATION OF INCOME (FROM LOCKDOWNS) WILL AFFECT IDPs MORE THAN MOST

IDP populations typically have no means of cushioning a cessation of earnings, even for short periods. A situation such as the one that has been imposed in some places, and which portends in others – where all monetary inflow is stopped (during state-wide lockdowns) – simply holds the implication of potential starvation for IDP families. They will not survive without external help.

The state of things is deeply concerning all round, but there are measures that can be taken to  forestall doom:

• Government, as well as humanitarian players, should scale up current response-plans, to cover vulnerable and at-risk populations such as IDPs in every foreseeable dimension during this pandemic – this means adequate healthcare for treatment and prevention, as well as food and other resources needed.
• Communication strategies should be formulated and enacted, which will effectively demonstrate the full dimensions of the current problem to IDPs, alongside proper methods of preventing spread and managing infections. The consequences of aberrant behaviour on everyone involved should be fully explained to them as well – it is paramount at this time to communicate acceptance to IDPs into their host communities, so that within crises they would think and act constructively as community-members, and not destructively as disgruntled outliers.
• Basic, healthcare and WASH facilities should be provided at this time to IDP Camps across the country as preventive measures, to enable them stem spread within their communities.

With all (sanitized and/or washed) hands on (a properly disinfected) deck, we should, IDPs and non-IDPs alike, prevail in the end.

“I was almost killed”

Amos is perched on the edge of the bench, next to me, underneath the broad shade of an old mango tree. It is mid-afternoon, and the heat is sweltering in this Internally Displaced Persons Camp in Sabo Kuchinguro, Abuja Federal Capitol Territory Nigeria. He is absently kicking the pebbles at his feet with the tip of his worn sandals, and is staring blankly into a crowd of noisy, playing schoolchildren in the distance.

“I was almost killed”, he says to me, his face lost in the contemplation of that troubling memory.

“They murdered my next-door neighbour, right in front of my eyes. When they came into our village, they simply set upon slaughtering everyone in sight. All we could do was run fast and far, away from the gunshots and the screams. We left everything behind and ran. We ran up to the mountains and hid for days with no food. We snuck back down in the middle of the night and kept running; we ran all the way to Cameroun. It was from there that some of us eventually made our way back here”.

These armed assailants in Amos’ tale are part of the Boko Haram terrorist group – who repeatedly attacked his village in Gwoza, Borno State and displaced him along with many others. Since 2009, Boko Haram has enacted sustained insurgency attacks in North-East Nigeria, killing thousands and displacing over 2 million people to date – to other parts of the country and to neighbouring Cameroun, Chad and Niger. Camps have necessarily been assembled to absorb and resettle the displaced persons, with a lot left to be desired howbeit – sparse local resources and thin donor-funding imply difficult living-conditions for the migrants. Although the outflow of persons from the troubled regions has waned over the years, the insurgency has not abated sufficiently for residents to return to their homes, and so Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDP) Camps across Nigeria have, if anything, only ballooned in their population-sizes.

“We have nothing to do here”

A collateral problem has emerged: beyond the immediate needs of resettlement, food, healthcare and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) facilities for IDPs, the question of livelihoods has been largely ignored in the intervening humanitarian efforts so far. To put it in context – the vast majority of work-force-age IDPs are (previously-) rural-dwelling farmers with little education, or none at all. Resettling predominantly to urban areas, they are too poorly-skilled to integrate within the local economies of these new metropolitan environments. What is more, opportunities in Agriculture, where their capabilities lie, are sparse in these places. The resultant is their entire dependence on donor-aid for sustenance and survival.

“We have nothing to do here”, says Amos to me.

He and I are walking among the dingy homes in the camp now – some of the dwellings are built only with wood and old cement-bags. A glumness hangs in the air all around us – a palpable despondency of this habitat’s occupants that has materialized into the dullness and dirt that characterize it. I see a barely-clad toddler playing on the ground, by a puddle of water, his faced smudged with mud and mucus. I reach down to pick him up.

“Please don’t do that!” Amos says sharply.

