In view of the long-standing debate between green growth and de-growth, this analysis throws light on the dimensions of future energy use growth and its implication for development and climate concerns, in the context of the developing world.

Latest energy demand projections show that a global energy transition is underway. Based on baseline projections by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), BP, Exxon Mobil and IEA, developing countries would have a larger share of energy use. This would be driven by changes in economic growth and structure, demography, and technological advancement. While these projection studies have varying model assumptions, they reach similar conclusions regarding energy use growth between developed and developing countries.

Specifically, projections indicate that global energy use is expected to rise by around one-third by 2040, most of which come from developing countries or non-member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (non-OECD). While energy demand slightly declines in OECD group (total: -0.3%) between 2017 and 2040, it is expected to rise significantly in non-OECD group (total: +56%) within the same period, with non-OECD Asia taking the lead. Thus, by 2040, developing countries will have around 67% of global energy use, up from 57% in 2017. China of course maintains the largest share of energy use. However, the fastest growth by far is expected to occur in India -- and to a lesser extent in Africa & other non-OECD Asia. But the slowest growth will occur in developing Europe & Eurasia, particularly, Russia.

Across sectors, industry will remain the largest contributor to overall growth in energy use for developing countries but will contribute twice as much as commercial, residential and transport sectors combined (figure 1). Strikingly, by 2040, the industrial sector of developing countries is also expected to contribute more energy than all the sectors of developed countries combined (figure 1). A key implication of the relative significance of industrial energy use is that, development efforts which narrowly targets household demand for energy may not be as effective in reducing energy poverty, improving human development, and controlling the climate impact of energy demand.

Data Source: EIA International Energy Outlook (2017)

Why developing countries will consume around 67% of the world's energy by 2040.

Rising energy use for the biggest users is expected to be driven by economic growth -measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), urbanization, and population growth. For India specifically, energy use growth will be mostly driven by expanding economic output --well above rates in China and the rest of the world. For Africa, energy use growth is expected to be mostly driven by fast growing population and urbanization –fastest rates globally (table 1).

However, for China, its current fast-growing energy use will begin to slow down around 2030s due to slower population growth and increasing transition away from energy-intensive industrial sectors towards less-energy intensive manufacturing and service sectors-- enabling it generate additional economic activity with lower energy use. This transition will be partly driven by stricter industrial standards in light of serious pollution concerns in China. This gives way for India, other developing Asia and Africa to pick up more heavy industrial production for global consumption by 2030s.

The slowest energy use growth for developing countries, however, is expected to come from developing Europe and Eurasia group, especially Russia, largely due to low population and economic growth as well as significant energy efficiency gains.

Energy intensity will decline, but not enough to stay on track with climate goals

These energy demand projections also show that while overall energy use increases, global energy intensity (amount of energy used per GDP) will continue to decline in the future --from around 1% p.a. (1950-2015) to around 2% p.a (2015-2040). The decline in energy intensity will be mostly driven by the decoupling of economic growth from energy demand –which is ongoing in many developed countries. This decoupling is reflected in slower economic and population growth as well as shifts in economic structures from lower-skilled manufacturing to higher-skilled advanced manufacturing or services. Interestingly, developing countries are expected to decouple by twice the rate of developed country grouping, on average, from around 2030s (figure 2). This would come mostly from China where environmental concerns and air pollution will force the Chinese government to promote better climate-sensitive industrial policies. Although decoupling occurs at a faster rate in the developing world, overall energy intensity remains high.

However, a 2% reduction in energy intensity is not enough to put the world on the path to meeting climate goals. For such reasons, some authors like Jacobson et al. (2017) suggest pathways for reducing energy use that reflect degrowth, while others propose improvements in energy efficiency as the best solution. But recent studies suggest that the latter may not be a viable long-term solution. Particularly, Fouquet & Person (2011) and Luke et al. (2014)  highlight that energy efficiency measures and technologies enable cost declines and expansion of services, which ultimately leads to higher energy use — known as the rebound effect. Therefore, they caution policymakers about depending heavily on efficiency-related emissions reduction as a climate mitigation strategy.