I am puzzled, but I comply and withdraw my outstretched hands. My little would-have-been-acquaintance looks up at me with an expression of disappointment at this turn of events.

“We have had cases of kidnappings of little children here in the camp”, Amos explains.

“We are vulnerable here….we are migrants….this is not our home. People can take advantage; and they have done. From experience, parents here are very wary of strangers accosting their children. This little boy’s parents might misunderstand your intentions”.

I do not press the matter further.

We stop at what Amos informs me is a brothel. The walls are built with bamboo, as is the ‘fence’. There is a large open space outside for visitors to sit in, and await their turns as it were. Clusters of men are seated in that space, speaking very little and smoking marijuana and cigarettes.

“Men here have nothing to do….no work. They just sit around all day, smoke, drink Codeine and Tramadol, and look for sex – consensual or forced. They have stayed idle this way for so long at this point that I feel some of them don’t even want to have any meaningful jobs anymore”, says Amos.

This makes me realize the very distinct possibility that elements of post-traumatic stress disorder and even depression, borne out the horrific ordeals that most of these people have lived through, might reside in them, undiagnosed and untreated. Surely it is important to get them working again, but maybe that step is contingent on an appraisal of their psychological states, given their past and indeed, present situations. Another thing nags at me.

“If these young men have no jobs and income, where do they get the money from, for the drugs and prostitutes?” I ask Amos.

“I don’t know”, he responds. I find this worrisome.

As we leave the premises, I notice 3 of the ‘hostesses’ seated outside in that open, conversing. I am astounded at how young one of them looks to me to be.

“Allow us farm”

Next to the entrance of the camp, where there are makeshift administrative offices and a tiny nurse’s station, we run into Enoch, who is one of the directors at the camp. He is himself an internally displaced person. Enoch tells me of how different groups bring different types of aid to them routinely – mostly money, food, and such items as clothing and books. He and Amos take me to what was purposed as a skills-training centre, housed in a makeshift building. They tell me the centre had been gifted to them by the Embassy of South Africa in Nigeria, in their recognition that the IDPs need to be reskilled in order for them to function gainfully within the labour markets of their new homes. The centre, which at one time had vocations such as sewing, cosmetics-making and basic computing taught within its walls, was now derelict…..with old and damaged equipment strewn about.

“The South Africans started this with the hopes that after a while, aid-groups from Nigeria would carry on the work. That didn’t happen, and it all died out eventually”, Enoch tells me.

“We are at a severe economic disadvantage. We are mostly just uneducated farmers here. Without training in even the most basic trades and crafts, a lot of us really will not be able to ever make a sufficient living”.

“Allow us to farm”, he continues. “If we cannot receive training that will help us get jobs, then at the very least allow us to farm – that is what we know to do. Given our plight, we should be allowed farmland and any concessions that help us get back on our feet. It’s not that we don’t appreciate all the help so far, it’s only that we would be prefer to be assisted to become self-sufficient, and not just be assisted to eat day to day”.

As I leave the camp that evening, I realize that this paradigm-shift Enoch spoke of is an imperative. I realize that in our collective neglect – oblivion even – of the more sustainable manner of aid to IDPs, we may have just been giving room for the emergence of another dire set of problems. But surely it’s not too late.

In 2019 CSEA conducted livelihood assessments in Waru and Sabo Kuchinguro IDP Camps in Abuja FCT Nigeria, to ascertain best methods for training/re-skilling/equipping IDPs for economic independence.

Context: Nigeria has Africa’s largest population and economy, but Nigerians consume 144 kwh per capita annually, only 3.5% as much as South Africans.¹ With only 12 GW installed, and typically just one-third of that delivered, Nigerian power production falls far short of demand, which is a primary constraint on economic growth. Self-generation using dirty diesel generators is exceedingly common in Nigeria, and bear a significant economic and environmental cost.² But exactly how big is the demand-supply gap? And what does future demand look like?

How large is power demand in Nigeria?

Electricity demand estimates and projections for Nigeria suggest that demand is already substantial and increasing rapidly due to population and income growth.

• Nigeria is one of the most underpowered countries in the world, with actual consumption 80% below expectations based on current population and income levels.³
• Peer countries consume far more electricity per capita than Nigeria does currently. Ghana consumes over twice as much, Tunisia over ten times, and South Africa almost thirty times as much.
• Self-generation in Nigeria is extremely prevalent; nearly 14GW capacity exists in small scale diesel and petrol generators, and nearly half of all electricity consumed is self-generated. This implies a huge unserved demand.
• Due to a population boom and a large gap in electrification, the World Bank projects electricity demand will have grown by a factor of over 5 between 2009 and 2020, and 16.8 by 2035.⁴

Given this, we can assume that Nigeria’s demand gap is significant, though exactly how large is disputed. The significant differences in these estimates demonstrate the difficulty, and importance, of accurate demand forecasting.

The below estimates show large variance in projections for peak power demand mainly due to differences in scenario assumptions and existing infrastructure during study periods. Projecting power demand in Nigeria is challenging due to difficulty in estimating the large amount of electricity produced by small and unregulated petrol/diesel-powered generators, and in quantifying suppressed demand. Looking at available demand estimates for 2015 (Table 1), Nigeria’s on-grid electricity demand seems to be about 4 – 12 times the total electricity distributed on the grid (at 3200 MW, or 3.2 GW). Even at optimistic capacity factors and assumptions about deliverability, Nigeria needs well over 63GW of new generation to satisfy unmet demand.⁵ Until then, expensive and dirty self-generation will remain pervasive.

Endnotes

• World Bank (2019). Electric Power Consumption (kWh per capita). Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=NG
• IEA (2017), Energy Access Outlook: From Poverty to Prosperity, IEA.
• Todd Moss and Gailyn Portelance. “Do African Countries Consume Less (or More) Electricity than Their Income Levels Suggest?”
• R. Cervigni, J. Rogers, and M. Henrion (2018), Low Carbon development: Opportunities for Nigeria, The World Bank
• GIZ (2015), The Nigerian Energy Sector An Overview with a Special Emphasis on Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Rural Electrification. Nigerian Energy Support Programme (NESP)
• Olayande, J.S & Rogo, A.T. (2008), Electricity Demand and Supply Projections for Nigeria, Abuja: Energy Commission of Nigeria
• Sambo, A. S., 2008. Paper presented at the “National Workshop on the Participation of State Governments in the Power Sector: Matching Supply with Demand”, 29 July 2008, Ladi Kwali Hall, Sheraton Hotel and Towers, Abuja.
• O. Ezennaya, O. Isaac, U. Okolie, O. Ezeanyim (2014), Analysis Of Nigeria‘s National Electricity Demand Forecast (2013-2030), International Journal Of Scientific & Technology Research 3(3)

This article was first published on Energy for Growth Hub

In Nigeria, approximately 50% of the estimated 193 million population live in poverty. In 2018, the World Poverty clock estimates that Nigeria has the highest number of people living in extreme poverty. These trends point to the need to rethink and rejig the government’s approach to poverty alleviation.

In rethinking Nigeria’s current approach, there are important lessons that could be drawn from emerging economies like China. Between 1990 and 2015, China effectively lifted 745 million out of poverty. This contributed to about 70% of the global poverty reduction over the period and the achievement has been described as the most impressive economic miracle in development history. While the roles of market reform, trade openness and state-led development initiatives in this ‘economic miracle’ are well documented, the role of education in the broader poverty alleviation strategies has been less emphasized. A new book on Poverty Alleviation in China[1] is drawing attention to the role of education in Chinese development narrative and there are many important lessons for countries like Nigeria which is facing similar developmental challenges. In this piece, we highlight four key lessons for Nigeria in order to reduce poverty via education.