The key implication is that relevant actors in the international community, academia and government still need to think more carefully about other ways to reduce climate impact from energy use, beyond energy efficiency.

Data Sources: Calculated using data from EIA International Energy Outlook (2017); IEA World Energy Outlook (2018); and World Bank Population Estimates and Projections (2018)

Is degrowth, then, a viable alternative solution for limiting energy demand and its impact on our planet? No, due to its impact on development/poverty reduction goals

One of the central messages in these projections is that the level of future energy demand will be largely determined by how fast developing economies grow, and what type of activities make up their economic growth. Given climate change concerns, it seems passively implied that degrowth –limiting the pace of economic growth – could be a viable solution for reducing future energy use. This notion may also be underpinned in the low levels of energy access targets envisioned by many development institutions, like the United Nations (UN) as part of its global development objective – as Moss & Gleave (2013) and Caine, et al. (2014) suggests. However, limiting the use of energy – a resource so essential to human progress – is not an effective alternative, if the world is interested in achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), especially those on poverty and equitable access to energy (SDGs 1 and 7).

Despite energy demand growth, average energy use in many developing countries will remain below levels required for human development. The UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) suggests that increases in energy consumption up to around 100 gigajoule (GJ) per head are associated with substantial increases in human development and well-being, after which the relationship flattens out. However, many developing countries will not attain this level by 2040 (figure 3), despite fast growing energy use. Specifically, despite economic growth and prosperity of the Indian people, energy use per head increases only marginally by 2040. For Africa, its fast-growing population is expected to suppress the prosperity of its people, thus energy use per capita only rises by one unit to 20 GJ.

But interestingly, energy use per head in China (at 102 GJ) could meet UN standards for human development by 2040. Perhaps this would classify China as a developed country by 2040. It is important to note that, while China struggles environmental degradation due to the high energy use and pollution of its industries, China’s high energy use has also allowed for faster development, that will potentially transform it to a developed country by 2040. This case of China buttresses the environmental cost, yet value of high energy in driving development.

Data Sources: EIA International Energy Outlook (2017) and World Bank Population Estimates and Projections (2018)

Key Takeaways

Environmental and climatic concerns are vital variables for consideration, given its immediate and long-term impact for our world. However, limiting energy demand through degrowth, especially for developing countries, would be inappropriate -- given the need for energy to drive human development and poverty reduction. Therefore, we need to think of a lower carbon and higher energy planet, bearing in mind both climate and socio-economic development goals, especially for developing countries where high energy level is required to lift people out of poverty.

Drawing on my recent grounding in the Ecomodernist ideology at The Breakthrough Institute, Any progress at advancing the twin goal (climate and poverty reduction) will require both: advanced technological innovations and piecemeal incremental policy changes to guide household and especially industry behavior. It would require unusual and equitable energy policy decisions to decrease the climate impact of energy use without reducing consumption, especially for developing countries where high energy is much needed.

The global community and developed countries will need to work with fast developing countries to minimize the environmental footprint of their industries, without minimizing production. Policies that encourage investments in initiatives that reduce emissions from industries, without constraining output, should be prioritized over household energy demand that are often in the forefront of development efforts. Carbon capture and storage for steelmaking, as well as non-emitting ways to produce cement are some good examples.

Lastly, reducing the social and political barriers to a high and clean energy transition will require relevant stakeholders to continuously spread the message of hope and possibilities that will fuel government action and human ingenuity. As advocates of energy equity emphasize, “the way we use energy will become increasingly clean not by limiting consumption but by using expanded access to energy to unleash human ingenuity”.

Think tanks in China have drawn prominence in the global body of think tankers since the end of the Chinese closed-border policy era. By all accounts, the number of Chinese think tanks have risen to top any global lists of think tanks. As a research associate in a leading think tank in Nigeria, the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa(CSEA), I was recently invited by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) to participate in a three-week seminar to study the characteristics and national conditions of Chinese think tanks. In this note, I document a brief summary of my key observations from engaging with Chinese think tank experts.

The whole idea of this piece is to explore areas of shared features with African think tanks as well as suggested areas of improvements for both communities.

First, I observed that think tanks in China play critical roles in the engagement and education of policymakers, the media and the public on local and international policy issues as it affects China. This is not very different from the role played by think tanks globally and Africa in particular. The main aim of think tanks is to generate evidence-based policy-oriented analysis, research, and advice for policy decision-making institutions and agents. However, contrary to the high dominance of private and non-governmental think tanks in Africa, virtually all think tanks in China are affiliated with the government at different levels and scale by operating as government-owned, quasi-governmental or party affiliated. Only very few operate as private ventures and are financially autonomous and operationally independent.

The institutional structures of these think tanks are designed such that they form a critical part of the government. For example, the president of CASS has an important hierarchical authority as a cabinet member of the People’s Republic of China. One advantage of this model is that being a fundamental unit of the government, it is assured a stable source of internal funding. Although these funds might sometimes be inadequate, the periodicity allows for steady contribution to policy issues through continuous evidence-collection and research.

In Africa, most government-based think tanks were also established to address specific policy needs and motives. However, funding irregularity, insufficiency, unavailability and lack of sustainability have mostly hindered their ability to consistently stay true to their missions. Therefore, most think tanks in Africa, even government based, are greatly dependent on international funding.

Second, the embedded nature of most Chinese think tanks ensures synergy between them and government ministries/departments. Most think tanks are compartmentalised into departments and specialisations and sometimes into research institutes in order to address specific research needs related to these ministerial/departmental specialisations. This structure has further facilitated mutual interactions among research experts and policymakers. It has reinforced staff mobility practices between the two separate but intertwined entities – policy space and think tanks. In addition, it has served to cushion the reverse effects of the political institutionalisation of China with strict rules on retirement ages for government officials. By appointing retired senior civil servants as heads of think tanks, it facilitates the sustainable use of policy experts in the areas of research for policy making and evaluation – and contributes to developing an institutional memory about policymaking which the think tanks can maintain. Nonetheless, it is worthy of mention that within the operational context of China, this practice might have lent a great deal to the popular belief that think tanks in China are not independent. Interestingly, the intellectual independence of Chinese think tanks is strictly observed as research outcomes and contributions to policy discussions are strictly data-driven and evidence-based.  However, like every other ‘independent’ think tank, Chinese think tanks are guided by the conditions, ideologies and principles of their funders, in this case the government and the Party.

African think tanks could adopt the revolving door policy of Chinese think tanks as this could be a good strategy for ensuring and sustaining the inputs of policy-experts who are retired top government officials in the development and implementation of key policy research. Adopting this practice could also bring about mutual benefits for both think tanks and the policymaking space by (i) ensuring knowledge transfer and experience sharing between retiring policymakers and think tanks; (ii) offering policymakers a ‘retirement incentive’ which in some contexts may reduce the temptation and tendencies to be corrupt while in public service; (iii) increasing the relevance of think tanks and (iv) also serve as a good narrative when raising funds. Although, contrary to the popular practice in China of putting retiring public officials at the helm of affairs of think tanks, which would mean that think tanks being led by older individuals and mostly men, think tanks in Africa might incorporate them as senior fellows. In addition, intellectual independence and operational autonomy would further be enshrined by defining their work engagements and ensuring that research outcomes are strictly data driven and evidence based in attempting to contribute to policy issues.

Third, I observed that different pressures and influences shape the reactions across different levels of Chinese government to think tanks’ research outputs and policy suggestions. An important characteristic of most of these think tanks is their administrative network and personal ties, referred to in traditional Chinese as “Guanxi (关系)”. In many instances, research reports and policy suggestions are directly communicated to the relevant policy making agencies (popularly referred to as “Neibu” 内部). These close ties have facilitated the huge acceptance of research outputs of Chinese think tanks by the government and policy decision-makers. This is in addition to exposing them to potential research gaps within the policy space and the effective tracking of developments.