First, vocational education was given priority among other levels of education in China. The elevation of the status of vocational training allowed a wider demographic of individuals (young and old) to acquire the benefits of skill development in the short-run through a flexible program. The programs ensured that the skills supplied within these communities matched local demand in order to effectively impact their experience. It also reduced the level of rural to urban migration as the campaign provided local opportunities, developed human capital within the rural areas which consequently broadened their capability. Although Nigeria has set up vocational training programs both in the formal 6-3-3 education system, as well as state governments and civil societies facilitated programs, its impact is limited. This is because the program is not widespread, lacks permeability and the programs are not standardised in delivery. Similarly, the lack of an overarching initiative focused on skill acquisition in the Nigerian education system limits its impact on poverty alleviation and also exclude some demographic groups in the development process.

Second, education policy is considered as a subset of the grander economic policy, as such China’s education policy are jointly designed and implemented by the ministries of finance and education. The synergy between the finance and the educational ministry covers standardisation of education structures across various regions as well as teacher’s training and placement programme. The understanding that education policy is directly related to economic policy is one crucial area that presents an apparatus for policy design which Nigeria can learn from. For instance, the problem of out-of-school children in the Northern Nigeria, many scholars have observed that poverty and other economic fundamentals play a role in the problem[2]. However, policy interventions to address the problem have concentrated mainly on education sector driven solution like building more schools. Predictably, most of the educational interventions to out-of-school children issues in Nigeria have failed to deliver the expected outcome. Again, China’s approach to economic planning through mainstreaming poverty alleviation programs into the education policy could help Nigeria to simultaneously tackle the educational and economic challenges.

Third, China’s intervention in reaching disadvantaged communities and vulnerable groups that are not in school employed a good mix of free education and other incentives to encourage participation. The Chinese government provides region-specific subsidies for students within disadvantaged areas as well as loan schemes to encourage longer years of education in order to effectively improve their quality of life. There is an increasing recognition in the Nigerian context too that making education free does not automatically translate to more inclusion or increase enrolment, but that additional incentive is required to encourage more participation of the disadvantage groups. Also, constraints to schooling extend beyond costs and could be driven by cultural and behavioural factors. Responding to these non-cost elements require additional interventions even when education is free. The federal and state governments recent school feeding programme is an example of balance policy mix to improve inclusion. Going forward, it is crucial to expand the interventions to region-specific incentives to improve educational performance in Nigeria.   

Fourth, it is reassuring that China with outstretched government’s presence still recognizes and ensures robust community participation in its education management. Besides allowing for supplementary training and facilities by the private sector, government-own initiatives also use local role models and organizations to secure wider buy-in from the public.The organizations and individuals were involved in campaign and awareness programme regarding education reform. In the Nigerian system where implementing reform is difficult, more involvement of communities in education policy intervention will be vital and could help restrain vested interests and better communicate reform benefits to the public. This is because the local agents understand the region-specific idiosyncrasies and factors to ensure efficient implantation and implementation of policy. In pursuing poverty alleviation in Nigeria, education system could play a significant role beyond its traditional functions of socialization and capacity and knowledge development. Education can directly work to reduce poverty through promoting inclusiveness, strengthen community engagement and using vocational education as a springboard for development. The Chinese experience offers a template which has worked to lift more than three times the estimated Nigerian population out of poverty and fortunately it only requires looking inward and building broad base local partnership.

[1] Editorial board of Poverty alleviation in China ‘Poverty-Alleviation via Education in China’,(2018), First edition

[2] Lincove, J. (2009). Determinants of schooling for boys and girls in Nigeria under a policy of free primary education. Economics of Education Review, 28(4), pp.474-484.

The Future

Policy makers of about 13 countries including China (the largest car market in the world) and Japan (the third largest car market in the world) are pushing for a phase out of fossil fuel powered cars in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve urban air quality across board. In December 2019, the Swedish government set up a committee of inquiry to offer proposals on how to enforce a complete ban on the sales of fossil fuel powered cars in the country by 2040. This is coming after Europe’s biggest economy, Germany, through its Bundesrat federal council, agreed to ban fossil fuel powered cars by 2030 in 2016, the same year Norway made its landmark announcement of a proposed ban on fossil fuel cars by 2025 – with a suggestion to the European Union (EU) to also introduce a ban on fossil-fuel powered vehicles. With China as the world’s largest car market announcing to set a deadline for car makers to end sales of fossil fuel-powered cars, the threat of renewable energy powered vehicles to the global oil demand cannot be over emphasized.

The Threat to Nigeria’s Oil Economy

According to a study by the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, global policy makers are targeting the automobile sector as part of ambitious plans to meet international agreements to reduce gas emissions because of the probable scenario where full penetration of electric cars and other vehicles could take almost 25 million barrels per day of oil use out of the global oil market.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) also predicts that the overall demand for crude oil will plateau in 2030, due to a rise in the use and market demand for electric cars and other electric powered vehicles. In fact, according to global oil giant British Petroleum (BP), the growth of electric cars will also mitigate the growth in oil demand. BP also estimates that a 100 million increase in electric cars reduces oil demand growth by 1.2 million barrels per day.

These new developments and switch to alternative energy powered cars from the usual fossil fuel powered cars will no doubt have a massive impact on the global demand for oil, a looming problem for countries whose economies are heavily dependent on oil.

It is no longer news that Nigeria is a massively oil dependent nation. In fact, according to statistics from the National Bureau Statistics and the International Monetary Fund in 2019, 94 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings come from oil exports while 57 percent of Nigeria’s revenue comes from its oil exports. More damning are the projections from an Aurora Energy Research press report in 2018 of a dwindling of revenues for oil producing countries in the world by more than $20 billion between now and 2040 – furthermore, an analysis of the demand and supply effects of a ‘burnout scenario’ by the leading energy research and analytics firms predicts a fall in oil prices to $32 per barrel in 2040 (in today’s money).

With statistics like those from the aforementioned, it is imperative to note that a rise in the mass production of electric cars and any other alternatively fueled modes of transportation would adversely affect Nigeria’s fragile oil dependent economy.

Following the global economic trends, it is ominous that Nigeria has to brace up in its diversification drive or face an economic armada in the next three to five decades. Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), a consultancy, notes that forecasts from oil companies have a lot more electric vehicles in them than they did a few years ago. China, which accounted for roughly half the electric cars sold in 2019, wants to see 2 million electric and plug-in hybrid cars on its roads in 2020, and 35 million car sales by 2025. There is no doubt that recent global trends will push the acceptability for electric powered vehicles and change the global economic dynamics

Not All Gloom

Fossil fuel-powered vehicles will continue to be the norm for a few more decades to come in these parts (Africa) “mostly due to an uneven distribution of the ‘electric car manufacturing’ technology and for the fact many parts of the world are still energy poor”[1]. With this in mind, “the uneven distribution of the technology and enabling infrastructure for electric vehicles will lead to 'dumping' - this is when fossil fuel-powered cars and other vehicles will be exported in their numbers from developed to developing countries as they are phased out by electric cars”[2].

These arguments not only shift the attention from the impact of alternative powered vehicles on oil dependent economies but also the negative effects on developing countries that may potentially arise due to technology consumption inequality.

Conclusion

With a gradual increase in the global levels of alternative energy consumption, not only the global auto industry but many other vital sectors will look away from fossil fuels as the years go by, ensuring that oil dependent countries like Nigeria have a rethink.

The rethink in this case should heavily depend on structural changes that diversifies Nigeria’s oil based economy as a means to neutralize the impending drop in oil revenues – which is the predicted outcome of the projected global shift from fossil fueled cars to electric powered cars.

In conclusion, the rapid development of hybrid and electric cars represents a substitute to fossil fuel powered passenger cars, thus a threat, to the Nigerian fossil fuel industry – and its “oil economy”.

References

Ishaku, J. (2018). Episode 3; Season 1 [Recorded by MakeWeYarn]. Abuja, Nigeria .

Ishaku, J. (2019). Abuja.

[1] Joseph Ishaku, a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA Africa) and a development economist at an informal energy discourse explaining why the market dynamics in Africa as regards the auto industry will stay the same regardless of a global shift from fossil fuel powered vehicles to electric powered vehicles. (Ishaku, 2019)

[2] Joseph Ishaku, a research fellow at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA Africa) and a development economist on a podcast: “MakeWeYarn” (Ishaku, 2018)