In Africa, some members of the public and government do not trust think tanks as they are often brandished as pro-government or working for the opposition. Building a strong network and trust with the policy space without compromising integrity, transparency, independence and research quality is a possibility and it can be achieved by building credibility. In addition, the practice of sharing research outcomes with first hand decision-making agents as it is the case in China might be a difficult task for African think tanks, as African states do not have control over the media, private sector, and the public, as well as how information flows and leaks within the various ministries and departments of government. However, engaging policy stakeholders throughout the research process would expose them to the likely outcomes and taking appropriate policy decisions where relevant and necessary.

In conclusion, while African think tanks are evolving and positioning for a sustainable future, it is imperative that they credibly build strong ties with policymakers to facilitate internal funding and acceptance. Achieving this should not in any way compromise their objectivity and best practice. However, they should accelerate engagement with experts within the policy space in order to facilitate their contributions to Africa’s development and prosperous future.

In 2003, Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme was launched to provide free and compulsory education from primary to junior secondary school. More than 15years since the inception of UBE, it remains curious that many cases of out-of-school children (OOSC) are still been attributed to monetary costs. For instance, the National Education Data Surveys (NEDS, 2015) indicate that 26% (23% public school and 49% private school) of children that stopped attending school in 2015 attributed it to monetary costs and this has consistently been the top reason for dropping out of school since 2004 (See Table 1). Similarly, Table 2 shows that 18% of children of school age not enrolled at all alluded it to monetary costs, which is the third highest reason after distance to school and labour needs of households. However, analysis of the reasons for exclusion as we did below suggests element of costs cut across most of these factors.

What are the Costs of Education?

From an economic angle, three types of costs are incurred in the process of schooling. First is the direct costs, such as expenses explicitly incurred on educational activities. These include tuition fees, feeding, uniform, transportation, books among others. Second, there are institutional costs that encompass recurrent costs (salaries, teaching aids, utilities, maintenance and repairs) and capital costs (land, buildings, furniture, equipment). The last category is the indirect costs, which is the opportunity costs of time spent by teachers and students in the process of schooling. The indirect costs is in principle, what would have been earned if not in school. It is, therefore, more relevant in evaluating decision on the cost-effectiveness of schooling.

In the private school setting, the direct and institutional costs are tied together and parents are expected to fully bear the costs. For public schools, how much government pays depends on the education policy in place. In Nigeria, the free education policy as stated in the UBE Acts (2004) only covers institutional costs plus tuition fees and to some extent, feeding and books. It, therefore, means that parents are expected to bear some costs despite education being claimed to be free. In simple terms, what is free under basic education in Nigeria is the costs incurred once a child reaches the door of the school.  It is also important to note that a rational economic agent will invest time or resources in schooling only when the perceived benefit is at least equal to the costs.

Institutional and Direct Costs: How they affect school access

Given that the government does not fully cover the direct costs, parents bear a proportion of the costs of education. Although contributions from parents are expected to be small, this can still present a significant burden depending on households’ income level. Some of the costs reportedly paid by pupils in public schools in Nigeria are shown in Table 3. On average, these costs added up to N25800. For poor households that live below N700 a day, these associated costs amount to a significant burden to sending their children to school. Essentially, the associated costs of education is the monetary cost that parents were alluding to for children dropping out or not attending school at all.

Further dissection of the costs paid in public schools in Nigeria reveals another dynamics at play. Government has not been sufficiently funding the institutional and direct costs components as promised in the UBE Act. Some of the reported expenses are for items supposedly cover under the free education programme. For example, school development levy, school supplies and to some extent textbook and exercise books are part of the institutional and indirect costs promised under the UBE Act. Invariably, school administrators are using various creative means to transfer the shortfall in government funding to parents.

Furthermore, poor funding could explain other reasons given for not attending or dropping out of school. For instance, 23% and 14% of those that dropped out and those enrolled in school respectively is due to poor school quality. An additional 14% and 13% of those that dropped out and those enrolled in school respectively are due to distance from school. The poor school quality and distance to school are emblematic of poor financing for institutional costs.

Indirect costs: How they affect school access?

When a child is sent to school, the household and society loss productive hours that could have been spent on adding to family income and invariably gross domestic product (GDP). However, the wage loss is counted as an investment since households and society benefited more in future through higher income and productive labour force.

However, all this rests on the assumption that households are well informed about the benefits of education. In many instances, this is not the case. The second top reason for children dropping out of school (15%) and for those not enrolling (21%) is due to the early transition to the labour market. According to UNESCO (2014), 24.7% of child labourers aged 7-14years in Nigeria are out of school.

The overall trend suggests that many families consider the indirect costs to be very high, and prefer early entrance into the labour market. For instance, the Nomadic group that accounts for almost half the population of the OOSC in Nigeria- It has been observed that children from this group enter early into the labour market to support family business as herdsmen. In essence, indirect costs is arguably the single largest contributor to OOSC problem in Nigeria.

In general, while there seems a multitude of reasons for OOSC problem, our analysis indicates majority of the factors still boil down to costs of education. If direct, institutional and indirect costs, are not sufficiently catered for, it will translate to more population of OOSC and a future demographic burden to the country.

Photo:UNICEF

North-eastern Nigeria, comprising of Borno, Taraba, Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe, and Bauchi states, has become the most uninhabitable region in the country due to series of Boko Haram attacks. Despite counterterrorism strategies of the Government, the Boko Haram insurgency has shown no signs of abating and have widened in its complexity. Additionally, clashes between nomadic Fulani herdsmen and farmers have been on the rise in the region and North-central Nigeria. As a result, millions have been displaced, killed, migrated and living in deplorable conditions. A lot of attention has been placed on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) – and rightly so – since they face the brunt of these violent attacks. However, very little attention has been paid to the efforts of and challenges facing humanitarian workers.  This piece delves into the challenges humanitarian workers face in conflict-affected parts of Northern Nigeria and provides key recommendations for addressing these challenges.

The Need for Humanitarian Assistance

The insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria has made many areas in the region listed as unsafe and high-risk zones. For instance,  Download File">eighty percent of Borno state is listed as high or very high-risk zones. Since the start of the Boko Haram conflict in 2009, over Download File">20,000 people have been killed, over Download File">4,000 have been abducted, and millions have been displaced. The 2018 International Organization of Migration (IOM) report estimates that nearly Download PDF">2 million persons are displaced and 7.7 million Download PDF">Nigerians are in need of humanitarian assistance and services in the region. Humanitarian services alongside relief items aids such as food, medical services, shelter, education, water, and sanitation are most needed in the region. Humanitarian workers operate in the front-line and are charged with the responsibility of saving the lives of IDPs, reducing their suffering, and facilitating the effective distribution of aid materials. In Nigeria, there are only 2, 000 indigenous and 500 international aid Download PDF">workers providing humanitarian services in worst-affected states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

Challenges Facing Humanitarian Workers

Increasing security risks: It is becoming increasingly dangerous to provide humanitarian assistance in Nigeria given the rise in the death of aid workers. Download File">Recorded deaths have increased from one aid worker (between 1997 and 2008) to thirteen aid workers (between 2009 and 2017). In a single Boko Haram attack in Download PDF">March 2018, three humanitarian workers were killed and three sustained injuries, which led to the evacuation of 40 aid workers and the temporary suspension of humanitarian deliveries in Rann, Borno State, after a raid on a camp housing 55,000 IDPs. There are cases of humanitarian workers being kidnapped for ransom. Due to poor security conditions, amid the lack of well-armed military Download File">personnel, humanitarian workers are often deterred from providing needed assistance in many conflict-affected parts of North East Nigeria. On account of security issues, three Local Government Areas (LGAs) have been identified as completely Download File">inaccessible , while 26 LGAs in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states are identified as partially accessible.

Insufficient Humanitarian Workers: The number of humanitarian workers in Nigeria is low when compared with the over 7.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Only 2,500 aid workers provide humanitarian services in the most-affected states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. The low supply of humanitarian workers means that available aid workers have an overwhelming workload. However, the reward for humanitarian assistance is not reciprocal to the effort and energy exerted by humanitarian workers who risk their lives in insecure regions of the country. A global survey carried out by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCFR) indicates that Download PDF">72 percent of its aid workers lack reciprocity between effort and potential rewards (effort-reward imbalance).

Inadequate Health Care: Due to the dearth of mental health facilities, humanitarian workers in Nigeria do not receive adequate care for their mental health. Generally, there is a considerable Download PDF">neglect of mental health issues in Nigeria and information about mental health is lacking, with only Download PDF">7 mental health facilities in the country. Yet, Download PDF">evidence suggests that humanitarian workers are at risk of mental health issues given the hazard associated with their line of work. Humanitarian workers relative to the general population are more likely to suffer from anxiety, depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), secondary traumatic stress, burnout, and alcohol misuse. This is due to exposure to traumatic events while administering humanitarian assistance amid contact with victims of conflict as well as an effort-reward imbalance. The exposure of humanitarian workers to traumatic events and neglect of mental issues in the country is a problem facing humanitarian workers in Nigeria.

Way forward

The government needs to do more to establish its presence in conflict-affected regions of North-Eastern Nigerian, in order to provide more support for displaced persons and humanitarian workers in the area. As such, we recommend:

Federal Government: The Federal Government particularly needs to improve its military presence. Download File">Over 50 percent of the security provided in displacement camps in the region are self-organized, signifying a lack of military presence. Humanitarian workers require military protection in the course of rendering assistance to reduce the life-threatening risks. Pending normalcy, the Federal Government should also increase its financial commitment and provide incentives for private funding. The Federal Government of Nigeria should increase humanitarian funding commitment in the region, beyond the Download File">0.8 percent of the needed fund it currently provides. This will help bridge the supply-demand gap in financial aids. The government should hence, increase the humanitarian aid in its budgetary allocation to be better equipped in responding to crisis and other disasters. Amid fiscal constraints, the government can also encourage private sector participation by providing incentives, such as short-term tax deductions, for the private sector to provide humanitarian assistance in affected areas. Also, there is a need to raise public awareness of the needs of displaced persons and the need for more aid workers.

State and Local Governments: States and local government are seen as first responders and immediate providers of assistance due to proximity. In order to reduce causalities, there is a need for state and local governments to respond quickly to crisis situations. To achieve this, local authorities should develop an effective information and communication sharing system between internal security agencies and displacement camps.

Role of Non-Governmental Organizations: The magnitude and duration of the crisis warranted the intervention of international and civil society organizations (CSOs). International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and local CSOs have provided various forms of humanitarian assistance over the years and are urged to continue to respond to call for emergency assistance in Nigeria. It is important for INGOs to collaborate with local partners in order to provide on-ground and security support as oppose to working in silos. INGOs also need to strengthen their institutional capacity by making preparation and debriefing mandatory for their staff who work in conflict areas. This is due to the exposure to violence and the associated mental risk facing aid workers. After debriefing aid workers should have access to good and affordable mental facilities to rehabilitate. Giving the link between effort-reward imbalance and mental health, INGOs and CSOs should pay humanitarian workers incommensurate with their invaluable assistance, so as to improve job satisfaction and reduce mental risk.

Regional Level: There is a need to promote regional cooperation and better coordination across borders. Governments, NGOs, and CSOs at the regional level should build a network among each other to share information and best practices, so as to learn from each other’s experiences and assist one another in capacity building. Regional institutions like AfDB, AU, ECOWAS can use their platforms to stress the importance of and challenges facing humanitarian workers.

The Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4) is very ambitious. It seeks to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education for children across the world by the year 2030. Achieving this target is particularly significant in Nigeria where the state of education is daunting. In 2017, the World Economic Forum ranked Nigeria 120th out of 136 countries with regards to the quality of primary education. Similarly, over 10 million Nigerian children of primary school age were not enrolled in school in 2019. This is the highest number of out-of-school children globally.

In Nigeria, certain groups are more affected by the education crisis than others. For example, children in rural areas are worse off than their counterparts in urban areas, those in the Northern region in comparison to those in the Southern part, and girls in relation to boys. The overall state of education and the inequalities stemming from education access have severe implications on living standards, access to jobs, and economic growth.

Despite the efforts of the government, the private sector, and international donors towards addressing the challenges facing education in Nigeria, key obstacles continue to hinder its implementation.

What is obstructing the implementation of SDG4 in Nigeria?

Perhaps the most significant challenge that stands in the way of achieving SDG4 in Nigeria is funding. Although the government plays a dominant role in financing the SDGs, public funds remain inadequate. They are not sufficient to support the implementation. An estimate by UNESCO in 2015 puts the financial requirement to achieve SDG4 in Nigeria at about USD 34 billion per annum between 2015 and 2030.

To put the figure into perspective, Nigeria’s total federal budget for 2018 is USD 29.9 billion, with education accounting for only 7% of this amount. Sub-national governments have even smaller resources at their disposal to fund their budgets. This implies that if public resources are solely relied upon for implementing quality education goals, then Nigeria already faces an annual financing gap of over USD 32 billion.

Another factor that hinders the proper implementation of the global agenda is the limited alignment of crucial aspects of SDG4 to existing national policies. SDG4 relates to education objectives set in the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), Nigeria’s medium-term development plan, and the Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act, which is the main legal framework for primary education. But there are essential omissions in the national policies particularly relating to education quality and learning needs of internally displaced children.

Data on enrollment and other indicators on the access to education and educational resources are available. However, gaps remain in gathering useful metrics that capture learning outcomes at a disaggregated level. This is needed to track SDG 4 successfully. Even in the limited cases where data is available, it lacks sufficient periodicity. That fact makes it less useful for well-timed tracking of progress on SDG4.

What is the next course of action?

Given the highlighted implementation challenges, more proactive measures are required to meet the ambitious target set under SDG 4. Through our findings at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA), within Southern Voice’s “State of the SDGs” project, we have come up with suggestions. We recommend the following interventions to:

The Nigerian Government

The crucial step in improving education financing is to ensure an increase in budgetary allocation to the sector. However, this will require a rise in domestic resource mobilization to expand fiscal space. It also means earmarking a significant proportion of the revenue accruing to the education sector. On the policy side, existing policies should be reviewed to integrate SDG4 into all national development plans. Its implementation should be institutionalized at state and local levels.

The Private Sector

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda highlights the importance of the private sector in the development agenda. Private sector partners should engage with the government to achieve SDG4. They can do so by internalising sustainable business practices and implementing more strategic corporate social responsibility programmes in education. The private sector is the primary source of innovation. It is therefore instrumental in bringing creative solutions and new technology to solve access and quality issues in education, particularly in hard-to-reach areas.

Investments from the private sector will also be vital in filling the funding gap. The growth of institutional investors in Nigeria, particularly pension funds and insurers, is mobilising capital that could be channelled to SDG4-related investment. Besides, public-private partnership initiatives de-risk investment in the social sector and ensure that private sector contribution is measured, not only in terms of profitability but also in terms of social impact. This will spur the private investment allocation to education.

The International Donor community

International donors are important actors in financing the global agenda given that domestic resources are inadequate in meeting the SDG financing needs. A large number of educationally disenfranchised children live in middle-income countries like Nigeria. That is why education programmes should be prioritised in the development assistance portfolio. It is also crucial to assist the government in capacity development to mobilize domestic resources. Donors can also provide a platform for developing countries to share, exchange and scale up development solutions.

With this multi-stakeholder approach and strategy, Nigeria will be better positioned to achieve SDG4 by 2030. This will contribute significantly to building an inclusive and sustainable society where every child has access to equitable and quality education.

About the SVSS project

The Southern Voice “State of the SDGs” initiative provides evidence-based analysis and recommendations to improve the delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As a collaborative initiative, the program compiles a broad range of perspectives that are usually missing from international debates. This report aims to fill an existing knowledge gap. Southern Voice is confident that it will enrich the discussions on the SDGs and level the playfield with new voices from the Global South.

This blog was first published on  SouthernVoice